From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1CA933DEAC8; Mon, 4 May 2026 14:21:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777904484; cv=none; b=WXI9j1NvKgvQAIvWQTL4inDygXRMiskRnRtOxtMEJMbtYAzIFe0APumAPrcmykFOmojsIK612Hj5IB/Fc1fhpn2vW/c3s7ti/ryanemqA9Z9wIhFlon0vqiWY9Wjm5eKN/jaJhBQL95Ye2aE50v3r/1IJ6/qOiUeO3kYKAo6sPE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777904484; c=relaxed/simple; bh=nBSeOpXkAsrfVgnh+IXrriU6vYH+w1mkHnrscLY8tSs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=cr2abEUJbXmMMtSJivLPt4csqRW9AYnuU2qfrFGvJ2OcXeQMyVDterISvMAyb4iY39R+GaDtFSn0z/KrNX7KYL5rw2VtpSrcCW1GNP+fFbfB1lZL0y9B1uB75HiSQkGNz6XKohb8VMz/na0GCfywBAtMakbuD4Ny7VRUjITrXxU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=PwvzMJWV; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="PwvzMJWV" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 65E9CC2BCF4; Mon, 4 May 2026 14:21:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1777904483; bh=nBSeOpXkAsrfVgnh+IXrriU6vYH+w1mkHnrscLY8tSs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=PwvzMJWVyNsSo9yWJoeuSI5GswfwDP9liWxhgE3knpgwmtDMpdmNQmxDwgYItZcec iYixw0O3hHKkBnkDtL5oVNwZKAPkCG6mOxcVYkjnwVUhVfzKnURyvKaxdO51fnSnqb Rb2BgFApvmAEXksw6wGk3ESUeBqjOpQGH0S90SeQ= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Yuhao Jiang , Junrui Luo , Gao Xiang , Chao Yu Subject: [PATCH 6.12 056/215] erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 15:51:15 +0200 Message-ID: <20260504135132.222870944@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0 In-Reply-To: <20260504135130.169210693@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260504135130.169210693@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gao Xiang commit d18a3b5d337fa412a38e776e6b4b857a58836575 upstream. Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs. If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block. nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of `sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)` as well [1]. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations") Fixes: 33bac912840f ("staging: erofs: keep corrupted fs from crashing kernel in erofs_readdir()") Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang Reported-by: Junrui Luo Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/A0FD7E0F-7558-49B0-8BC8-EB1ECDB2479A@outlook.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/erofs/dir.c | 28 +++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) --- a/fs/erofs/dir.c +++ b/fs/erofs/dir.c @@ -18,20 +18,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct in const char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff; unsigned int de_namelen; - /* the last dirent in the block? */ - if (de + 1 >= end) - de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); - else + /* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ + if (de + 1 < end) de_namelen = le16_to_cpu(de[1].nameoff) - nameoff; + else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; + else + de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); - /* a corrupted entry is found */ - if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen > EROFS_NAME_LEN) { - erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", - EROFS_I(dir)->nid); - DBG_BUGON(1); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; - } + /* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ + if (!in_range32(de_namelen, 1, EROFS_NAME_LEN) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, le64_to_cpu(de->nid), d_type)) @@ -40,6 +38,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct in ctx->pos += sizeof(struct erofs_dirent); } return 0; +err_bogus: + erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", EROFS_I(dir)->nid); + DBG_BUGON(1); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; } static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -67,7 +69,7 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, } nameoff = le16_to_cpu(de->nameoff); - if (nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) || nameoff >= bsz) { + if (!nameoff || nameoff >= bsz || (nameoff % sizeof(*de))) { erofs_err(sb, "invalid de[0].nameoff %u @ nid %llu", nameoff, EROFS_I(dir)->nid); err = -EFSCORRUPTED;