From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9058C4ACC77; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 13:47:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788184051; cv=none; b=OGihfsOkg4eo+h7OoKvovbiILFMgrEZC5WpFbWrY8FDUhY6VhKsP/hW1kpDzAW1KQ4zPNKZ9J1dsGURYD8SFIqSegid5LFyXeqY9ZT7n847Z2DyCVDRsZJphb6kGnmETCz/iULRXOh8UW3CwX8A8U9e+VvopXcezrj3Tjki2TJE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788184051; c=relaxed/simple; bh=JCRysK7XtzoCQRSli1Zs3T4LseR7NETTqhP9JhZRpvU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=XK3wVWhks6Q2+0Za/i70xZ/p+P6PUXamM8HUOox2KkfVdI80XiJ7Hro/qW6lnE3QVXHftVRfYN4+U6HbpX7WOWOftqJ2nmUchomElFuOrKNHLgp0uGIf6vphg73hkAwhM/MUd60V28LdKVzFVHVvi6zPnX78BbThPRuolIiWQgs= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=ozYT9OP0; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="ozYT9OP0" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7DC701F00A3D; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 13:47:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788184048; bh=XE53V8Z33mfXYU+evjK0HBNnN1cBi/CN+LCc4aPDUPk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=ozYT9OP0EN54zCaMQ4/qiGwEo6EIE/w+7myQ4wgwxCwZKEkL18pu3xjIuZeMn8HVZ z9m6boUyC4K7wDVFD+na7W56yzztjB1LIvsLShmvRwvzDbRd4ZVl57Sw0DN1txfzqK +5RDnQunbpuLcs5CspKrz2RejKqqV39qq/5Exlxo= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Vega , Zihan Xi , Ren Wei , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 6.18 55/83] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 15:34:31 +0200 Message-ID: <20260831133402.339745986@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260831133359.207714926@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260831133359.207714926@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Zihan Xi commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream. attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo. Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC], extack))) goto error; - if (!x->props.aalgo) { + if (!x->aalg) { if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH], extack))) goto error;