From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 200734CB8A1; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:04:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788185101; cv=none; b=pWv3z6sds8Fwr8Eq6Aws+ePT0vYSNYNFl1UoMmi8WaVA1iZfcpQeDq7vVlUOdygg/T7zGFJ58Ntb70Ja3JkyJEgEafURwH4QDSI1EycKZT0d4H4UX/FGHooTlYfd+V529VXWK6JpRsxuTnfMY5YUegM08OD7EcGmhjQu1/cL3jw= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788185101; c=relaxed/simple; bh=uvFTaUeER/gea8MwODK4VZfOATW8ERqRm6nJv9WF6Mg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=sffGzofkykD77sCQk9hAPDetFyA5ogIX5p3KxR2FuVBTCat+dBEdi6XdYqanlerCAR5LkNHfC1IoX3DS2ieggiprLcjWgypt2kcPrufzc+gqzwaJxT/uEGnA7Kpeya9WkCbxFd6FeqDCqCXjPEmpb+sVXmkwFhWBwH3VgMnZR4s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=pBumvWrB; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="pBumvWrB" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 535401F00A3D; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:04:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788185098; bh=lsClknWqYi/mnQiRujxqAqhYx8pjWWr1lDhgzVW6jCc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=pBumvWrBnB0YOofB+UW8lx4utI+LceW1UvgAqJXgz/4I6H2mtKDCN8C8ecBPmM32B Hvo5Jbwy5mHer6NC6bSNSrsxhPIw3wdcoBXsdkpZndEjYDXzXPqIySxcY6/T6twHxG dykFOJB1ZQOo6q8Th5VE4Nm7QdW7Q5/5QqISe71Y= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Vega , Zihan Xi , Ren Wei , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 5.15 53/69] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 15:35:26 +0200 Message-ID: <20260831133401.362520570@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260831133358.601894154@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260831133358.601894154@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Zihan Xi commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream. attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo. Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC]))) goto error; - if (!x->props.aalgo) { + if (!x->aalg) { if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH]))) goto error;