From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 994BE78B61; Tue, 27 Feb 2024 14:17:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709043423; cv=none; b=R+VjySH3LeNny38kJCc2LNlrzKs0st1nYlIULYKBuVuiJf6REI/oxmHGQf/hCeo10BRe9AXXMTeOJIsKhQxpmIfcEHBUVawfneFho+BwHbnFCsn8PBBAgYElbdH+ptpOIRXt2x6QoxVbQVPzb5DdMxseZfoZRbVX0KSJWtbdsVo= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709043423; c=relaxed/simple; bh=D6KjqZOOjaUVW6vL0f5mS27fniWlqx2hiXgBxflsBfQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=lEBXWh/LcElU6is1G5HsBD9yM3n1iLIbs5xCBigKph2mpelVfqIurwpY5SHYDxfAePKsbUnN/i/Ym3tTYvB3Hr317vKal26YCWfwlqVHBtN+UUn4aXX4ex4PJQdY3jRe4st+HekVBKG6Vm+ijFtcJBp6j832ElHG3XQsToGRztI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=iwAHvuBU; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="iwAHvuBU" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 25EF8C433F1; Tue, 27 Feb 2024 14:17:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1709043423; bh=D6KjqZOOjaUVW6vL0f5mS27fniWlqx2hiXgBxflsBfQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=iwAHvuBUbZnhUwc0SpbGek5J7WS10eh+LiiXxK0L8Ff2QZ//3gx2+ovyIkDpGhRsX tpMhT5OGaAKFLkl5H9z5EMF5fnXK9kJgVwBX1cttAyadCDbLD6xq2nRII4zJzbyBLR 4QxpvK/jhQNKHkghMRdLp4BJpP76/+enfJQmtfFA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Masahiro Yamada , Huacai Chen , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1 074/195] LoongArch: Select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP to use the common SECCOMP menu Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 14:25:35 +0100 Message-ID: <20240227131612.940561541@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240227131610.391465389@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20240227131610.391465389@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Masahiro Yamada [ Upstream commit 6b79ecd084c99b31c8b4d0beda08893716d5558e ] LoongArch missed the refactoring made by commit 282a181b1a0d ("seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig") because LoongArch was not mainlined at that time. The 'depends on PROC_FS' statement is stale as described in that commit. Select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP, and remove the duplicated config entry. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 18 +----------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig index b1b4396dbac6c..fa3171f563274 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ config LOONGARCH select GPIOLIB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE @@ -462,23 +463,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START specified in the "crashkernel=YM@XM" command line boot parameter passed to the panic-ed kernel). -config SECCOMP - bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" - depends on PROC_FS - default y - help - This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications - that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their - execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to - the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write - syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in - their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is - enabled via /proc//seccomp, it cannot be disabled - and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls - defined by each seccomp mode. - - If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. - endmenu config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL -- 2.43.0