From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6BC002798F8; Tue, 27 May 2025 17:34:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1748367298; cv=none; b=VwfmUMPOhUdIm+is36DxIl/xo2bVjUFJ6GyE/sVq2Cd60pEGLxqDD6TKSSET+pg+L0omMd+Zy0CAdgOkgibI2IECOqiix+YgmGqnku7ZHjbxd5EoGYkw+LXYdaqZpfp9mDbq2QjnmFA+6Qxm4OBisAdyDAQGWE5E0IZbwVRQ/zo= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1748367298; c=relaxed/simple; bh=zHrp8qOpZ7THRrGKuQqnhqwbAjlWz2LjLtcBB5HFNKo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=lAKBQNZTS9KqMdONSdQMD0H5XeBsRL9VpdYcj+YxFtiSPgunNDcASXZ0tJIWDUT5IFcGKOS+REGadjeWmdTiFYMil1wD8DQ1fnoHhmPhqO7IVw7MDwoKyfk88ojDdIkq81z5V9U3IRKCNnX7wWIxiNZiaZQPOS0in1RjMd+TTws= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=gW0CgCup; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="gW0CgCup" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CFE18C4CEE9; Tue, 27 May 2025 17:34:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1748367298; bh=zHrp8qOpZ7THRrGKuQqnhqwbAjlWz2LjLtcBB5HFNKo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gW0CgCup1oNO84gvMptG78+M0p23SzG3uRa75OGNBKMvUfHfeMriFCEclJpEFai6M UKA5I6q8tVqhLtSMz2gWSOj9piqTrKctd3lQ/Hpr2o0IKBhqwAFjiGgQYjjos03ZLL +EpwhWeIZHaHqdT+uz2vV8nq/g4dfOO7/NNgswlM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Breno Leitao , Ingo Molnar , Pawan Gupta , Josh Poimboeuf , Peter Zijlstra , David Kaplan , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.14 315/783] x86/bugs: Make spectre user default depend on MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 18:21:52 +0200 Message-ID: <20250527162525.894904213@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.49.0 In-Reply-To: <20250527162513.035720581@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20250527162513.035720581@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.68 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Breno Leitao [ Upstream commit 98fdaeb296f51ef08e727a7cc72e5b5c864c4f4d ] Change the default value of spectre v2 in user mode to respect the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 config option. Currently, user mode spectre v2 is set to auto (SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO) by default, even if CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 is disabled. Set the spectre_v2 value to auto (SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO) if the Spectre v2 config (CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) is enabled, otherwise set the value to none (SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE). Important to say the command line argument "spectre_v2_user" overwrites the default value in both cases. When CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 is not set, users have the flexibility to opt-in for specific mitigations independently. In this scenario, setting spectre_v2= will not enable spectre_v2_user=, and command line options spectre_v2_user and spectre_v2 are independent when CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2=n. Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: David Kaplan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241031-x86_bugs_last_v2-v2-2-b7ff1dab840e@debian.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 +++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index f9e11cebc598c..a8e98f75b610a 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -6602,6 +6602,8 @@ Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation against user space to user space task attacks. + Selecting specific mitigation does not force enable + user mitigations. Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and the user space protections. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index b6994993c39f7..e0e0ecc401947 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1442,9 +1442,13 @@ static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd; static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) { + enum spectre_v2_user_cmd mode; char arg[20]; int ret, i; + mode = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ? + SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE; + switch (spectre_v2_cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE: return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE; @@ -1457,7 +1461,7 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user", arg, sizeof(arg)); if (ret < 0) - return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; + return mode; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) { if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) { @@ -1467,8 +1471,8 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) } } - pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg); - return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; + pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to default\n", arg); + return mode; } static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) -- 2.39.5