[PATCH 4.19 10/34] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter

[Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>

commit 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 upstream.

Add the "retbleed=<value>" boot parameter to select a mitigation for
RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret"
(JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto".

Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on
AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on
Intel).

  [peterz: rebase; add hygon]
  [jpoimboe: cleanups]

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: this effectively remove the UNRET mitigation as an option, so it
 has to be complemented by a later pick of the same commit later. This is
 done in order to pick retbleed_select_mitigation]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |   12 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      |   74 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4132,6 +4132,18 @@
 
 	retain_initrd	[RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction
 
+	retbleed=	[X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary
+			Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions)
+			vulnerability.
+
+			off         - unconditionally disable
+			auto        - automatically select a migitation
+
+			Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run
+			time according to the CPU.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto.
+
 	rfkill.default_state=
 		0	"airplane mode".  All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm,
 			etc. communication is blocked by default.
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include "cpu.h"
 
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -111,6 +112,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 
 	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
 	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
+	retbleed_select_mitigation();
+	/*
+	 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+	 * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
+	 * forced for UNRET.
+	 */
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
@@ -706,6 +713,71 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(c
 early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "RETBleed: " fmt
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation {
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
+};
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
+	RETBLEED_CMD_OFF,
+	RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO,
+};
+
+const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
+};
+
+static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
+static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
+	RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+
+static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "auto"))
+		retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+	else
+		pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
+
+#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
+
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+		return;
+
+	switch (retbleed_cmd) {
+	case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF:
+		return;
+
+	case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
+	default:
+		if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED))
+			break;
+
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (retbleed_mitigation) {
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
@@ -1901,7 +1973,7 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu
 
 static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
 {
-	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
 }
 
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,