From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 507CF43C055; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 13:57:09 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788184630; cv=none; b=H4PEHjbmE2mdgxDaigFSu5d1BfAVlGhPNGInZ3S08idDXk6i/m9inBAdZh1e1JOuRgYSfV47T/dUo+7pijVq9iCd1I1TYRfzio1OQ2wQKtQH4W0YhN0xzAVFS9TlY7pWFFWiWsYVVMZ/7N42R0/jjutMyWZGxIoaNbY8O1aKsXE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788184630; c=relaxed/simple; bh=yshh27xSNhrQ9xJekVmjAUkaGmk5JI8GmDpPcvZI/d0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=HbaDuNvnoUGgiZk7hnIcRl6q7af5OD4RTIyiYqvkHbLFFf1UQxGvjikvYfRVgE5LS+CLthK3dX8fiBDjq4gtBBVAULscXMxv0uTVfnzF5cghy8WTF6gsPbrBcRXtdZqP5Y+0knjkBBXvSChU8z5VmV/t/02fI31iIjUU4xrrMbk= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=oARTFIbC; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="oARTFIbC" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AAB7A1F000E9; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 13:57:08 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788184629; bh=45Um8kb/nGyGD0tYn2Sdw/Ennqyfn33Kz4QWkNm6sKY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=oARTFIbCAF4ee+pp7dnmUztvqH6NdYP6YhZwO/xG3yHmGKa+2WAffNAqEcs/bW5wl PxuK/u4qh/lB3inaBzqO+Qc0dC71jwnxCP3MXV7qHkbUs0aPS6NcPSmojySVkCDo/a TYFEZyCzpYKonPSMjnsRMUSJX6ZFxhrY4QVn8TLY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Vega , Zihan Xi , Ren Wei , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 6.6 75/91] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 15:35:03 +0200 Message-ID: <20260831133403.513377249@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260831133359.468089036@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260831133359.468089036@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Zihan Xi commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream. attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo. Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC], extack))) goto error; - if (!x->props.aalgo) { + if (!x->aalg) { if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH], extack))) goto error;