From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1EA0A17F3 for ; Mon, 31 Oct 2022 07:03:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9351CC433C1; Mon, 31 Oct 2022 07:03:24 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1667199804; bh=mbhFij+caWlahXkS8fPxBRegIev2Lppr8kl3mhA76JY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=G++lkzlOwPD0uGv4ZGgTb7t38llD5mQiQw30RSFQadXBtnk/+DdV2y6wbbUV5JkiG Msyn5wJwyIPj5yZyr08l7eXsE6Dz88xQUyrJGwXvbog4XvH7PNfnqHiOwCG9SpnGWv BD2Dx170Regwgb2Ftkb1sKx/4C/WMQfRkom9MSlg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Josh Poimboeuf , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Borislav Petkov , Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo , Suraj Jitindar Singh Subject: [PATCH 4.14 25/34] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2022 08:02:58 +0100 Message-Id: <20221031070140.704516418@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.1 In-Reply-To: <20221031070140.108124105@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20221031070140.108124105@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Josh Poimboeuf commit fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf upstream. On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from __vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks. Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately after the vmexit. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo [ bp: Adjust for the fact that vmexit is in inline assembly ] Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided. */ -static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) +static __always_inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE unsigned long loops; @@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force); extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void); --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -185,6 +185,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) #endif } +/* + * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path. + * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead. + */ void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -9770,10 +9770,31 @@ static void vmx_arm_hv_timer(struct kvm_ vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, delta_tsc); } +u64 __always_inline vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + u64 guestval, hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 0; + + guestval = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); + + /* + * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value. + */ + if (guestval != hostval) + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval); + + barrier_nospec(); + + return guestval; +} + static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); unsigned long debugctlmsr, cr3, cr4; + u64 spec_ctrl; /* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */ if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && @@ -9967,6 +9988,23 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc , "eax", "ebx", "edi", "esi" #endif ); + /* + * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before + * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit! + * + * For retpoline, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB entries + * and (in some cases) RSB underflow. + * + * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't + * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled + * before the first unbalanced RET. + * + * So no RETs before vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() below. + */ + vmexit_fill_RSB(); + + /* Save this for below */ + spec_ctrl = vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx); vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx); @@ -9986,12 +10024,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc * save it. */ if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) - vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - - x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); - - /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ - vmexit_fill_RSB(); + vmx->spec_ctrl = spec_ctrl; /* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */ if (debugctlmsr)