From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D55D532572F; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:33:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1783010013; cv=none; b=tYZzIGGy2oFNHX5rk7vIxJbcAvsAyTJ40NWgK14VaGBq/lYGXzi1FiX1uANBpBb/UkgUPaUxe8YTBl+QvZh91hdcI87xgBKInk+2+C5sPAZIDJn10TBq1APa/eS2relzjmRbv200R1lMDZcywuNT4FwyQxzVfGfkoClqp5ykhyY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1783010013; c=relaxed/simple; bh=xDJf/eo2jTFHY4cSL0FTZJcaoHc7ijq011rFdpUCiXc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Jjs49BPd87xWDGA37H6xMokYeLR340H/Np7u/LOpas6OF1Mg5BVaBd4OLJEvJTULDHPCVNX8kjEA9kpbMZgnfCcBmxPaIkcNAFDgui+uQjzF5H1UlaDhkPby6mc6+YBOCKGnmVZlfRzp6+1IfBcTuOa67Eg+caY/0cjVhiMcdbE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=JBN21E0e; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="JBN21E0e" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 41EDE1F000E9; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:33:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1783010011; bh=6LmyYFqzzIhujc2hXFY4paADSzpotr83drkXrhJioIc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=JBN21E0ewov3onuV+Pmg1WzHZ2Vtmox3Q8ZokosOlG9JtiEZSUIXhNcP3BrauxhJZ /W+tdgZn3mu5P/n6Wx2rIXXKXuNGV28ubC5ZK+aMA1umB3x/o4M7zFjQpbZmyyr/SE msFN3Vg7Z5dG0ruYgyTDbo33opCrvB/H5Nzz0JY0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Doruk Tan Ozturk , Alexander Lobakin , Stefan Schmidt Subject: [PATCH 6.1 077/129] mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 18:19:56 +0200 Message-ID: <20260702155113.734064616@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260702155112.163984240@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260702155112.163984240@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Doruk Tan Ozturk commit 84a04eb5b210643bd67aab81ff805d32f62aa865 upstream. llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt). On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference. On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true). The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by: - ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c) - TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c) Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to: - Silent data corruption of other skb clones - Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb() - Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free) Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method") Fixes: 03556e4d0dbb ("mac802154: add llsec encryption method") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wpan/20260525161806.96158-1-doruk@0sec.ai/ Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk Closes: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526183726.56100-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac802154/llsec.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) --- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c +++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c @@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80 { struct ieee802154_hdr hdr; int rc, authlen, hlen; + struct sk_buff *trailer; struct mac802154_llsec_key *key; u32 frame_ctr; @@ -766,6 +767,12 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80 skb->mac_len = ieee802154_hdr_push(skb, &hdr); skb_reset_mac_header(skb); + rc = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer); + if (rc < 0) { + llsec_key_put(key); + return rc; + } + rc = llsec_do_encrypt(skb, sec, &hdr, key); llsec_key_put(key); @@ -905,6 +912,13 @@ llsec_do_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, co const struct ieee802154_hdr *hdr, struct mac802154_llsec_key *key, __le64 dev_addr) { + struct sk_buff *trailer; + int err; + + err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer); + if (err < 0) + return err; + if (hdr->sec.level == IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC) return llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(skb, sec, hdr, key, dev_addr); else