From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CB3CC2DA76C; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 20:17:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784665044; cv=none; b=umcwYDWb3+PARg+1x1sGLiXKv2+lWMepg9hhuNbnvxbO5iJveHs6B38T6/2NbZqPYTnFQgcuAo4aI8AO9q/U2dIgik4ZFueQWWw2dEFcZ+/QhV1BrdWTN//Zlbyh4QM5Xmez9bsYKv0L4DGsunDCkxVLDZ2Zh4ZM8Tnc46atPWA= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784665044; c=relaxed/simple; bh=BQTiffjYwm1ICBciQkm1zjyJUqzCsLr4UXE5/SbGUW8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Pmj2E5dLb3DvE2mDby0zwk7/ZLju8eg9MQLZihJAe+9cqCLmpuNT+zMwdjygMt1PdX/eVOJ3sT1f/s3XpE+BirOJYblkBA+cGeTC3Bq7mgSIkqNivIPBx9IJJY2rm6yssFJbiRrFRYsYLM2vSegdVYXDz7tw75MsKMHEe6wO0KE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=ntoR7F/X; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="ntoR7F/X" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3D5B91F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 20:17:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784665042; bh=UoDDVU4VmCh+Q7Ex/08ctA3X+1+IwzUi+YF6saiFXp8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=ntoR7F/XFw/qpwbDgVZrZ5SuQDVCxY6fl8oEYp46bhAbjVvTm7wsrIspjqOTY2kX3 Oc9AG8D53VgjHXLczX/Jsc1Q06BRFjZ9vYzDrGaP9f2Wmq7hZYRZWhOKeYE4G7XrHG VCXkiy0+NZw4TuCnY4TX5EMSOoOrHxziURUiEfHA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Zijing Yin , Sabrina Dubroca , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 6.6 0155/1266] net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:09:52 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152445.274142509@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152441.786066624@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152441.786066624@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Zijing Yin commit d129c3177d7b1138fd5066fcc63a698b3ba415b0 upstream. pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by allocating x->calg and copying only the algorithm name: x->calg = kmalloc_obj(*x->calg); if (!x->calg) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; } strcpy(x->calg->alg_name, a->name); x->props.calgo = sa->sadb_sa_encrypt; Unlike the authentication (x->aalg) and encryption (x->ealg) branches of the same function, the compression branch never initializes calg->alg_key_len. IPComp carries no key and the allocation only reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field is left containing uninitialized slab data. calg->alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE: xfrm_state_migrate() xfrm_state_clone_and_setup() x->calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig->calg); kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig)); where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8. With a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the 68-byte calg object. Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60 Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 print_report+0xf7/0x600 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60 xfrm_state_migrate+0x70a/0x1da0 xfrm_migrate+0x753/0x18a0 xfrm_do_migrate+0xb47/0xf10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x411/0xb50 netlink_rcv_skb+0x158/0x420 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x71/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x584/0x850 netlink_sendmsg+0x8b0/0xdc0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9f7/0xb90 ___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0 __sys_sendmsg+0x16d/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Allocated by task 9287: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 pfkey_add+0x2652/0x2ea0 pfkey_process+0x6d0/0x830 pfkey_sendmsg+0x42c/0x850 __sys_sendto+0x461/0x4b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ff11000025a74980 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 68-byte region [ff11000025a74980, ff11000025a749c4) Depending on the uninitialized value the same field can instead request an oversized kmemdup() allocation and make the migration clone fail. The XFRM netlink path is not affected: verify_one_alg() rejects an XFRMA_ALG_COMP attribute shorter than xfrm_alg_len(), so a calg added via XFRM_MSG_NEWSA is always self-consistent. Initialize calg->alg_key_len to 0, matching the aalg/ealg branches. Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zijing Yin Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/key/af_key.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -1218,6 +1218,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state * pfkey_msg2xfr goto out; } strcpy(x->calg->alg_name, a->name); + x->calg->alg_key_len = 0; x->props.calgo = sa->sadb_sa_encrypt; } else { int keysize = 0;