From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2254F471433; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 19:51:54 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784663516; cv=none; b=Tcb2/BYoPNHs/N0UZp7hjhrHsv4EXgmk5uJ2czUa4aUb5gLjysMArf4CRtKlvey4Eui3TKDFba4P4jJXOLWnISZzYkMpDlzwsP46rfCRCLC5hRAyvvfIfsl9wut3KcYZjEFtV0lEWyhg4xs1i0uKXHIvgq0y2TKrTypAJUDSmmw= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784663516; c=relaxed/simple; bh=8NeTUQdGWhUL97ZbtE9oqwmSo/1cH8BPxJlwylWqqoc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=RCfKTiPFDhqkb4maLpF99y4oUkhgIk0XWLfjJeQu/a56slyJL1UUrCAtnxdq5NgLvhk8+2jeqACygOyk6iIeRug/Jgb2r3+wJDVWrr3hfX6+kys+mnf9eaBgcZGjBTW181bWiePJJfCBKbsruBqjGPW4WGnYmamlrVmErTHpGPg= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=upGM1BFR; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="upGM1BFR" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 456CC1F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 19:51:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784663514; bh=PUModjgQAcc0u+q3a7EK3FtjAv6RtdOmf4x8i+ybf4g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=upGM1BFRh1yks3vbobm7s+G8Ayb6k3Yo6LZI7a81EoEy8/naYRH6yLTykibNa6U9g Q7vrxUWEF13BBRbPWemVh56wsBbjWQPAWv/kUZ8iZSbHNOh/ImgRkVmZuDUjy8ggWv gnm7Rc3plfQykxvY4iWUOOHuLn1S/U40Z0R2sdOI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Peter Ujfalusi , Liam Girdwood , Bard Liao , Mark Brown Subject: [PATCH 6.12 0852/1276] ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Fix heap overflow in bytes_ext put/get Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:21:35 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152505.117920400@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152446.065700225@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152446.065700225@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Peter Ujfalusi commit fd46668d538993218eea19c6925c868ac0f2630c upstream. The ipc_control_data buffer is allocated as kzalloc(max_size), where max_size covers the entire struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data including its flexible array payload. However, the bounds checks in bytes_ext_put and _bytes_ext_get compared user data lengths against max_size directly, ignoring that cdata->data sits at an offset of sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes into the allocation. This allowed writing up to sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes past the end of the heap buffer from unprivileged userspace via the ALSA TLV kcontrol interface, and similarly allowed over-reading adjacent heap data on the get path. Fix all bounds checks to subtract sizeof(*cdata) from max_size so they reflect the actual space available at the cdata->data offset. Also fix the error-path restore in bytes_ext_put which wrote to cdata->data instead of cdata, causing the same overflow. Fixes: 67ec2a091630 ("ASoC: SOF: Add bytes_ext control IPC ops for IPC3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi Reviewed-by: Liam Girdwood Reviewed-by: Bard Liao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609083458.31193-7-peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/soc/sof/ipc3-control.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/sound/soc/sof/ipc3-control.c +++ b/sound/soc/sof/ipc3-control.c @@ -398,9 +398,17 @@ static int sof_ipc3_bytes_ext_put(struct } /* be->max is coming from topology */ - if (header.length > scontrol->max_size) { - dev_err_ratelimited(scomp->dev, "Bytes data size %d exceeds max %zu\n", - header.length, scontrol->max_size); + if (header.length > scontrol->max_size - sizeof(*cdata)) { + dev_err_ratelimited(scomp->dev, "Bytes data size %u exceeds max %zu\n", + header.length, scontrol->max_size - sizeof(*cdata)); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Ensure the data is large enough to contain the ABI header */ + if (header.length < sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr)) { + dev_err_ratelimited(scomp->dev, + "Bytes data size %u less than ABI header %zu\n", + header.length, sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr)); return -EINVAL; } @@ -436,7 +444,7 @@ static int sof_ipc3_bytes_ext_put(struct } /* be->max has been verified to be >= sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr) */ - if (cdata->data->size > scontrol->max_size - sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr)) { + if (cdata->data->size > scontrol->max_size - sizeof(*cdata) - sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr)) { dev_err_ratelimited(scomp->dev, "Mismatch in ABI data size (truncated?)\n"); goto err_restore; } @@ -452,7 +460,7 @@ static int sof_ipc3_bytes_ext_put(struct err_restore: /* If we have an issue, we restore the old, valid bytes control data */ if (scontrol->old_ipc_control_data) { - memcpy(cdata->data, scontrol->old_ipc_control_data, scontrol->max_size); + memcpy(cdata, scontrol->old_ipc_control_data, scontrol->max_size); kfree(scontrol->old_ipc_control_data); scontrol->old_ipc_control_data = NULL; } @@ -491,10 +499,13 @@ static int _sof_ipc3_bytes_ext_get(struc } /* check data size doesn't exceed max coming from topology */ - if (cdata->data->size > scontrol->max_size - sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr)) { - dev_err_ratelimited(scomp->dev, "User data size %d exceeds max size %zu\n", + if (cdata->data->size > scontrol->max_size - sizeof(*cdata) - + sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr)) { + dev_err_ratelimited(scomp->dev, + "User data size %u exceeds max size %zu\n", cdata->data->size, - scontrol->max_size - sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr)); + scontrol->max_size - sizeof(*cdata) - + sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr)); return -EINVAL; }