From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 32489221DA7; Tue, 29 Apr 2025 17:50:40 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1745949040; cv=none; b=UxFCgr2BZCrHLFO/XYa3Kwv7dgOr1ohnAiI3My3FrLX1ykJdxcrgzJ1I5G+5i8JPlqco5qbRCmnYxf7swo/NKWob1uqezGWTobz6jeu9nihem5HGvPt/FpMLpo/bkgvmnXoI17TvdXbVOQ3sdenQQGWt3tKZjsZJpCIKujM2d2w= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1745949040; c=relaxed/simple; bh=iO6cmXFLPsS9tGgoSP53rbAlnrAXDiCWdYavI5cQm4s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=oLVECzkfxNfbTs7aUiuYdS1S/KGo8PLUoR/wxlBRS7O4nBhzKREs1cbRL0CLXxAXCNLDe85fw+m1KlCx8gEGF4JGkQanuvHu9VGEQQ/GPf8yp1wCUz5I5hqpQt0/aptbSkZtOGyGzCEpAj2XfiDjDJZ4Dgx9r6EK5vmMoGhrHXA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=IvuoOsv1; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="IvuoOsv1" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8120AC4CEE3; Tue, 29 Apr 2025 17:50:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1745949040; bh=iO6cmXFLPsS9tGgoSP53rbAlnrAXDiCWdYavI5cQm4s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IvuoOsv16gSFpXkArfFJUJDhDqr+89aVkSZXmnLqiUJDlPRpIBXAjcmDDjX+OjdlK /SdG6sXMnWUGQd9FQYd7Lx3xJ+ivSgWNss+xsDwapaDApi6nE+4uPWewZV/XSNkY80 QWgufv460EVj/U8AUPAiPfEBApPgfCivZlaficlE= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Mark Rutland , Mark Brown , Catalin Marinas , Fuad Tabba , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , Will Deacon Subject: [PATCH 5.15 196/373] KVM: arm64: Eagerly switch ZCR_EL{1,2} Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2025 18:41:13 +0200 Message-ID: <20250429161131.233066246@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.49.0 In-Reply-To: <20250429161123.119104857@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20250429161123.119104857@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.68 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Mark Rutland [ Upstream commit 59419f10045bc955d2229819c7cf7a8b0b9c5b59 ] In non-protected KVM modes, while the guest FPSIMD/SVE/SME state is live on the CPU, the host's active SVE VL may differ from the guest's maximum SVE VL: * For VHE hosts, when a VM uses NV, ZCR_EL2 contains a value constrained by the guest hypervisor, which may be less than or equal to that guest's maximum VL. Note: in this case the value of ZCR_EL1 is immaterial due to E2H. * For nVHE/hVHE hosts, ZCR_EL1 contains a value written by the guest, which may be less than or greater than the guest's maximum VL. Note: in this case hyp code traps host SVE usage and lazily restores ZCR_EL2 to the host's maximum VL, which may be greater than the guest's maximum VL. This can be the case between exiting a guest and kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(). If a softirq is taken during this period and the softirq handler tries to use kernel-mode NEON, then the kernel will fail to save the guest's FPSIMD/SVE state, and will pend a SIGKILL for the current thread. This happens because kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp() binds the guest's live FPSIMD/SVE state with the guest's maximum SVE VL, and fpsimd_save_user_state() verifies that the live SVE VL is as expected before attempting to save the register state: | if (WARN_ON(sve_get_vl() != vl)) { | force_signal_inject(SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, 0, 0); | return; | } Fix this and make this a bit easier to reason about by always eagerly switching ZCR_EL{1,2} at hyp during guest<->host transitions. With this happening, there's no need to trap host SVE usage, and the nVHE/nVHE __deactivate_cptr_traps() logic can be simplified to enable host access to all present FPSIMD/SVE/SME features. In protected nVHE/hVHE modes, the host's state is always saved/restored by hyp, and the guest's state is saved prior to exit to the host, so from the host's PoV the guest never has live FPSIMD/SVE/SME state, and the host's ZCR_EL1 is never clobbered by hyp. Fixes: 8c8010d69c132273 ("KVM: arm64: Save/restore SVE state for nVHE") Fixes: 2e3cf82063a00ea0 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Ensure correct VL is loaded before saving SVE state") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Reviewed-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Mark Brown Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Fuad Tabba Cc: Marc Zyngier Cc: Oliver Upton Cc: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210195226.1215254-9-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier [ v6.6 lacks pKVM saving of host SVE state, pull in discovery of maximum host VL separately -- broonie ] Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 7 ++++ arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c | 19 +++++------ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 5 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 9 ++--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c | 31 +++++++++--------- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c | 4 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 3 + 9 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ enum kvm_mode kvm_get_mode(void); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(userspace_irqchip_in_use); extern unsigned int kvm_sve_max_vl; +extern unsigned int kvm_host_sve_max_vl; int kvm_arm_init_sve(void); u32 __attribute_const__ kvm_target_cpu(void); --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h @@ -117,5 +117,12 @@ void __noreturn __host_enter(struct kvm_ extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64mmfr0_el1_sys_val); extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64mmfr1_el1_sys_val); +extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_sve_max_vl); + +static inline bool guest_owns_fp_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + return vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED; +} + #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HYP_H__ */ --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c @@ -129,15 +129,16 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcp local_irq_save(flags); if (vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED) { - if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) { - __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1) = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR); - - /* Restore the VL that was saved when bound to the CPU */ - if (!has_vhe()) - sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1, - SYS_ZCR_EL1); - } - + /* + * Flush (save and invalidate) the fpsimd/sve state so that if + * the host tries to use fpsimd/sve, it's not using stale data + * from the guest. + * + * Flushing the state sets the TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE bit for the + * context unconditionally, in both nVHE and VHE. This allows + * the kernel to restore the fpsimd/sve state, including ZCR_EL1 + * when needed. + */ fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state(); } --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S @@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ alternative_if ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN alternative_else_nop_endif mrs x1, isr_el1 cbz x1, 1f + + // Ensure that __guest_enter() always provides a context + // synchronization event so that callers don't need ISBs for anything + // that would usually be synchonized by the ERET. + isb mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_IRQ ret --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h @@ -215,6 +215,61 @@ static inline void __hyp_sve_restore_gue write_sysreg_el1(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1), SYS_ZCR); } +static inline void fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + u64 zcr_el1, zcr_el2; + + if (!guest_owns_fp_regs(vcpu)) + return; + + if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) { + zcr_el2 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1; + + write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR); + + zcr_el1 = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1); + write_sysreg_el1(zcr_el1, SYS_ZCR); + } +} + +static inline void fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + u64 zcr_el1, zcr_el2; + + if (!guest_owns_fp_regs(vcpu)) + return; + + /* + * When the guest owns the FP regs, we know that guest+hyp traps for + * any FPSIMD/SVE/SME features exposed to the guest have been disabled + * by either fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest() or kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd() + * prior to __guest_entry(). As __guest_entry() guarantees a context + * synchronization event, we don't need an ISB here to avoid taking + * traps for anything that was exposed to the guest. + */ + if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) { + zcr_el1 = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR); + __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1) = zcr_el1; + + /* + * The guest's state is always saved using the guest's max VL. + * Ensure that the host has the guest's max VL active such that + * the host can save the guest's state lazily, but don't + * artificially restrict the host to the guest's max VL. + */ + if (has_vhe()) { + zcr_el2 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1; + write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR); + } else { + zcr_el2 = sve_vq_from_vl(kvm_host_sve_max_vl) - 1; + write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR); + + zcr_el1 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1; + write_sysreg_el1(zcr_el1, SYS_ZCR); + } + } +} + /* Check for an FPSIMD/SVE trap and handle as appropriate */ static inline bool __hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c @@ -19,13 +19,17 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_nvhe_init_params, kvm_init_params); +unsigned int kvm_host_sve_max_vl; + void __kvm_hyp_host_forward_smc(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt); static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) { DECLARE_REG(struct kvm_vcpu *, vcpu, host_ctxt, 1); + fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(kern_hyp_va(vcpu)); cpu_reg(host_ctxt, 1) = __kvm_vcpu_run(kern_hyp_va(vcpu)); + fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(kern_hyp_va(vcpu)); } static void handle___kvm_adjust_pc(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) @@ -237,11 +241,6 @@ void handle_trap(struct kvm_cpu_context case ESR_ELx_EC_SMC64: handle_host_smc(host_ctxt); break; - case ESR_ELx_EC_SVE: - sysreg_clear_set(cptr_el2, CPTR_EL2_TZ, 0); - isb(); - sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2); - break; case ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW: case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW: handle_host_mem_abort(host_ctxt); --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c @@ -34,15 +34,13 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_host_data, kvm DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_cpu_context, kvm_hyp_ctxt); DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, kvm_hyp_vector); -static bool guest_owns_fp_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - return vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED; -} - static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { u64 val = CPTR_EL2_TAM; /* Same bit irrespective of E2H */ + if (!guest_owns_fp_regs(vcpu)) + __activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu); + /* !hVHE case upstream */ if (1) { val |= CPTR_EL2_TTA | CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1; @@ -52,12 +50,22 @@ static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct if (!guest_owns_fp_regs(vcpu)) val |= CPTR_EL2_TFP; + + write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2); } +} - if (!guest_owns_fp_regs(vcpu)) - __activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu); +static void __deactivate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + /* !hVHE case upstream */ + if (1) { + u64 val = CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1; - write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2); + if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SVE)) + val |= CPTR_EL2_TZ; + + write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2); + } } static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -86,7 +94,6 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_ static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { extern char __kvm_hyp_host_vector[]; - u64 cptr; ___deactivate_traps(vcpu); @@ -111,11 +118,7 @@ static void __deactivate_traps(struct kv write_sysreg(this_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params)->hcr_el2, hcr_el2); - cptr = CPTR_EL2_DEFAULT; - if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu) && (vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED)) - cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TZ; - - write_sysreg(cptr, cptr_el2); + __deactivate_cptr_traps(vcpu); write_sysreg(__kvm_hyp_host_vector, vbar_el2); } --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c @@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm sysreg_save_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt); + fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_guest(vcpu); + /* * ARM erratum 1165522 requires us to configure both stage 1 and * stage 2 translation for the guest context before we clear @@ -144,6 +146,8 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm __deactivate_traps(vcpu); + fpsimd_lazy_switch_to_host(vcpu); + sysreg_restore_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt); if (vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED) --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c @@ -42,11 +42,14 @@ static u32 kvm_ipa_limit; PSR_AA32_I_BIT | PSR_AA32_F_BIT) unsigned int kvm_sve_max_vl; +unsigned int kvm_host_sve_max_vl; int kvm_arm_init_sve(void) { if (system_supports_sve()) { kvm_sve_max_vl = sve_max_virtualisable_vl; + kvm_host_sve_max_vl = sve_max_vl; + kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_sve_max_vl) = kvm_host_sve_max_vl; /* * The get_sve_reg()/set_sve_reg() ioctl interface will need