From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1292D17F4F6; Mon, 4 Aug 2025 00:36:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1754267789; cv=none; b=Md+0xwyYP40vivN6LJ8T7Q/oOgP8d/niI5m89L3x5/yLFgRvRb6AjrdFhrrEpGbnOQV6jG7f4OGISRBEkndrqdj7Ab/e42u+GolcepxLUo+U1T3CKRG1ACME4/b/upqe36dVIF/dLW6VwI7E7ILoy4gJ2oHYCV762JYM5SAEbjg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1754267789; c=relaxed/simple; bh=VrwbxypVD0Y5SCQnGfre7FhJQ2fIMoQaWa6ph1TT2sY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=OewGUIENb/NddGVj8Z1cTKAGzgx71vsXmwLJgRdvST+eAdMOYHUCtpa2vWIV1e+9SYuCyBx5V7//b1p2Uvr9uh1Wy2VqqWFUOIa5iNagu21lOYZS642mkABkQFvWZnLvA0w9o+JrUw4aCMFu+QqRvXUK52KRz8BtaMRmbWOeHa8= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=PKY1bmUI; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="PKY1bmUI" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A57E9C4CEF0; Mon, 4 Aug 2025 00:36:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1754267788; bh=VrwbxypVD0Y5SCQnGfre7FhJQ2fIMoQaWa6ph1TT2sY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=PKY1bmUIKlXUS/xRN0nkvmIEpsGA7zkHrY7aOT2KvDlxHHVz4ssD6MTr7BZNTdM+3 czpHBNsaus4lplpnu+JhJ8rD6AIMN1IZ7wtTSlfEYshnniyrWwM8SMBNboa4oLv3EQ 46zzHvsAiyMVkk5FnJ9fTfzMAOFnkSAFZHw7l4M8zbqak146uDBG0EoQQy8qDzIhHY t2QsaWih2ALdaARHwiXIcq8oIFSnKpehI/DhXQ8cC5CcBQPwu9hwwMmUwvOt7ebpTT BksAhuH1F80IDb5ERKuHL+ZmL6zTVxMaCfDvU5NOgbJfu/bRfYC9DwwuFFFY8ZXsiF +8EGZ2LRF6O7Q== From: Sasha Levin To: patches@lists.linux.dev, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Lucy Thrun , kernel test robot , Takashi Iwai , Sasha Levin , rf@opensource.cirrus.com Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 54/59] ALSA: hda/ca0132: Fix buffer overflow in add_tuning_control Date: Sun, 3 Aug 2025 20:34:08 -0400 Message-Id: <20250804003413.3622950-54-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: <20250804003413.3622950-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20250804003413.3622950-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore X-stable-base: Linux 6.6.101 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Lucy Thrun [ Upstream commit a409c60111e6bb98fcabab2aeaa069daa9434ca0 ] The 'sprintf' call in 'add_tuning_control' may exceed the 44-byte buffer if either string argument is too long. This triggers a compiler warning. Replaced 'sprintf' with 'snprintf' to limit string lengths to prevent overflow. Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202506100642.95jpuMY1-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Lucy Thrun Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250610175012.918-3-lucy.thrun@digital-rabbithole.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus: **Backport Status: YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees for the following reasons: 1. **Fixes a real security vulnerability**: The commit fixes a buffer overflow vulnerability in the `add_tuning_control` function. The sprintf call could overflow the 44-byte `namestr` buffer (defined as `char namestr[SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ID_NAME_MAXLEN]` where `SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ID_NAME_MAXLEN` is 44). 2. **Long-standing bug**: The vulnerable code was introduced in 2012 (commit 44f0c9782cc6a), meaning this buffer overflow has existed in the kernel for over a decade, affecting many stable kernel versions. 3. **Simple and contained fix**: The fix is minimal - it simply replaces `sprintf` with `snprintf` on a single line: ```c - sprintf(namestr, "%s %s Volume", name, dirstr[dir]); + snprintf(namestr, sizeof(namestr), "%s %s Volume", name, dirstr[dir]); ``` 4. **Low risk of regression**: The change is straightforward and only adds bounds checking. It doesn't change any logic or behavior when strings fit within the buffer. 5. **Detected by automated testing**: The issue was caught by the kernel test robot, indicating it's a real compiler warning that should be addressed. 6. **Potential for exploitation**: While the tuning control names like "Wedge Angle", "SVM Level", and "EQ Band0-9" are relatively short, combined with "Playback" or "Capture" and " Volume", they could theoretically overflow the 44-byte buffer. For example: "EQ Band9" (8) + " " (1) + "Playback" (8) + " Volume" (7) = 24 bytes, which is safe, but the vulnerability exists if longer names were added in the future. 7. **Affects user-facing functionality**: This is in the ALSA HD Audio driver for Creative CA0132 sound cards, which are used by end users, making it important to fix in stable kernels. The fix follows stable kernel rules perfectly: it's a minimal change that fixes an important bug without introducing new features or architectural changes. sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c index 27e48fdbbf3a..0ebcb0064436 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c @@ -4411,7 +4411,7 @@ static int add_tuning_control(struct hda_codec *codec, } knew.private_value = HDA_COMPOSE_AMP_VAL(nid, 1, 0, type); - sprintf(namestr, "%s %s Volume", name, dirstr[dir]); + snprintf(namestr, sizeof(namestr), "%s %s Volume", name, dirstr[dir]); return snd_hda_ctl_add(codec, nid, snd_ctl_new1(&knew, codec)); } -- 2.39.5