From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BC97B1A6827; Mon, 4 May 2026 14:21:05 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777904465; cv=none; b=Qot6eVJiwksuZ9qZJhwWoGEkwMuIc/QfJTozxakUPXS8QBjlB5TA88UkJaovOplS4ZE8bRqoeHFTXQcnXl4Ops/jp7juqhUm6Zv1PbAyr9o1cHnoE+hJsbcYAc/Naw7952bfl/GtXER4IUQhYnor/RtPhAmzX2JcS45o6TZ0jy4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777904465; c=relaxed/simple; bh=nb6jAI5gcV47f4gVfqXBcuAzhPbzZqutkOf1+me+Rd4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=SXUlV4FlxnpDpxbhOXuye9pNKjy2A3A8i88wrg2N2N1pK78vVPAb8Np5GsiuHduBhuewroN22P/LE7aYWf26thb10rjyTDTjW+VdqETfHrVIfgyrtN9a7ScgX60eGd9mEsw5JFVsMOuR6IYyLP02JrYXzJ0iFm3AzeA8BLWd2ck= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=JVDiZyzi; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="JVDiZyzi" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 517A8C2BCB8; Mon, 4 May 2026 14:21:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1777904465; bh=nb6jAI5gcV47f4gVfqXBcuAzhPbzZqutkOf1+me+Rd4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=JVDiZyzi6j0lwOKn6gI3rggJtBNCDFnGQhz/8PANeUE05DZ/5EXHLOQl30fmDh0FI iQAoZ4a0T5bf4fvSZw6oOnB2ohY+v5v5l14Hqm+rdmeoBOJT56vauzW8hGoAPVQkbE VcXbfN1QrEndhcF5TCxxfVi/gik/wXBCXXCXP7Z4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Josh Law , Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH 6.12 049/215] lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 15:51:08 +0200 Message-ID: <20260504135131.970904884@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0 In-Reply-To: <20260504135130.169210693@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260504135130.169210693@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Josh Law commit 8cdf30813ea8ce881cecc08664144416dbdb3e16 upstream. The ts_kmp algorithm stores its prefix_tbl[] table and pattern in a single allocation sized from the pattern length. If the prefix_tbl[] size calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and subsequent pattern copies can overflow it. Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow helpers before calculating the combined allocation size. This fixes a potential heap overflow. The pattern length calculation can wrap during a size_t addition, leading to an undersized allocation. Because the textsearch library is reachable from userspace via Netfilter's xt_string module, this is a security risk that should be backported to LTS kernels. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260308202028.2889285-2-objecting@objecting.org Signed-off-by: Josh Law Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/ts_kmp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/lib/ts_kmp.c +++ b/lib/ts_kmp.c @@ -94,8 +94,22 @@ static struct ts_config *kmp_init(const struct ts_config *conf; struct ts_kmp *kmp; int i; - unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int); - size_t priv_size = sizeof(*kmp) + len + prefix_tbl_len; + unsigned int prefix_tbl_len; + size_t priv_size; + + /* Zero-length patterns would make kmp_find() read beyond kmp->pattern. */ + if (unlikely(!len)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* + * kmp->pattern is stored immediately after the prefix_tbl[] table. + * Reject lengths that would wrap while sizing either region. + */ + if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(len, sizeof(*kmp->prefix_tbl), + &prefix_tbl_len) || + check_add_overflow(sizeof(*kmp), (size_t)len, &priv_size) || + check_add_overflow(priv_size, prefix_tbl_len, &priv_size))) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); conf = alloc_ts_config(priv_size, gfp_mask); if (IS_ERR(conf))