From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 805AF1DDC24; Tue, 8 Oct 2024 12:13:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1728389598; cv=none; b=SLYSNLXLiZWe18l8qPOpR0pqn1WE2vklQP1rGoKki00Nj7Z9Ej9Tqd1q6ucwqB+N4ITfzlClgXw9P/6xOf12HcVaVtzd0fvR8x7bsG1VsoYa5XAYO5LeKPyk2zGQ/NVeQz9fj3dgPOG2y6ZudU3umJZ1iNrQet7LKH3GIkdQ8Os= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1728389598; c=relaxed/simple; bh=q+FKGaJpwQYNEbOzJXha4VcsqNUWEMLaOwtiG1oK0Wk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=MuEQtsYJaz2kSkZB8aF9fY1nWDxtaJVn40cpYnxhltXsgAllvpfZIrSTqjG3uWyM/1IzE/p5zadUkM46AOcjMYpzDc1CAUEhoNtSal9Ou+M+OjIDg/7IO51EHkmH5Zb4AUo662pWLZ6aTBjvsxVzgLybPdoEWNCwv9ZoTsu0S4s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=vkNWNLZQ; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="vkNWNLZQ" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AC768C4CECC; Tue, 8 Oct 2024 12:13:17 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1728389598; bh=q+FKGaJpwQYNEbOzJXha4VcsqNUWEMLaOwtiG1oK0Wk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=vkNWNLZQLl4KzCaI1ouIA6/rS2dFkK1wAojI/mt9ktQ5GxA1Vk+7Sxn8xPMHcqr9y xROHSqb0MFTj7qENvn1ooteT8a0CvNJXygbEUhLIGMnfRyH2o/inN169J1Ab38iFOa 1iid617aSwoWslnbQuuQgo2BO7UsDnZy9t7+Q0L4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Eric Dumazet , Willem de Bruijn , David Ahern , Paolo Abeni , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.10 040/482] net: add more sanity checks to qdisc_pkt_len_init() Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 14:01:43 +0200 Message-ID: <20241008115649.881695157@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.2 In-Reply-To: <20241008115648.280954295@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20241008115648.280954295@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric Dumazet [ Upstream commit ab9a9a9e9647392a19e7a885b08000e89c86b535 ] One path takes care of SKB_GSO_DODGY, assuming skb->len is bigger than hdr_len. virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() does not fully dissect TCP headers, it only make sure it is at least 20 bytes. It is possible for an user to provide a malicious 'GSO' packet, total length of 80 bytes. - 20 bytes of IPv4 header - 60 bytes TCP header - a small gso_size like 8 virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() would declare this packet as a normal GSO packet, because it would see 40 bytes of payload, bigger than gso_size. We need to make detect this case to not underflow qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len. Fixes: 1def9238d4aa ("net_sched: more precise pkt_len computation") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Reviewed-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/core/dev.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 62ec4bf8bcd88..d716a046eaf97 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -3756,10 +3756,14 @@ static void qdisc_pkt_len_init(struct sk_buff *skb) hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr); } - if (shinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY) - gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len, - shinfo->gso_size); + if (unlikely(shinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY)) { + int payload = skb->len - hdr_len; + /* Malicious packet. */ + if (payload <= 0) + return; + gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(payload, shinfo->gso_size); + } qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len; } } -- 2.43.0