From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8F5CE33E344; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:24:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1783009463; cv=none; b=O5D6hx1mXilnkcpjPj1VcNPWP82dgZjPz3dZ+UAEFHcoKR5JqLoosnKNeDAiPEmrVjPLhVMLpP1jp9S7IPCe599kPKdGBV6GpHfh5C1uO9XKJqj8pG5uhHZDNVYFmc4o2qp6PkqgFrdBfjTt6bqKJl1Wc2n97CCn7aK6AaCEmJA= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1783009463; c=relaxed/simple; bh=9iOEFO89MgMnJj7ViYrsG7ZFg1svQePWyX39ZlEQouk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=H+eMaJrFHal98uoB2xjhJX7NrYbi+AnZY83e8hG/86ZMEHz6iu6t6i9RQxc0k1vk6v0LHUgBk4u5Vv7MdiVEh7jMvIyWjk3A0ZU1yacEsomd1Ozqp/G8JJxIcSY6yLKnZEt5fW0PLc45vLCFcPdakQE+lwsvYhS5zCRy7v2N/QI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=BYGeSdXd; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="BYGeSdXd" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 013781F00A3A; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:24:19 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1783009460; bh=faq3ooaN0nnlYK6T+wtPKOqdrxaMMuE7d2jtZa/Kg5s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=BYGeSdXd4GSlB1Ub7l8SSTOb2exGbKPBs3diXqlDfEJrL/FfFkL+nCgPy/RgraBLA xi3HFN3EmDSXarXxjVX1aqKb/IzbdUdGaGUqTDDZaO5/LSCjCYF5ZjJzbfJLWS3KaX UyFwzKSSECkys3ZER5KsGz78rpKcIuyCeyq1aiPA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Doruk Tan Ozturk , Alexander Lobakin , Stefan Schmidt Subject: [PATCH 5.10 61/96] mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 18:19:53 +0200 Message-ID: <20260702155110.264870584@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260702155108.949633242@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260702155108.949633242@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Doruk Tan Ozturk commit 84a04eb5b210643bd67aab81ff805d32f62aa865 upstream. llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt). On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference. On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true). The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by: - ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c) - TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c) Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to: - Silent data corruption of other skb clones - Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb() - Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free) Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method") Fixes: 03556e4d0dbb ("mac802154: add llsec encryption method") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wpan/20260525161806.96158-1-doruk@0sec.ai/ Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk Closes: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526183726.56100-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac802154/llsec.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) --- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c +++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c @@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80 { struct ieee802154_hdr hdr; int rc, authlen, hlen; + struct sk_buff *trailer; struct mac802154_llsec_key *key; u32 frame_ctr; @@ -766,6 +767,12 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80 skb->mac_len = ieee802154_hdr_push(skb, &hdr); skb_reset_mac_header(skb); + rc = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer); + if (rc < 0) { + llsec_key_put(key); + return rc; + } + rc = llsec_do_encrypt(skb, sec, &hdr, key); llsec_key_put(key); @@ -905,6 +912,13 @@ llsec_do_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, co const struct ieee802154_hdr *hdr, struct mac802154_llsec_key *key, __le64 dev_addr) { + struct sk_buff *trailer; + int err; + + err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer); + if (err < 0) + return err; + if (hdr->sec.level == IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC) return llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(skb, sec, hdr, key, dev_addr); else