From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 83CEE1EF941; Wed, 6 Nov 2024 13:13:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730898799; cv=none; b=V5n/y9fVEB4iDZcSBXbx6HYE/Q9fcmGe0viWAo2gusBZXjiFj6r6hHkm3pMV2yZ+SZUGlCaReizn0sh3EdyEUTFxPjUEvC8CCaO6HQMnUd/vIQCKsc84tCNdI91lIIFht0HWzNEjclaVfEA4MaAsqFd7SFqPtjVVGLAtynyTyow= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730898799; c=relaxed/simple; bh=71jrIEHRXuvAOqqWxRPDlmwb3MF9OGofd96iX0ko924=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=QJIf6efJbq4W70mrmlrK0iW6ufc81H3d9wmydvyOK5nK79Ad/C4eQU4ai4qNkaeSNaRP6uyfQ78wlL1FmxX43ZdHetAIWG+RHdbO13YUgN2Qwl2BKU2uGKUviam9sDm3+G+SbyywVrspX2b21VjnxIlGCT2+B+Nt0TlV2dj/WnI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=NEV82oYf; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="NEV82oYf" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CA9AEC4CECD; Wed, 6 Nov 2024 13:13:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1730898799; bh=71jrIEHRXuvAOqqWxRPDlmwb3MF9OGofd96iX0ko924=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=NEV82oYf1layjNPYPgOuBJl16bQjKB/dJ73PMjc12HEEQnbu1odBCCbPhWAJ5vF32 mGguX6R7tf5JOS/itoJNIE1F9MYWqHkI4zwY3srMoqeczqZnf6ZdOoHasXPHHpohHS wj8YL9p8GjJFHEfA3uF6t9vpArF2ArEdeN25SHG4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Dan Carpenter , Johannes Berg , Sasha Levin , Sherry Yang Subject: [PATCH 5.4 360/462] wifi: mac80211: fix potential key use-after-free Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 13:04:13 +0100 Message-ID: <20241106120340.422328766@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.0 In-Reply-To: <20241106120331.497003148@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20241106120331.497003148@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Johannes Berg commit 31db78a4923ef5e2008f2eed321811ca79e7f71b upstream. When ieee80211_key_link() is called by ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() but returns 0 due to KRACK protection (identical key reinstall), ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() will still return a pointer into the key, in a potential use-after-free. This normally doesn't happen since it's only called by iwlwifi in case of WoWLAN rekey offload which has its own KRACK protection, but still better to fix, do that by returning an error code and converting that to success on the cfg80211 boundary only, leaving the error for bad callers of ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(). Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin [ Sherry: bp to fix CVE-2023-52530, resolved minor conflicts in net/mac80211/cfg.c because of context change due to missing commit 23a5f0af6ff4 ("wifi: mac80211: remove cipher scheme support") ccdde7c74ffd ("wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling")] Signed-off-by: Sherry Yang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/cfg.c | 3 +++ net/mac80211/key.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c +++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c @@ -491,6 +491,9 @@ static int ieee80211_add_key(struct wiph sta->cipher_scheme = cs; err = ieee80211_key_link(key, sdata, sta); + /* KRACK protection, shouldn't happen but just silently accept key */ + if (err == -EALREADY) + err = 0; out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&local->sta_mtx); --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_ */ if (ieee80211_key_identical(sdata, old_key, key)) { ieee80211_key_free_unused(key); - ret = 0; + ret = -EALREADY; goto out; }