From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev, Srikanth Aithal <sraithal@amd.com>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH 6.1 10/15] x86/retpoline: Dont clobber RFLAGS during srso_safe_ret()
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 16:15:06 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230824141447.659017387@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230824141447.155846739@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
commit ba5ca5e5e6a1d55923e88b4a83da452166f5560e upstream.
Use LEA instead of ADD when adjusting %rsp in srso_safe_ret{,_alias}()
so as to avoid clobbering flags. Drop one of the INT3 instructions to
account for the LEA consuming one more byte than the ADD.
KVM's emulator makes indirect calls into a jump table of sorts, where
the destination of each call is a small blob of code that performs fast
emulation by executing the target instruction with fixed operands.
E.g. to emulate ADC, fastop() invokes adcb_al_dl():
adcb_al_dl:
<+0>: adc %dl,%al
<+2>: jmp <__x86_return_thunk>
A major motivation for doing fast emulation is to leverage the CPU to
handle consumption and manipulation of arithmetic flags, i.e. RFLAGS is
both an input and output to the target of the call. fastop() collects
the RFLAGS result by pushing RFLAGS onto the stack and popping them back
into a variable (held in %rdi in this case):
asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n"
<+71>: mov 0xc0(%r8),%rdx
<+78>: mov 0x100(%r8),%rcx
<+85>: push %rdi
<+86>: popf
<+87>: call *%rsi
<+89>: nop
<+90>: nop
<+91>: nop
<+92>: pushf
<+93>: pop %rdi
and then propagating the arithmetic flags into the vCPU's emulator state:
ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK);
<+64>: and $0xfffffffffffff72a,%r9
<+94>: and $0x8d5,%edi
<+109>: or %rdi,%r9
<+122>: mov %r9,0x10(%r8)
The failures can be most easily reproduced by running the "emulator"
test in KVM-Unit-Tests.
If you're feeling a bit of deja vu, see commit b63f20a778c8
("x86/retpoline: Don't clobber RFLAGS during CALL_NOSPEC on i386").
In addition, this breaks booting of clang-compiled guest on
a gcc-compiled host where the host contains the %rsp-modifying SRSO
mitigations.
[ bp: Massage commit message, extend, remove addresses. ]
Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/de474347-122d-54cd-eabf-9dcc95ab9eae@amd.com
Reported-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal@amd.com>
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20230810013334.GA5354@dev-arch.thelio-3990X/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811155255.250835-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(srso_alias_untrain_ret)
#endif
SYM_START(srso_alias_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
- add $8, %_ASM_SP
+ lea 8(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_SP
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
ret
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ __EXPORT_THUNK(retbleed_untrain_ret)
* SRSO untraining sequence for Zen1/2, similar to retbleed_untrain_ret()
* above. On kernel entry, srso_untrain_ret() is executed which is a
*
- * movabs $0xccccccc308c48348,%rax
+ * movabs $0xccccc30824648d48,%rax
*
* and when the return thunk executes the inner label srso_safe_ret()
* later, it is a stack manipulation and a RET which is mispredicted and
@@ -232,11 +232,10 @@ SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL
* the stack.
*/
SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
- add $8, %_ASM_SP
+ lea 8(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_SP
ret
int3
int3
- int3
/* end of movabs */
lfence
call srso_safe_ret
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-24 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-24 14:14 [PATCH 6.1 00/15] 6.1.48-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 01/15] x86/cpu: Fix __x86_return_thunk symbol type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 02/15] x86/cpu: Fix up srso_safe_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 03/15] x86/alternative: Make custom return thunk unconditional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 04/15] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 05/15] x86/cpu: Rename original retbleed methods Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 06/15] x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 07/15] x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 08/15] x86/srso: Explain the untraining sequences a bit more Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 09/15] x86/static_call: Fix __static_call_fixup() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 11/15] x86/CPU/AMD: Fix the DIV(0) initial fix attempt Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 12/15] x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 13/15] x86/retpoline,kprobes: Fix position of thunk sections with CONFIG_LTO_CLANG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 14/15] objtool/x86: Fixup frame-pointer vs rethunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 15/15] x86/srso: Correct the mitigation status when SMT is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 21:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 00/15] 6.1.48-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2023-08-25 3:05 ` Florian Fainelli
2023-08-25 1:30 ` SeongJae Park
2023-08-25 2:40 ` Joel Fernandes
2023-08-25 7:05 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 7:15 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25 7:45 ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-25 8:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-25 8:48 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 16:29 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25 9:33 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 9:26 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
2023-08-26 8:45 ` Salvatore Bonaccorso
2023-08-25 9:40 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 10:15 ` Jon Hunter
2023-08-25 12:16 ` Conor Dooley
2023-08-25 12:33 ` Takeshi Ogasawara
2023-08-25 15:40 ` Guenter Roeck
2023-08-25 18:12 ` Shuah Khan
2023-08-26 1:23 ` Bagas Sanjaya
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