From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3A2073DC4AB; Mon, 4 May 2026 13:54:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777902868; cv=none; b=BuLgCtS4PmtCn0O5GBD+Gy9tZJUjXbVwc4inzO0wjkK2ZvBC8TtFbswF+rNJPSNRYbYaC7oTl3Y8ndp1Q3V9YRvLFgowHuIe6UStTysV85fOolbI98KwesV5b+jThqIF6BBLETD3QtGI3F70zGcFYfUwwdc7Foll1lSyly6ya3o= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777902868; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Cu0hQ3Jgk7izEyCkNhl6N5qFtFyrRaARTDWlldx6gEo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=fxEdyglUN+6rF3opSuxaivXTfmXFrsYHgjPAd5GJSFOsLejbWXv+XnFZ5KM0aTvhKkO+ndGNmfCWUjTY5tsb8OHoSek5G6xVsN6C+Xod7tNKxyAZxOV5RGZTi1s9PPg2Cn5SDILYkez6VvvFAALkrxoQzdcZMFIDc3sxSXLtKfw= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=c/kk47Qw; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="c/kk47Qw" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 87F40C2BCF5; Mon, 4 May 2026 13:54:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1777902867; bh=Cu0hQ3Jgk7izEyCkNhl6N5qFtFyrRaARTDWlldx6gEo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=c/kk47QwwaDovg5S4/irgHkDdxrDCbg/wRJI/W9S81ZBQl48Fb1jVrx3R6gDst3Mk fYUdIdlabfdiWI9MXM5aElvSNXKEpnvQpO7J4w+qUGtX0rwNPuZJesatzJpnwDC3gi WTTe2zRzQW5YO87YXq4DN94ZpMg20W4Z0GsN71xw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Yuhao Jiang , Tyllis Xu Subject: [PATCH 7.0 014/307] ibmasm: fix OOB reads in command_file_write due to missing size checks Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 15:48:19 +0200 Message-ID: <20260504135143.364535594@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0 In-Reply-To: <20260504135142.814938198@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260504135142.814938198@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Tyllis Xu commit 0eb09f737428e482a32a2e31e5e223f2b35a71d3 upstream. The command_file_write() handler allocates a kernel buffer of exactly count bytes and copies user data into it, but does not validate the buffer against the dot command protocol before passing it to get_dot_command_size() and get_dot_command_timeout(). Since both the allocation size (count) and the header fields (command_size, data_size) are independently user-controlled, an attacker can cause get_dot_command_size() to return a value exceeding the allocation, triggering OOB reads in get_dot_command_timeout() and an out-of-bounds memcpy_toio() that leaks kernel heap memory to the service processor. Fix with two guards: reject writes smaller than sizeof(struct dot_command_header) before allocation, then after copying user data reject commands where the buffer is smaller than the total size declared by the header (sizeof(header) + command_size + data_size). This ensures all subsequent header and payload field accesses stay within the buffer. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tyllis Xu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260314165355.548119-1-LivelyCarpet87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c +++ b/drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c @@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ static ssize_t command_file_write(struct return -EINVAL; if (count == 0 || count > IBMASM_CMD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE) return 0; + if (count < sizeof(struct dot_command_header)) + return -EINVAL; if (*offset != 0) return 0; @@ -319,6 +321,11 @@ static ssize_t command_file_write(struct return -EFAULT; } + if (count < get_dot_command_size(cmd->buffer)) { + command_put(cmd); + return -EINVAL; + } + spin_lock_irqsave(&command_data->sp->lock, flags); if (command_data->command) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&command_data->sp->lock, flags);