From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DE6B115E84 for ; Mon, 23 Oct 2023 11:29:59 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="EoGo6y8C" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5B300C433C7; Mon, 23 Oct 2023 11:29:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1698060599; bh=SA24MIPuwVcSz/U2Cf24E6+TvY/bdIJ3qMWJuMDud7w=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=EoGo6y8Cr3l8D40ERlFee6XrKWWUyZrA2dKX3yC952eOwv4fdWPy7+itZDaYWv6Hj eUTpJSmzLvysk31059AncpFv1W6Waw9it3DEZquCuqwH573j/T/jmEYoZjmrWY3DLL dTWmjaFAM5gsN7Q2DwiLcI+QnnVEyTeVEx6YUWXY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Jordan Rife , Ilya Dryomov Subject: [PATCH 5.4 029/123] libceph: use kernel_connect() Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2023 12:56:27 +0200 Message-ID: <20231023104818.717888287@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.42.0 In-Reply-To: <20231023104817.691299567@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20231023104817.691299567@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jordan Rife commit 7563cf17dce0a875ba3d872acdc63a78ea344019 upstream. Direct calls to ops->connect() can overwrite the address parameter when used in conjunction with BPF SOCK_ADDR hooks. Recent changes to kernel_connect() ensure that callers are insulated from such side effects. This patch wraps the direct call to ops->connect() with kernel_connect() to prevent unexpected changes to the address passed to ceph_tcp_connect(). This change was originally part of a larger patch targeting the net tree addressing all instances of unprotected calls to ops->connect() throughout the kernel, but this change was split up into several patches targeting various trees. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230821100007.559638-1-jrife@google.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9944248dba1bce861375fcce9de663934d933ba9.camel@redhat.com/ Fixes: d74bad4e74ee ("bpf: Hooks for sys_connect") Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ceph/messenger.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ static int ceph_tcp_connect(struct ceph_ dout("connect %s\n", ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr)); con_sock_state_connecting(con); - ret = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss), - O_NONBLOCK); + ret = kernel_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss), + O_NONBLOCK); if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { dout("connect %s EINPROGRESS sk_state = %u\n", ceph_pr_addr(&con->peer_addr),