From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EAC7D421259; Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:24:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786980258; cv=none; b=fifJdxScsPqePXjGmwABCVogrp/hA29CdmrJFbQTCD2T70bzckBzrINYKd7WbWGVBD2+rB2+VKYZIEGp4blYm6fr5B+Q5jHxl+ZtMn9X5FY+gnc4u1l15YzDDThcv8JL3LiF3ZCw17X1K6xmhywN1xdhVDHsW7L/PZuVKG1Mv/4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786980258; c=relaxed/simple; bh=W4OamJtx4VaixNYLBDcey3jt3Xr+ZoqtbQqves7oQ3g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=EqOef2TetB/W9hhEe/jzai65txSc036+mnmgK0VCjSEJdPZ86vao58lLOvJQ3hA+x4fsuBjW4qkk4ElqJ4muL+O4Lfgax9z6OAB3MAqFdasRzNHNmMMtr2WRiL+UK2TnBhtM01IGYEq0eR+X8I4K2nk919K8Vy+m/4Lbi5LvtEU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=sRMmfsRa; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="sRMmfsRa" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 50D011F000E9; Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:24:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1786980256; bh=rSUdyr0PpqNyMg+FSYJhh2w6jdP8cdemp+7ap4dqoGE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=sRMmfsRar6vZyiW2N/l29Z9QXGaiqbdG1B3tYJOpxWtHsEwEQj/JSmkBBGQvHlMXd 3aVVt+Z3oV6Z1VMWtUwDwMmabr7r6KYoWR9gJLxpGLNAOeMH9zq7g1SJBCTXfqCw+c MtPDlwTPabgVZro3TOo386d6Ren1BxPRachx8yQ8= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Xuanqiang Luo , Antoine Tenart , Jakub Kicinski , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1 510/609] udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:33:26 +0200 Message-ID: <20260817132600.913824170@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260817132543.039278408@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260817132543.039278408@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Xuanqiang Luo [ Upstream commit d0f86fb36eb260abd10007b62c9dcc1028e03e61 ] __skb_udp_tunnel_segment() gets the UDP header before ensuring the tunnel header is in the skb head. If the pull reallocates skb->head, the saved UDP header pointer is no longer valid. Get the UDP header after the pull to avoid a potential use-after-free. Fixes: dbef491ebe7f ("udp: Use uh->len instead of skb->len to compute checksum in segmentation") Signed-off-by: Xuanqiang Luo Reviewed-by: Antoine Tenart Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730093554.68127-1-xuanqiang.luo@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c index 35c014e10f24b..60fbb4ca34e00 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c @@ -21,17 +21,19 @@ static struct sk_buff *__skb_udp_tunnel_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, int tnl_hlen = skb_inner_mac_header(skb) - skb_transport_header(skb); bool remcsum, need_csum, offload_csum, gso_partial; struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb); u16 mac_offset = skb->mac_header; __be16 protocol = skb->protocol; u16 mac_len = skb->mac_len; int udp_offset, outer_hlen; + struct udphdr *uh; __wsum partial; bool need_ipsec; if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, tnl_hlen))) goto out; + uh = udp_hdr(skb); + /* Adjust partial header checksum to negate old length. * We cannot rely on the value contained in uh->len as it is * possible that the actual value exceeds the boundaries of the -- 2.53.0