From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 35CEE47044A; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 19:41:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784662897; cv=none; b=qjrcesChkA9AqnvX2wVGgd6EB37PKwtMrLHDVgLXUa3ez88hXOEMrAQJG7msOzoKsOFEXdjnzvSUwS/BGnZYjLKosFCe3TcXr+cM/R9/4PJ+AWOxtUX9VFzgYhSgoTyipM9QyPgzypXVImKSrtLD5VZq88WEYjhamB+DuZHCGEg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784662897; c=relaxed/simple; bh=dNwLxWOZtPHaEwOx2mPysZOpRutHade8ghg7hn3e7JE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=OmG9ONxB8iH7BNDVFINztp53YcKV6FoozOnH7mGkZwX7N8CSEjY1ncu5M9Y35/+tcRMTHk20i0WqTLk0dKG4NUv+g5+6gE0Njkwz7iG2i/G1RX6GjfWKZ/GBApANLbWyS/ZgaZwU9tqhmWhyBMkprSa1A3U42gocgvwwduX9LSA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=G3Fz4rEC; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="G3Fz4rEC" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9C0291F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 19:41:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784662896; bh=vkSRHsFgsMdLe+cRQoZMp4RP1d4PPfmluuB4WZB0Mxk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=G3Fz4rEC5t2YcpY4qIxkpXIzpGs10kbdZ5C5Dz12Wkbd63+Vaj17y6H6p0rPMCp8h i56sOajIKAnX/NSJ2zjhqGgauqa2SkKd9JkAY1dQ4gB0WzEahNeJ83QUqACn21Jsoa s3MouNOGubzMvEqDcDRoPpLSijksO/clGkLbnN4o= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Luis Gerhorst , Jiayuan Chen , Emil Tsalapatis , Nuoqi Gui , Alexei Starovoitov , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.12 0618/1276] bpf: Fix stack slot index in nospec checks Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:17:41 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152459.939620652@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152446.065700225@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152446.065700225@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Nuoqi Gui [ Upstream commit d1d53aa30ab3b5ae89161c9cc840b3f7489ad386 ] check_stack_write_fixed_off() computes the byte slot for a fixed-offset stack write as -off - 1, and records each written byte in slot_type[] with (slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE. The Spectre v4 sanitization pre-check uses slot_type[i] instead. For a 4-byte write at fp-8 after the lower half of fp-8 has been zeroed, the pre-check scans bytes 0..3 and sees STACK_ZERO while the actual write updates bytes 7..4. That can leave the second half-slot write without nospec_result even though the bytes being overwritten still require sanitization. Use the same slot index in the sanitization pre-check that the write path uses when updating slot_type[]. Fixes: 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") Acked-by: Luis Gerhorst Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis Signed-off-by: Nuoqi Gui Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260618-f01-11-stack-nospec-slot-index-v3-1-780297041721@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 64a6ec8eb847ba..7f1144486a8c4a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4769,7 +4769,8 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { - u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]; + u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % + BPF_REG_SIZE]; if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) { sanitize = true; -- 2.53.0