From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2380B3DB310; Fri, 4 Sep 2026 05:44:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788500698; cv=none; b=d+ZMpL7Mmxhth6/U6wo1SRrVoueMC+ByU4ogfO8WBDwRcvgACRnYqHWGnfDAfL6TvTg6uPlaUDQ/3KASl4RCI3OEVjxJe253HnHVON4P+4JxaUKZxRVm4Q8RGhR5OKX+B6J9vxF+mvdHf5xIXHhTI4qWJ2YVjNyz1jrrQSQyaNY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788500698; c=relaxed/simple; bh=8qaw3sPPYA2iiPk4M3Zoz3QHc+q7amyzonGWB1TKNr4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=jmDaJ/KiFV7r94HnWiL6MYvRpaTskX2nQ0YSO8KMjanl1uyep94G7cU1rToFE7S9D1tqP8i0OACnpqarVppXs4KkHUYeNBlwMCHxT+3Zki94opAC/TSwLJ4bc6Yas8IrjFBp9oIzLC4aB9Joe/vOtT7Mk8aiTqFBJEw2fgiTFf8= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=qhdMHn6O; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="qhdMHn6O" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7E8521F00A3D; Fri, 4 Sep 2026 05:44:56 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788500697; bh=ctKpuDEo3BLRb5h2ZUpdpg7bG5lM/HhqLsrEVEgWROY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=qhdMHn6OUi5qA02m6Rx6KVo191192vDSeVPYQ7oLtvJtxIsYUD7dQDOohS+4wwvRY L46YbaG8m2cuBX1MwQ1tyfAiAh3gY7mBnpg06Zxc9cw5eMO7iD+0i/U8DDAR/k2z/R h6QQAyTo9OyPY4tpeTZe+nNfd2kSiW/WtV4sUhsU= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Robbie Ko , Jeff Layton , Chuck Lever Subject: [PATCH 6.18 147/552] nfsd: reject out-of-range nseconds in NFSv3 SETATTR and create ops Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 06:55:04 +0200 Message-ID: <20260904045751.974302131@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260904045747.813364717@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260904045747.813364717@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Robbie Ko commit eb0eca7720662ba5847df1510e73801f7f473094 upstream. A client can send an NFSv3 SETATTR, CREATE, MKDIR, SYMLINK or MKNOD carrying an atime or mtime whose nseconds field is out of range. The value is well-formed on the wire and decodes cleanly into a valid uint32, but it is not a valid timespec64: tv_nsec must be less than NSEC_PER_SEC. Nothing in the setattr path clamps it. notify_change() runs the time through timestamp_truncate(), which does not reduce tv_nsec below NSEC_PER_SEC when the filesystem supports nanosecond granularity (s_time_gran == 1), and the inode atime/mtime setters store it verbatim (only ctime is normalized, via inode_set_ctime_to_ts()). The un-normalized value then corrupts on-disk metadata: ext4's ext4_encode_extra_time() shifts tv_nsec left by EXT4_EPOCH_BITS, which overflows the 32-bit extra field and clobbers the seconds-epoch bits, so the stored seconds (and thus the year) are wrong on read-back. XFS with bigtime mis-stores the timestamp for the same reason. Validate the client-supplied atime/mtime in the proc handlers and return NFS3ERR_INVAL before anything is changed. RFC 1813 lists NFS3ERR_INVAL for SETATTR and describes it as the error for a value the server 'can not store ... in its own representation'; the client maps it to EINVAL. Checking in the proc handlers, rather than in nfsd_setattr(), keeps the rejection in front of object creation. The create operations create the object before nfsd_create_setattr() runs, so a late failure would leave the new object behind and turn a non-idempotent request into a namespace change that reports failure. The check is therefore done up front, for the create operations before the object is created. tv_nsec is a long, so the comparison casts it to unsigned long (the same width) rather than to u32, matching timespec64_valid(). A u32 cast would truncate on 64-bit; the unsigned long cast also rejects a value that became negative when an out-of-range u32 wire nseconds was assigned to a 32-bit long. Only client-supplied times are checked: SET_TO_SERVER_TIME requests carry no client value. The sattrguard3 ctime is deliberately left alone: an out-of-range guard simply never matches the object's ctime and yields NFS3ERR_NOT_SYNC via the existing guardtime comparison, which is the protocol-correct outcome rather than rejecting the request. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616054027.2360930-2-robbieko@synology.com Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+) --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c @@ -29,6 +29,25 @@ static int nfs3_ftypes[] = { S_IFIFO, /* NF3FIFO */ }; +/* + * Reject a client-supplied atime or mtime whose nanoseconds field is out + * of range. Such a value is well-formed on the wire but is not a valid + * timespec64, and storing it verbatim can corrupt on-disk timestamps. + * tv_nsec is a long, so it is cast to unsigned long (the same width) to + * catch both an over-large value and one that became negative when an + * out-of-range u32 wire nseconds was assigned to a 32-bit long. + */ +static bool nfsd3_time_in_range(const struct iattr *iap) +{ + if ((iap->ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME_SET) && + (unsigned long)iap->ia_atime.tv_nsec >= NSEC_PER_SEC) + return false; + if ((iap->ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET) && + (unsigned long)iap->ia_mtime.tv_nsec >= NSEC_PER_SEC) + return false; + return true; +} + static __be32 nfsd3_map_status(__be32 status) { switch (status) { @@ -101,9 +120,14 @@ nfsd3_proc_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqst SVCFH_fmt(&argp->fh)); fh_copy(&resp->fh, &argp->fh); + if (!nfsd3_time_in_range(&argp->attrs)) { + resp->status = nfserr_inval; + goto out; + } if (argp->check_guard) guardtime = &argp->guardtime; resp->status = nfsd_setattr(rqstp, &resp->fh, &attrs, guardtime); +out: resp->status = nfsd3_map_status(resp->status); return rpc_success; } @@ -265,6 +289,8 @@ nfsd3_create_file(struct svc_rqst *rqstp trace_nfsd_vfs_create(rqstp, fhp, S_IFREG, argp->name, argp->len); + if (!nfsd3_time_in_range(iap)) + return nfserr_inval; if (isdotent(argp->name, argp->len)) return nfserr_exist; if (!(iap->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) @@ -404,8 +430,13 @@ nfsd3_proc_mkdir(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) argp->attrs.ia_valid &= ~ATTR_SIZE; fh_copy(&resp->dirfh, &argp->fh); fh_init(&resp->fh, NFS3_FHSIZE); + if (!nfsd3_time_in_range(&argp->attrs)) { + resp->status = nfserr_inval; + goto out; + } resp->status = nfsd_create(rqstp, &resp->dirfh, argp->name, argp->len, &attrs, S_IFDIR, 0, &resp->fh); +out: resp->status = nfsd3_map_status(resp->status); return rpc_success; } @@ -419,6 +450,10 @@ nfsd3_proc_symlink(struct svc_rqst *rqst .na_iattr = &argp->attrs, }; + if (!nfsd3_time_in_range(&argp->attrs)) { + resp->status = nfserr_inval; + goto out; + } if (argp->tlen == 0) { resp->status = nfserr_inval; goto out; @@ -475,6 +510,11 @@ nfsd3_proc_mknod(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) goto out; } + if (!nfsd3_time_in_range(&argp->attrs)) { + resp->status = nfserr_inval; + goto out; + } + type = nfs3_ftypes[argp->ftype]; resp->status = nfsd_create(rqstp, &resp->dirfh, argp->name, argp->len, &attrs, type, rdev, &resp->fh);