From: Ilya Smith <blackzert@gmail.com>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
rth@twiddle.net, ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru, mattst88@gmail.com,
vgupta@synopsys.com, linux@armlinux.org.uk, tony.luck@intel.com,
fenghua.yu@intel.com, ralf@linux-mips.org, jejb@parisc-linux.org,
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au,
schwidefsky@de.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com,
ysato@users.sourceforge.jp, dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
x86@kernel.org, nyc@holomorphy.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
arnd@arndb.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
deepa.kernel@gmail.com, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
kstewart@linuxfoundation.org, pombredanne@nexb.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
steve.capper@arm.com, punit.agrawal@arm.
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap.
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 21:47:15 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <F9D157F8-F70F-45BC-B9E4-B5CB7CC419F4@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180327143820.GH5652@dhcp22.suse.cz>
> On 27 Mar 2018, at 17:38, Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> wrote:
>=20
> On Tue 27-03-18 16:51:08, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>=20
>>> On 27 Mar 2018, at 10:24, Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> On Mon 26-03-18 22:45:31, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>> On 26 Mar 2018, at 11:46, Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>> On Fri 23-03-18 20:55:49, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> On 23 Mar 2018, at 15:48, Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> =
wrote:
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 07:36:36PM +0300, Ilya Smith wrote:
>>>>>>>> Current implementation doesn't randomize address returned by =
mmap.
>>>>>>>> All the entropy ends with choosing mmap_base_addr at the =
process
>>>>>>>> creation. After that mmap build very predictable layout of =
address
>>>>>>>> space. It allows to bypass ASLR in many cases. This patch make
>>>>>>>> randomization of address on any mmap call.
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> Why should this be done in the kernel rather than libc? libc is =
perfectly
>>>>>>> capable of specifying random numbers in the first argument of =
mmap.
>>>>>> Well, there is following reasons:
>>>>>> 1. It should be done in any libc implementation, what is not =
possible IMO;
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Is this really so helpful?
>>>>=20
>>>> Yes, ASLR is one of very important mitigation techniques which are =
really used=20
>>>> to protect applications. If there is no ASLR, it is very easy to =
exploit=20
>>>> vulnerable application and compromise the system. We can=E2=80=99t =
just fix all the=20
>>>> vulnerabilities right now, thats why we have mitigations - =
techniques which are=20
>>>> makes exploitation more hard or impossible in some cases.
>>>>=20
>>>> Thats why it is helpful.
>>>=20
>>> I am not questioning ASLR in general. I am asking whether we really =
need
>>> per mmap ASLR in general. I can imagine that some environments want =
to
>>> pay the additional price and other side effects, but considering =
this
>>> can be achieved by libc, why to add more code to the kernel?
>>=20
>> I believe this is the only one right place for it. Adding these 200+ =
lines of=20
>> code we give this feature for any user - on desktop, on server, on =
IoT device,=20
>> on SCADA, etc. But if only glibc will implement =E2=80=98user-mode-aslr=
=E2=80=99 IoT and SCADA=20
>> devices will never get it.
>=20
> I guess it would really help if you could be more specific about the
> class of security issues this would help to mitigate. My first
> understanding was that we we need some randomization between program
> executable segments to reduce the attack space when a single address
> leaks and you know the segments layout (ordering). But why do we need
> _all_ mmaps to be randomized. Because that complicates the
> implementation consirably for different reasons you have mentioned
> earlier.
>=20
There are following reasons:
1) To protect layout if one region was leaked (as you said).=20
2) To protect against exploitation of Out-of-bounds vulnerabilities in =
some=20
cases (CWE-125 , CWE-787)
3) To protect against exploitation of Buffer Overflows in some cases =
(CWE-120)
4) To protect application in cases when attacker need to guess the =
address=20
(paper ASLR-NG by Hector Marco-Gisbert and Ismael Ripoll-Ripoll)
And may be more cases.
> Do you have any specific CVE that would be mitigated by this
> randomization approach?
> I am sorry, I am not a security expert to see all the cosequences but =
a
> vague - the more randomization the better - sounds rather weak to me.
It is hard to name concrete CVE number, sorry. Mitigations are made to =
prevent=20
exploitation but not to fix vulnerabilities. It means good mitigation =
will make=20
vulnerable application crash but not been compromised in most cases. =
This means=20
the better randomization, the less successful exploitation rate.
Thanks,
Ilya
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-28 18:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <1521736598-12812-1-git-send-email-blackzert@gmail.com>
[not found] ` <1521736598-12812-2-git-send-email-blackzert@gmail.com>
2018-03-22 20:53 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap Andrew Morton
2018-03-23 17:43 ` Ilya Smith
[not found] ` <1521736598-12812-3-git-send-email-blackzert@gmail.com>
2018-03-22 20:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] Architecture defined limit on memory region random shift Andrew Morton
2018-03-23 17:48 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 17:49 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-22 20:57 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] Randomization of address chosen by mmap Andrew Morton
2018-03-23 17:25 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 12:48 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 17:55 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-26 8:46 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-26 19:45 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 7:24 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-27 13:51 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 14:38 ` Michal Hocko
2018-03-28 18:47 ` Ilya Smith [this message]
2018-03-27 22:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-03-28 18:48 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-27 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-27 23:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-27 23:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-28 0:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Luck, Tony
2018-04-03 0:11 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-28 21:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-23 18:00 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:06 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:16 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-23 19:29 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-23 19:35 ` Rich Felker
2018-03-28 4:50 ` Rob Landley
2018-03-30 7:55 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 9:07 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 9:57 ` Pavel Machek
2018-03-30 11:10 ` Ilya Smith
2018-03-30 13:33 ` Rich Felker
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=F9D157F8-F70F-45BC-B9E4-B5CB7CC419F4@gmail.com \
--to=blackzert@gmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \
--cc=dalias@libc.org \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=deepa.kernel@gmail.com \
--cc=deller@gmx.de \
--cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=hughd@google.com \
--cc=ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru \
--cc=jejb@parisc-linux.org \
--cc=kstewart@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
--cc=mattst88@gmail.com \
--cc=mhocko@kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
--cc=nyc@holomorphy.com \
--cc=paulus@samba.org \
--cc=pombredanne@nexb.com \
--cc=punit.agrawal@arm. \
--cc=ralf@linux-mips.org \
--cc=rth@twiddle.net \
--cc=schwidefsky@de.ibm.com \
--cc=steve.capper@arm.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=vgupta@synopsys.com \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=ysato@users.sourceforge.jp \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox