From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev, Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com>
Subject: [PATCH 6.1 83/96] bpf: Allow reads from uninit stack
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 17:32:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240716152749.708287113@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240716152746.516194097@linuxfoundation.org>
6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
commit 6715df8d5d24655b9fd368e904028112b54c7de1 upstream.
This commits updates the following functions to allow reads from
uninitialized stack locations when env->allow_uninit_stack option is
enabled:
- check_stack_read_fixed_off()
- check_stack_range_initialized(), called from:
- check_stack_read_var_off()
- check_helper_mem_access()
Such change allows to relax logic in stacksafe() to treat STACK_MISC
and STACK_INVALID in a same way and make the following stack slot
configurations equivalent:
| Cached state | Current state |
| stack slot | stack slot |
|------------------+------------------|
| STACK_INVALID or | STACK_INVALID or |
| STACK_MISC | STACK_SPILL or |
| | STACK_MISC or |
| | STACK_ZERO or |
| | STACK_DYNPTR |
This leads to significant verification speed gains (see below).
The idea was suggested by Andrii Nakryiko [1] and initial patch was
created by Alexei Starovoitov [2].
Currently the env->allow_uninit_stack is allowed for programs loaded
by users with CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities.
A number of test cases from verifier/*.c were expecting uninitialized
stack access to be an error. These test cases were updated to execute
in unprivileged mode (thus preserving the tests).
The test progs/test_global_func10.c expected "invalid indirect read
from stack" error message because of the access to uninitialized
memory region. This error is no longer possible in privileged mode.
The test is updated to provoke an error "invalid indirect access to
stack" because of access to invalid stack address (such error is not
verified by progs/test_global_func*.c series of tests).
The following tests had to be removed because these can't be made
unprivileged:
- verifier/sock.c:
- "sk_storage_get(map, skb->sk, &stack_value, 1): partially init
stack_value"
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS programs are not executed in unprivileged mode.
- verifier/var_off.c:
- "indirect variable-offset stack access, max_off+size > max_initialized"
- "indirect variable-offset stack access, uninitialized"
These tests verify that access to uninitialized stack values is
detected when stack offset is not a constant. However, variable
stack access is prohibited in unprivileged mode, thus these tests
are no longer valid.
* * *
Here is veristat log comparing this patch with current master on a
set of selftest binaries listed in tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.cfg
and cilium BPF binaries (see [3]):
$ ./veristat -e file,prog,states -C -f 'states_pct<-30' master.log current.log
File Program States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
-------------------------- -------------------------- ---------- ---------- ----------------
bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv6_from_host 349 244 -105 (-30.09%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1320 895 -425 (-32.20%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1320 895 -425 (-32.20%)
bpf_sock.o cil_sock4_connect 70 48 -22 (-31.43%)
bpf_sock.o cil_sock4_sendmsg 68 46 -22 (-32.35%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1554 803 -751 (-48.33%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv4 6457 2473 -3984 (-61.70%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv6 7249 3908 -3341 (-46.09%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 287 145 -142 (-49.48%)
strobemeta.bpf.o on_event 15915 4772 -11143 (-70.02%)
strobemeta_nounroll2.bpf.o on_event 17087 3820 -13267 (-77.64%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc 21271 6635 -14636 (-68.81%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp 23122 6024 -17098 (-73.95%)
-------------------------- -------------------------- ---------- ---------- ----------------
Note: I limited selection by states_pct<-30%.
Inspection of differences in pyperf600_bpf_loop behavior shows that
the following patch for the test removes almost all differences:
- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf.h
+ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf.h
@ -266,8 +266,8 @ int __on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args *ctx)
}
if (event->pthread_match || !pidData->use_tls) {
- void* frame_ptr;
- FrameData frame;
+ void* frame_ptr = 0;
+ FrameData frame = {};
Symbol sym = {};
int cur_cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id();
W/o this patch the difference comes from the following pattern
(for different variables):
static bool get_frame_data(... FrameData *frame ...)
{
...
bpf_probe_read_user(&frame->f_code, ...);
if (!frame->f_code)
return false;
...
bpf_probe_read_user(&frame->co_name, ...);
if (frame->co_name)
...;
}
int __on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args *ctx)
{
FrameData frame;
...
get_frame_data(... &frame ...) // indirectly via a bpf_loop & callback
...
}
SEC("raw_tracepoint/kfree_skb")
int on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args* ctx)
{
...
ret |= __on_event(ctx);
ret |= __on_event(ctx);
...
}
With regards to value `frame->co_name` the following is important:
- Because of the conditional `if (!frame->f_code)` each call to
__on_event() produces two states, one with `frame->co_name` marked
as STACK_MISC, another with it as is (and marked STACK_INVALID on a
first call).
- The call to bpf_probe_read_user() does not mark stack slots
corresponding to `&frame->co_name` as REG_LIVE_WRITTEN but it marks
these slots as BPF_MISC, this happens because of the following loop
in the check_helper_call():
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
if (err)
return err;
}
Note the size of the write, it is a one byte write for each byte
touched by a helper. The BPF_B write does not lead to write marks
for the target stack slot.
- Which means that w/o this patch when second __on_event() call is
verified `if (frame->co_name)` will propagate read marks first to a
stack slot with STACK_MISC marks and second to a stack slot with
STACK_INVALID marks and these states would be considered different.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzY3e+ZuC6HUa8dCiUovQRg2SzEk7M-dSkqNZyn=xEmnPA@mail.gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQKs2i1iuZ5SUGuJtxWVfGYR9kDgYKhq3rNV+kBLQCu7rA@mail.gmail.com/
[3] git@github.com:anakryiko/cilium.git
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230219200427.606541-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 11 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func10.c | 9
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 13 -
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c | 104 +++++++----
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c | 9
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c | 13 -
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c | 27 --
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spill_fill.c | 7
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c | 52 -----
9 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 136 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3599,6 +3599,8 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(st
continue;
if (type == STACK_MISC)
continue;
+ if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)
+ continue;
verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, size);
return -EACCES;
@@ -3636,6 +3638,8 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(st
continue;
if (type == STACK_ZERO)
continue;
+ if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)
+ continue;
verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, size);
return -EACCES;
@@ -5426,7 +5430,8 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized
stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];
if (*stype == STACK_MISC)
goto mark;
- if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) {
+ if ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) ||
+ (*stype == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) {
if (clobber) {
/* helper can write anything into the stack */
*stype = STACK_MISC;
@@ -11967,6 +11972,10 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifie
if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID)
continue;
+ if (env->allow_uninit_stack &&
+ old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC)
+ continue;
+
/* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack
* and these slots were used
*/
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func10.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func10.c
@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
struct Small {
- int x;
+ long x;
};
struct Big {
- int x;
- int y;
+ long x;
+ long y;
};
__noinline int foo(const struct Big *big)
@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ __noinline int foo(const struct Big *big
}
SEC("cgroup_skb/ingress")
-int test_cls(struct __sk_buff *skb)
+__failure __msg("invalid indirect access to stack")
+int global_func10(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct Small small = {.x = skb->len };
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c
@@ -2221,19 +2221,22 @@
* that fp-8 stack slot was unused in the fall-through
* branch and will accept the program incorrectly
*/
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, 2, 2),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, 2, 2),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .fixup_map_hash_48b = { 6 },
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -8+0 size 8",
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP,
+ .fixup_map_hash_48b = { 7 },
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -8+0 size 8",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+ .result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"calls: ctx read at start of subprog",
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c
@@ -29,19 +29,30 @@
{
"helper access to variable memory: stack, bitwise AND, zero included",
.insns = {
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 64),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel),
+ /* set max stack size */
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -128, 0),
+ /* set r3 to a random value */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0),
+ /* use bitwise AND to limit r3 range to [0, 64] */
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 64),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ /* Call bpf_ringbuf_output(), it is one of a few helper functions with
+ * ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO parameter allowed in unpriv mode.
+ * For unpriv this should signal an error, because memory at &fp[-64] is
+ * not initialized.
+ */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R1 off -64+0 size 64",
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ .fixup_map_ringbuf = { 4 },
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -64+0 size 64",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+ .result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"helper access to variable memory: stack, bitwise AND + JMP, wrong max",
@@ -183,20 +194,31 @@
{
"helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, no min check",
.insns = {
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 3),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel),
+ /* set max stack size */
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -128, 0),
+ /* set r3 to a random value */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0),
+ /* use JMP to limit r3 range to [0, 64] */
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3, 64, 6),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ /* Call bpf_ringbuf_output(), it is one of a few helper functions with
+ * ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO parameter allowed in unpriv mode.
+ * For unpriv this should signal an error, because memory at &fp[-64] is
+ * not initialized.
+ */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R1 off -64+0 size 64",
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ .fixup_map_ringbuf = { 4 },
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -64+0 size 64",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+ .result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP (signed), no min check",
@@ -564,29 +586,41 @@
{
"helper access to variable memory: 8 bytes leak",
.insns = {
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ /* set max stack size */
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -128, 0),
+ /* set r3 to a random value */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -64),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -64),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -56),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -48),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -40),
+ /* Note: fp[-32] left uninitialized */
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -24),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -16),
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 63),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, -16),
+ /* Limit r3 range to [1, 64] */
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 63),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ /* Call bpf_ringbuf_output(), it is one of a few helper functions with
+ * ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO parameter allowed in unpriv mode.
+ * For unpriv this should signal an error, because memory region [1, 64]
+ * at &fp[-64] is not fully initialized.
+ */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R1 off -64+32 size 64",
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ .fixup_map_ringbuf = { 3 },
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -64+32 size 64",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+ .result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"helper access to variable memory: 8 bytes no leak (init memory)",
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c
@@ -54,12 +54,13 @@
/* bpf_strtoul() */
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_strtoul),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL,
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R4 off -16+4 size 8",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R4 off -16+4 size 8",
+ /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+ .result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"ARG_PTR_TO_LONG misaligned",
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c
@@ -128,9 +128,10 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
- .errstr = "invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8",
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+ .result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"precision tracking for u32 spill/fill",
@@ -258,6 +259,8 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ,
- .errstr = "invalid read from stack off -8+1 size 8",
- .result = REJECT,
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -8+1 size 8",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+ .result = ACCEPT,
},
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c
@@ -531,33 +531,6 @@
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
- "sk_storage_get(map, skb->sk, &stack_value, 1): partially init stack_value",
- .insns = {
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
- BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -8),
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock),
- BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 1),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, -8),
- BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0),
- BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .fixup_sk_storage_map = { 14 },
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
- .result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack",
-},
-{
"bpf_map_lookup_elem(smap, &key)",
.insns = {
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, 0),
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spill_fill.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spill_fill.c
@@ -171,9 +171,10 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
- .result = REJECT,
- .errstr = "invalid read from stack off -4+0 size 4",
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -4+0 size 4",
+ /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
+ .result = ACCEPT,
},
{
"Spill a u32 const scalar. Refill as u16. Offset to skb->data",
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c
@@ -213,31 +213,6 @@
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
},
{
- "indirect variable-offset stack access, max_off+size > max_initialized",
- .insns = {
- /* Fill only the second from top 8 bytes of the stack. */
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -16, 0),
- /* Get an unknown value. */
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0),
- /* Make it small and 4-byte aligned. */
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 4),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_2, 16),
- /* Add it to fp. We now have either fp-12 or fp-16, but we don't know
- * which. fp-12 size 8 is partially uninitialized stack.
- */
- BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
- /* Dereference it indirectly. */
- BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 5 },
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 var_off",
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
-},
-{
"indirect variable-offset stack access, min_off < min_initialized",
.insns = {
/* Fill only the top 8 bytes of the stack. */
@@ -290,33 +265,6 @@
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB,
},
{
- "indirect variable-offset stack access, uninitialized",
- .insns = {
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 6),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 28),
- /* Fill the top 16 bytes of the stack. */
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -16, 0),
- BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
- /* Get an unknown value. */
- BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_1, 0),
- /* Make it small and 4-byte aligned. */
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_4, 4),
- BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_4, 16),
- /* Add it to fp. We now have either fp-12 or fp-16, we don't know
- * which, but either way it points to initialized stack.
- */
- BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 8),
- /* Dereference it indirectly. */
- BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_getsockopt),
- BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
- BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
- },
- .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R4 var_off",
- .result = REJECT,
- .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS,
-},
-{
"indirect variable-offset stack access, ok",
.insns = {
/* Fill the top 16 bytes of the stack. */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-16 15:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-07-16 15:31 [PATCH 6.1 00/96] 6.1.100-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 01/96] mm: prevent derefencing NULL ptr in pfn_section_valid() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 02/96] cachefiles: propagate errors from vfs_getxattr() to avoid infinite loop Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 03/96] cachefiles: narrow the scope of triggering EPOLLIN events in ondemand mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 04/96] cachefiles: stop sending new request when dropping object Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 05/96] cachefiles: cancel all requests for the object that is being dropped Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 06/96] cachefiles: wait for ondemand_object_worker to finish when dropping object Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 07/96] cachefiles: cyclic allocation of msg_id to avoid reuse Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 08/96] cachefiles: add missing lock protection when polling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 09/96] filelock: fix potential use-after-free in posix_lock_inode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 10/96] fs/dcache: Re-use value stored to dentry->d_flags instead of re-reading Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 11/96] vfs: dont mod negative dentry count when on shrinker list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 12/96] tcp: fix incorrect undo caused by DSACK of TLP retransmit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 13/96] net: phy: microchip: lan87xx: reinit PHY after cable test Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 14/96] skmsg: Skip zero length skb in sk_msg_recvmsg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 15/96] octeontx2-af: Fix incorrect value output on error path in rvu_check_rsrc_availability() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 16/96] net: fix rc7s __skb_datagram_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 17/96] i40e: Fix XDP program unloading while removing the driver Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 18/96] net: ethernet: lantiq_etop: fix double free in detach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 19/96] bpf: Refactor some inode/task/sk storage functions for reuse Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 20/96] bpf: Reduce smap->elem_size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 21/96] bpf: use bpf_map_kvcalloc in bpf_local_storage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 22/96] bpf: Remove __bpf_local_storage_map_alloc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 23/96] bpf: fix order of args in call to bpf_map_kvcalloc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 24/96] net: ethernet: mtk-star-emac: set mac_managed_pm when probing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 25/96] ppp: reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed packets Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 26/96] ethtool: netlink: do not return SQI value if link is down Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 27/96] udp: Set SOCK_RCU_FREE earlier in udp_lib_get_port() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 28/96] net/sched: Fix UAF when resolving a clash Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 29/96] net, sunrpc: Remap EPERM in case of connection failure in xs_tcp_setup_socket Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 30/96] s390: Mark psw in __load_psw_mask() as __unitialized Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 31/96] firmware: cs_dsp: Fix overflow checking of wmfw header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 32/96] firmware: cs_dsp: Return error if block header overflows file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 33/96] firmware: cs_dsp: Validate payload length before processing block Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 34/96] firmware: cs_dsp: Prevent buffer overrun when processing V2 alg headers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 35/96] firmware: cs_dsp: Use strnlen() on name fields in V1 wmfw files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 36/96] ARM: davinci: Convert comma to semicolon Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 37/96] octeontx2-af: replace cpt slot with lf id on reg write Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 38/96] octeontx2-af: update cpt lf alloc mailbox Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 39/96] octeontx2-af: fix a issue with cpt_lf_alloc mailbox Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 40/96] octeontx2-af: fix detection of IP layer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 41/96] octeontx2-af: extend RSS supported offload types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 42/96] octeontx2-af: fix issue with IPv6 ext match for RSS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 43/96] octeontx2-af: fix issue with IPv4 " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 44/96] cifs: fix setting SecurityFlags to true Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 45/96] Revert "sched/fair: Make sure to try to detach at least one movable task" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 46/96] tcp: use signed arithmetic in tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 47/96] tcp: avoid too many retransmit packets Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:31 ` [PATCH 6.1 48/96] net: ks8851: Fix deadlock with the SPI chip variant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 49/96] net: ks8851: Fix potential TX stall after interface reopen Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 50/96] USB: serial: option: add Telit generic core-dump composition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 51/96] USB: serial: option: add Telit FN912 rmnet compositions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 52/96] USB: serial: option: add Fibocom FM350-GL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 53/96] USB: serial: option: add support for Foxconn T99W651 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 54/96] USB: serial: option: add Netprisma LCUK54 series modules Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 55/96] USB: serial: option: add Rolling RW350-GL variants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 56/96] USB: serial: mos7840: fix crash on resume Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 57/96] USB: Add USB_QUIRK_NO_SET_INTF quirk for START BP-850k Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 58/96] usb: gadget: configfs: Prevent OOB read/write in usb_string_copy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 59/96] USB: core: Fix duplicate endpoint bug by clearing reserved bits in the descriptor Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 60/96] hpet: Support 32-bit userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 61/96] xhci: always resume roothubs if xHC was reset during resume Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 62/96] ksmbd: discard write access to the directory open Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 63/96] nvmem: rmem: Fix return value of rmem_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 64/96] nvmem: meson-efuse: Fix return value of nvmem callbacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 65/96] nvmem: core: only change name to fram for current attribute Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 66/96] platform/x86: toshiba_acpi: Fix array out-of-bounds access Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 67/96] ALSA: hda/realtek: add quirk for Clevo V5[46]0TU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 68/96] ALSA: hda/realtek: Enable Mute LED on HP 250 G7 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 69/96] ALSA: hda/realtek: Limit mic boost on VAIO PRO PX Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 70/96] Fix userfaultfd_api to return EINVAL as expected Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 71/96] libceph: fix race between delayed_work() and ceph_monc_stop() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 72/96] ACPI: processor_idle: Fix invalid comparison with insertion sort for latency Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 73/96] wireguard: selftests: use acpi=off instead of -no-acpi for recent QEMU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 74/96] wireguard: allowedips: avoid unaligned 64-bit memory accesses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 75/96] wireguard: queueing: annotate intentional data race in cpu round robin Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 76/96] wireguard: send: annotate intentional data race in checking empty queue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 77/96] misc: fastrpc: Fix DSP capabilities request Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 78/96] misc: fastrpc: Avoid updating PD type for capability request Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 79/96] misc: fastrpc: Copy the complete capability structure to user Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 80/96] x86/retpoline: Move a NOENDBR annotation to the SRSO dummy return thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 81/96] cifs: use origin fullpath for automounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 82/96] cifs: avoid dup prefix path in dfs_get_automount_devname() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 84/96] nilfs2: fix kernel bug on rename operation of broken directory Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 85/96] sched: Move psi_account_irqtime() out of update_rq_clock_task() hotpath Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 86/96] i2c: rcar: bring hardware to known state when probing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 87/96] i2c: mark HostNotify target address as used Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 88/96] i2c: rcar: reset controller is mandatory for Gen3+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 89/96] i2c: rcar: introduce Gen4 devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 90/96] i2c: rcar: ensure Gen3+ reset does not disturb local targets Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 91/96] i2c: testunit: avoid re-issued work after read message Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 92/96] i2c: rcar: clear NO_RXDMA flag after resetting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 93/96] x86/entry/64: Remove obsolete comment on tracing vs. SYSRET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 94/96] x86/bhi: Avoid warning in #DB handler due to BHI mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 95/96] kbuild: Make ld-version.sh more robust against version string changes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 15:32 ` [PATCH 6.1 96/96] i2c: rcar: fix error code in probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-16 18:38 ` [PATCH 6.1 00/96] 6.1.100-rc1 review SeongJae Park
2024-07-16 18:42 ` Florian Fainelli
2024-07-16 19:01 ` Pavel Machek
2024-07-16 20:29 ` Naresh Kamboju
2024-07-17 6:24 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-17 15:51 ` Shuah Khan
2024-07-17 16:57 ` Allen
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