From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH 6.1 15/15] x86/srso: Correct the mitigation status when SMT is disabled
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2023 16:15:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230824141447.863010001@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230824141447.155846739@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
commit 6405b72e8d17bd1875a56ae52d23ec3cd51b9d66 upstream.
Specify how is SRSO mitigated when SMT is disabled. Also, correct the
SMT check for that.
Fixes: e9fbc47b818b ("x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations")
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814200813.p5czl47zssuej7nv@treble
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2398,8 +2398,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigatio
* Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
* IBPB microcode has been applied.
*/
- if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) &&
- (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED))) {
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
return;
}
@@ -2689,7 +2688,7 @@ static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf)
{
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
- return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: SMT disabled\n");
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n",
srso_strings[srso_mitigation],
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-24 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-24 14:14 [PATCH 6.1 00/15] 6.1.48-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 01/15] x86/cpu: Fix __x86_return_thunk symbol type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 02/15] x86/cpu: Fix up srso_safe_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:14 ` [PATCH 6.1 03/15] x86/alternative: Make custom return thunk unconditional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 04/15] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 05/15] x86/cpu: Rename original retbleed methods Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 06/15] x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 07/15] x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 08/15] x86/srso: Explain the untraining sequences a bit more Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 09/15] x86/static_call: Fix __static_call_fixup() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 10/15] x86/retpoline: Dont clobber RFLAGS during srso_safe_ret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 11/15] x86/CPU/AMD: Fix the DIV(0) initial fix attempt Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 12/15] x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 13/15] x86/retpoline,kprobes: Fix position of thunk sections with CONFIG_LTO_CLANG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` [PATCH 6.1 14/15] objtool/x86: Fixup frame-pointer vs rethunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-24 14:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2023-08-24 21:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 00/15] 6.1.48-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2023-08-25 3:05 ` Florian Fainelli
2023-08-25 1:30 ` SeongJae Park
2023-08-25 2:40 ` Joel Fernandes
2023-08-25 7:05 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 7:15 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25 7:45 ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-25 8:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-08-25 8:48 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 16:29 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2023-08-25 9:33 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 9:26 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
2023-08-26 8:45 ` Salvatore Bonaccorso
2023-08-25 9:40 ` Naresh Kamboju
2023-08-25 10:15 ` Jon Hunter
2023-08-25 12:16 ` Conor Dooley
2023-08-25 12:33 ` Takeshi Ogasawara
2023-08-25 15:40 ` Guenter Roeck
2023-08-25 18:12 ` Shuah Khan
2023-08-26 1:23 ` Bagas Sanjaya
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