From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CFD0047AF66; Tue, 16 Jun 2026 17:31:54 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781631115; cv=none; b=n1ekZ1GkWPckMhyYDixvuT4XiDUPzB+M8cfaBqDA30kwSF7YW4KeP5YPvTRYGAsnG8XHLtsn7uq3kPgVnpFveMJH2m5UukKUuQRBa4vcXZA852OzVtsgp+mwV0u07EJTZvD3zAab26VHxOjT7/aH+CQhAEe7YJD000ejJfU/aII= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781631115; c=relaxed/simple; bh=nopMvH3ajIGupUDH82Ou4jgJ+0BrKONFBUxOvFYXiwA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=alqZMK27B2E2dqnFGw6sTmNnS4pWFfzrbNtgw7W2+UEeXDW7al6XTwFR/Rn0XV0mJgBpjyPy2/oMqZieInOVfLvcLLImK1VKSOFoUaH0j+PWwMcxZ1Hn0nKsQLS/GMceeEizjtB5I+z4mTTK6X4OXKxSvWzuXhq1F7CtOAZ5gA8= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=OsLlQKP3; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="OsLlQKP3" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B82031F000E9; Tue, 16 Jun 2026 17:31:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1781631114; bh=GK52MEhqxa4+a1C5Kl4zmnMdUcRo8DpSt0CQOEWNqXs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=OsLlQKP33YR5CuxMsbDo8MYPfIL8NI2Tg/2f2y8l/qQMZ+kDCgTZiVL0L9ilr67kQ Um2qiAlceMkVXojHK6nRbePxbIryCqrjoN4RV7zfTG/1zoZoMD5ehnT2joigDi8Mg+ HLqWKCUsdANM5lt9VDCtDN4iO6lexdcK6K7hy80g= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, stable , Michael Bommarito Subject: [PATCH 6.1 159/522] usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 20:25:06 +0530 Message-ID: <20260616145133.558774004@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0 In-Reply-To: <20260616145125.307082728@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260616145125.307082728@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Michael Bommarito commit 4e036c10e7f4df5d951c69cc3697bc8e209c6d02 upstream. ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received: data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); ... ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs: * dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path). * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket. * renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the request. * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT. A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer. The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a 1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer. Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to userspace. Fixes: ddf8abd25994 ("USB: f_fs: the FunctionFS driver") Cc: stable Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419160359.1577270-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c @@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static ssize_t ffs_ep0_read(struct file /* unlocks spinlock */ ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); - if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) + if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, ret))) ret = -EFAULT; goto done_mutex;