From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F1C9F7868F; Mon, 4 Mar 2024 21:53:53 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709589234; cv=none; b=pu/deD0jGXAIp9zHAxdC2T+X5rEFNB8ar+o9gxQ7Hqfu3BdVm1sYc5aHDbJDh2uTM4e3+PMc0ufK2EC0fRiu6sltcUcEH0Uml2zNWSs3mKFx5Vw+iGlvpl7WptFHeyYoP5gpXBKRCQENEhLfeJsWLNy8D/fT+pP7SNALye4u+A8= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709589234; c=relaxed/simple; bh=H4ZYKjFL3qGGS4Z75Nt2WLaiqaBYkLIUnhbLQfq4+Vk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=sXD4sPuosB2KXCj8/QK3Ij8/wtgLOiLbPjTRdQOrUeHi7CUn6iVR/ZNwuIENGGP28HRjnlq0W69Y8kAnYTA0A+id+AJSf2J/K2vFXj5Jyy05hLeVsLvNpGX4mHZxDD/ITS30v8W8Ll052JBk8FDBwpFZv27U27O8CJZDxGLbhlE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=LR8oyGBK; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="LR8oyGBK" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 38577C433F1; Mon, 4 Mar 2024 21:53:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1709589233; bh=H4ZYKjFL3qGGS4Z75Nt2WLaiqaBYkLIUnhbLQfq4+Vk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=LR8oyGBKnCRAEldj2VO1Xufxvv1wUgwbRdXWI58l2buuaKFd9onwzE5lrzb4zW6OM QIqq1y/REiEHWXyNFZTYj/t3kNx26iFZT1gQygwZyYvxVjFKnUVPNtB3JM0w1zy5l5 nWgwTHzF9s59fOH9xBk67p/CLw4TBulc4iLhRaiM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Jakub Kicinski , "David S. Miller" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.15 31/84] tls: hw: rx: use return value of tls_device_decrypted() to carry status Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 21:24:04 +0000 Message-ID: <20240304211543.367960693@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240304211542.332206551@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20240304211542.332206551@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jakub Kicinski [ Upstream commit 71471ca32505afa7c3f7f6a8268716e1ddb81cd4 ] Instead of tls_device poking into internals of the message return 1 from tls_device_decrypted() if the device handled the decryption. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Stable-dep-of: f7fa16d49837 ("tls: decrement decrypt_pending if no async completion will be called") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tls/tls_device.c | 7 ++----- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c index f23d18e666284..e7c361807590d 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_device.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c @@ -936,7 +936,6 @@ int tls_device_decrypted(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx, struct sk_buff *skb, struct strp_msg *rxm) { struct tls_offload_context_rx *ctx = tls_offload_ctx_rx(tls_ctx); - struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb); int is_decrypted = skb->decrypted; int is_encrypted = !is_decrypted; struct sk_buff *skb_iter; @@ -951,11 +950,9 @@ int tls_device_decrypted(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx, tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, rxm->full_len, is_encrypted, is_decrypted); - tlm->decrypted |= is_decrypted; - if (unlikely(test_bit(TLS_RX_DEV_DEGRADED, &tls_ctx->flags))) { if (likely(is_encrypted || is_decrypted)) - return 0; + return is_decrypted; /* After tls_device_down disables the offload, the next SKB will * likely have initial fragments decrypted, and final ones not @@ -970,7 +967,7 @@ int tls_device_decrypted(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx, */ if (is_decrypted) { ctx->resync_nh_reset = 1; - return 0; + return is_decrypted; } if (is_encrypted) { tls_device_core_ctrl_rx_resync(tls_ctx, ctx, sk, skb); diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 7da17dd7c38b9..eed32ef3ca4a0 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -1571,9 +1571,8 @@ static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, tls_ctx, skb, rxm); if (err < 0) return err; - - /* skip SW decryption if NIC handled it already */ - if (tlm->decrypted) { + if (err > 0) { + tlm->decrypted = 1; *zc = false; goto decrypt_done; } -- 2.43.0