From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 580001775C for ; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 11:29:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D0079C433C8; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 11:29:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1691580564; bh=kUdY39Vvl+59gv1C/dT/69binvhxB0iX9AyhSAiRqyk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=xDcS22keQx7KumDx2NLujEFcOqyf+44wJ+lVjjEWQkLTdctAH38+xc1fvGVftOXXK ycZBmzu3ufwTpv9u8GFhvCp2BJHcs9BLLZxz+CNmODUp2wccjbf6LUfYahKefroxAs NRaHHWgdd+1kMhGNtTmeifMraPuDy8rSip3oDQVo= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Kees Cook Subject: [PATCH 5.4 069/154] Documentation: security-bugs.rst: update preferences when dealing with the linux-distros group Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2023 12:41:40 +0200 Message-ID: <20230809103639.275443743@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.41.0 In-Reply-To: <20230809103636.887175326@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20230809103636.887175326@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Greg Kroah-Hartman commit 4fee0915e649bd0cea56dece6d96f8f4643df33c upstream. Because the linux-distros group forces reporters to release information about reported bugs, and they impose arbitrary deadlines in having those bugs fixed despite not actually being kernel developers, the kernel security team recommends not interacting with them at all as this just causes confusion and the early-release of reported security problems. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2023063020-throat-pantyhose-f110@gregkh Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst | 24 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst @@ -56,20 +56,18 @@ information submitted to the security li of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been lifted, in perpetuity. -Coordination ------------- +Coordination with other groups +------------------------------ -Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege -escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private - mailing list so that distribution vendors -are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the -upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and -will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update -publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate, -the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can -include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix -the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki: - +The kernel security team strongly recommends that reporters of potential +security issues NEVER contact the "linux-distros" mailing list until +AFTER discussing it with the kernel security team. Do not Cc: both +lists at once. You may contact the linux-distros mailing list after a +fix has been agreed on and you fully understand the requirements that +doing so will impose on you and the kernel community. + +The different lists have different goals and the linux-distros rules do +not contribute to actually fixing any potential security problems. CVE assignment --------------