From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1861B3D9521; Fri, 4 Sep 2026 05:12:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788498732; cv=none; b=a3e91rnu6IVOn6TqmsehvmfNc1vKqd2BgM+VFUAGGv7bTL66DjUl11iSenTQfMvZhfUDquvJ+FUEmlZ7aSpzq53EQaHaC2ohpD17vi9CU5og844EMkGq+QFc2tm0D1fXqSBaGvuukAKZOAHMA07u5i95M7AJK9IhiiHtmpCKdwE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788498732; c=relaxed/simple; bh=0mMTm/VpTOMw/U2CTo55hYONr51LdgnjxqDlEzxGF64=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=E7GoHC/B1xShW/qPd4yEGmWcHWWpi8xD4lcDUuMcJsWU5hptJpd7DlG6nYohmDQI5qpSripgjkhVLSiZReeof3oCX3C1K2fOQnUzidtAnzJej3k5BNlgO1E//gbIELM+R10qoAWwgt9/pM6rSMSOTHpbZSkYAhScQOmJP7H9o9s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=E5j6Xtly; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="E5j6Xtly" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 71C171F00AC4; Fri, 4 Sep 2026 05:12:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788498731; bh=27L14dBcxUnZl+d4Cyq2/kGxiaqdQQoXLUK4iE0mwjg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=E5j6Xtly89AGOGTtowpkmANCgsVJURVm12rrsKurVL2HRjZvQq1TfuDjVNyrnWUj3 xZvrqB0AxTi+sYlQOoqTWrwfNy7kSR4UtRKAhKVpn/HAH8O4KWabe7KVW1VJYNHf+n ps/M7CaPydCQbzSXPNeCvkHewUknCKOd+NlEtZpc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Jeff Layton , Chuck Lever Subject: [PATCH 7.2 165/713] nfsd: check client ownership when cancelling a copy-notify stateid Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 06:52:13 +0200 Message-ID: <20260904045807.522451829@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260904045803.810145556@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260904045803.810145556@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jeff Layton commit 6bdbfab96e0cf25e5f57dac5c09dc1749751a4bf upstream. On the OFFLOAD_CANCEL path (clp != NULL), manage_cpntf_state() freed the target cpntf state without checking ownership. The lookup key st->si_opaque.so_id is allocated cyclically (guessable) and the embedded clientid is the fixed per-net nn->s2s_cp_cl_id, so any authenticated NFSv4.2 client could cancel and free another client's copy-notify stateid. Compare the creating clientid recorded in state->cp_p_clid against the requesting client's cl_clientid and return nfserr_bad_stateid on a mismatch instead of freeing the entry. Fixes: ce0887ac96d3 ("NFSD add nfs4 inter ssc to nfsd4_copy") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-nfsd-testing-v3-5-a0ff7db6aa3e@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -7504,10 +7504,20 @@ __be32 manage_cpntf_state(struct nfsd_ne state = NULL; goto unlock; } - if (!clp) + if (!clp) { refcount_inc(&state->cp_stateid.cs_count); - else + } else if (memcmp(&clp->cl_clientid, &state->cp_p_clid, + sizeof(clientid_t))) { + /* + * OFFLOAD_CANCEL: only the creating client may cancel. + * so_id is guessable, so without this check any client + * could free another's cpntf state. + */ + state = NULL; + goto unlock; + } else { _free_cpntf_state_locked(nn, state); + } } unlock: spin_unlock(&nn->s2s_cp_lock);