From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D68D21DE8A9; Tue, 8 Oct 2024 12:18:50 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1728389930; cv=none; b=OwiSfRbfjLd9Dj8GxRrhQKvttZmmPeFg7qczbTPLjBLD5w/RmHHqbQ755RFQDdGTUgeU2oj2BuPsvoLwb1e+UBFJuz4LWXVQGqCGwwVwSeuPEEI+Iq37zQbouDn9L0k9hmb+NBTpyMh/kbwiWbUCyviscU0GQ7h815+t2Flw78o= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1728389930; c=relaxed/simple; bh=89AAJqf3JKKvt7bEWvBlvminwqPuKAONPU4BaeltjLo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=leybKpUUo6MbK+YfRPGrZXHfI2F7r6XlAYKLYK+CI85Pb+9TFhBPMfT4s2hEEEHvM2K2fc7/PaT0VzwB+CYtF5VNmI6Z3cAkI/Yp4cO89QG5XP52bufdjcIUUdSrQq6Sx90VhAO0+KXw+Q+KGhvJkwRshCgkXXTMorJefPiCVl0= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=ENyJ0raq; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="ENyJ0raq" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 49F80C4CEC7; Tue, 8 Oct 2024 12:18:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1728389930; bh=89AAJqf3JKKvt7bEWvBlvminwqPuKAONPU4BaeltjLo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ENyJ0raqrA245A9l3f7M1wEWrJZB4qBfEwf2chvLLGC+3Ti6aaYFhRnjqKqfXFiyC VaItCGPq9KloAunMLh2483i1cKvWlTXPBZiHNoF67p3KbmSMt0GFytdjvlh2MPici9 ekqlc0rlyeRto6WMDTVpXV9M/ftrwf7OeCmTZw/E= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Al Grant , James Clark , Will Deacon , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.10 122/482] drivers/perf: arm_spe: Use perf_allow_kernel() for permissions Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 14:03:05 +0200 Message-ID: <20241008115653.107122779@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.2 In-Reply-To: <20241008115648.280954295@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20241008115648.280954295@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: James Clark [ Upstream commit 5e9629d0ae977d6f6916d7e519724804e95f0b07 ] Use perf_allow_kernel() for 'pa_enable' (physical addresses), 'pct_enable' (physical timestamps) and context IDs. This means that perf_event_paranoid is now taken into account and LSM hooks can be used, which is more consistent with other perf_event_open calls. For example PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR uses perf_allow_kernel() rather than just perfmon_capable(). This also indirectly fixes the following error message which is misleading because perf_event_paranoid is not taken into account by perfmon_capable(): $ perf record -e arm_spe/pa_enable/ Error: Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting ... Suggested-by: Al Grant Signed-off-by: James Clark Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827145113.1224604-1-james.clark@linaro.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240807120039.GD37996@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/ Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 9 ++++----- include/linux/perf_event.h | 8 +------- kernel/events/core.c | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c index 9100d82bfabc0..3569050f9cf37 100644 --- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ /* * Cache if the event is allowed to trace Context information. - * This allows us to perform the check, i.e, perfmon_capable(), + * This allows us to perform the check, i.e, perf_allow_kernel(), * in the context of the event owner, once, during the event_init(). */ #define SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX 0x00001 @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static_assert((PERF_EVENT_FLAG_ARCH & SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX) == SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_C static void set_spe_event_has_cx(struct perf_event *event) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable()) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && !perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr)) event->hw.flags |= SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX; } @@ -745,9 +745,8 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) set_spe_event_has_cx(event); reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event); - if (!perfmon_capable() && - (reg & (PMSCR_EL1_PA | PMSCR_EL1_PCT))) - return -EACCES; + if (reg & (PMSCR_EL1_PA | PMSCR_EL1_PCT)) + return perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr); return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h index 393fb13733b02..a7f1a3a4d1dce 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h @@ -1608,13 +1608,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void) return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1; } -static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) -{ - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable()) - return -EACCES; - - return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); -} +int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr); static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 36191add55c37..081d9692ce747 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -13362,6 +13362,15 @@ const struct perf_event_attr *perf_event_attrs(struct perf_event *event) return &event->attr; } +int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) +{ + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable()) + return -EACCES; + + return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_allow_kernel); + /* * Inherit an event from parent task to child task. * -- 2.43.0