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From: Pratyush Yadav <ptyadav@amazon.de>
To: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	<patches@lists.linux.dev>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Bin Lan <bin.lan.cn@windriver.com>,
	Pratyush Yadav <ptyadav@amazon.de>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 19:10:54 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250210191056.58787-1-ptyadav@amazon.de> (raw)

From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com>

commit ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 upstream.

The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which
doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for
RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX,
bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.

So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the
remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it
potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by
SELinux.

The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via
AIO and can be found in [1].

The PoC:

$ cat > test.c

int main(void) {
	size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
	int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0);
	const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0);
	unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff);
	syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old);
	syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0);
	syscall(SYS_personality, old);
	// show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced
	int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY);
	unsigned char buf2[1024];
	while (1) {
		int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024);
		if (ret <= 0) break;
		write(1, buf2, ret);
	}
	close(fd);
}

$ gcc test.c -o test
$ ./test | grep rwx
7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted)

Link: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/42452389 [1]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Yadav <ptyadav@amazon.de>
---
 mm/mmap.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 9f76625a1743..2c17eb840e44 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -3078,8 +3078,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
 	}
 
 	file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
+	ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_fput;
 	ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
 			prot, flags, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
+out_fput:
 	fput(file);
 out:
 	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
-- 
2.47.1


             reply	other threads:[~2025-02-10 19:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-10 19:10 Pratyush Yadav [this message]
2025-02-19  8:12 ` [PATCH 5.10] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-02-19 10:54   ` Pratyush Yadav

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