From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A779527CCF0; Tue, 27 May 2025 17:39:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1748367560; cv=none; b=nMSQA9aAeUhZoPye6uMd/Z0XB3+MwUKE9T2eLRfHef2lSUcAWUKa+JS/2YSKzFOJum2s0B3xrpImqALVevwu1P+PuRh077lfafSbvcDEhF+4Whq4CnazzoFiSpLA2pWN7ug+Tx6YseDGKEs5nQY8b431UhN3MY6g9gVcWWfZNeg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1748367560; c=relaxed/simple; bh=I2TZYDGk8iAgR/cSktuCls1myrtpd3TXDVCCxrl4wXE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Uf8KmIMWo4gOvCuBpDjOKy/enRNf+LP3VeKunk8uNPDnyeJ/Gwd42Uwt/X0HVl0ixcwuFgKO6OgwFRcyjoyDuW7r4WzcJluSVeJbRQ54ImeowWTBiG1u5MVpPyWhL4jgJc+TkCPtCKc+OBW5yKXFFwK0b0Fe+Mb0ENMS4DESi4M= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=zjdfkVZo; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="zjdfkVZo" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 87CC2C4CEE9; Tue, 27 May 2025 17:39:17 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1748367558; bh=I2TZYDGk8iAgR/cSktuCls1myrtpd3TXDVCCxrl4wXE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=zjdfkVZo+7D7Nm2s2BgHf6Y/33C/v1T+sy1ps1qb87b6HYm6HNkZ3+Gt+3aXgCiIU eNx9SOxRSzIREahkgYoiV4mseZkieN+8IJaYJu0muxzaYCdAZdlQqhl1IfItE8+kOp LYejxxNMYCT0+91G+5H24Jl+U4tE51Xw1cYLtgUA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Brian Gerst , Ingo Molnar , Ard Biesheuvel , Linus Torvalds , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.14 426/783] x86/boot: Disable stack protector for early boot code Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 18:23:43 +0200 Message-ID: <20250527162530.470565771@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.49.0 In-Reply-To: <20250527162513.035720581@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20250527162513.035720581@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.68 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Brian Gerst [ Upstream commit a9a76b38aaf577887103e3ebb41d70e6aa5a4b19 ] On 64-bit, this will prevent crashes when the canary access is changed from %gs:40 to %gs:__stack_chk_guard(%rip). RIP-relative addresses from the identity-mapped early boot code will target the wrong address with zero-based percpu. KASLR could then shift that address to an unmapped page causing a crash on boot. This early boot code runs well before user-space is active and does not need stack protector enabled. Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Linus Torvalds Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250123190747.745588-4-brgerst@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index b43eb7e384eba..84cfa179802c3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_orc.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_frame.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_unwind_guess.o := n +CFLAGS_head32.o := -fno-stack-protector +CFLAGS_head64.o := -fno-stack-protector CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(src)/../include/asm/trace obj-y += head_$(BITS).o -- 2.39.5