From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C1BAE42586B; Sat, 12 Sep 2026 13:40:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789220453; cv=none; b=KpMy0nD2JIqcTcQT0HVgq4pYLwWJuoX81XTvev683iX183ZLJlLLbnQmTjIWrRuomm2+BiCkOVvCQyP3IFvTgt/EeyUZbvgEDtkPJqzDCjE5Xu/bv62Rb3REOtXmskbfTrrvj3JlTyQtAjSR3W0gX0rsbBB7BRUy5gObLScR8Sk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789220453; c=relaxed/simple; bh=oK1m4HEB5g/hL+HK9zWplxbDryMhq+lkuQgnTHqJQnE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=OUmJ/kP8g3fVNG2x0NhswaOFC86zrlegJEEw+tBSesJzC+4v29lkU/VjBsF8Ce11sUlxddC2noTITTIJJ0WZy+fjCRtA8SfCDdVThz7uAQTTs06SuwtcpbWyDoSEGkQeRd2rtMbEjVIo2/TWgiQSQpGYT3ygusWt65wNTNi6wkc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=emV3y/YN; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="emV3y/YN" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 95EDB1F000FF; Sat, 12 Sep 2026 13:40:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1789220451; bh=w0eql4V26cvUsu43ueYQCtPct6T2WO+Aio1SzGYku+c=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=emV3y/YN86Tvs1mvIdGghd2d8xFOeflV+WxEksXOsjjQ7JED2CQGNkCxQUWvtPXf+ ts+965l8XyyqSuUxZ8RYeoL91AT9Ob2nqpDPx1/86iYWG83ggwR9b+ELLxCCgi+LhO prRlGrQE7/lop1rw8FVsVR9x8INmlCC9Mn9Hqn2o= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Bryam Vargas , Joseph Qi , Changwei Ge , Heming Zhao , Joel Becker , Jun Piao , Junxiao Bi , Mark Fasheh , Andrew Morton Subject: [PATCH 6.6 0180/1424] ocfs2: bound namelen in dlm_migrate_request_handler Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2026 08:43:32 +0200 Message-ID: <20260912065611.322973929@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260912065607.279695368@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260912065607.279695368@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Bryam Vargas commit ea5b5609305a8437bc955a0834a530c12246d78f upstream. Patch series "ocfs2/dlm: bound peer-controlled lengths in the o2dlm". The o2dlm receive handlers trust u8 length and count fields from the wire without bounding them, so a node in a DLM domain can corrupt or panic any other node with a malformed message. Three defects: - dlm_migrate_request_handler() passes migrate->namelen unchecked to dlm_init_mle(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte mname[] of an o2dlm_mle slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~215 attacker-controlled bytes. - dlm_mig_lockres_handler() passes mres->lockname_len unchecked to dlm_init_lockres(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~223 bytes. - the same handler trusts mres->num_locks without checking that the message is large enough to hold that many entries, so dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[] past the kmalloc(data_len) copy and trips a BUG_ON (an out-of-bounds read ending in a panic). The other o2dlm receive handlers already reject an oversized name; the migration and recovery handlers have omitted it since the DLM was added (see the Fixes tags). Patch 1 bounds namelen; patch 2 validates lockname_len, num_locks, and the payload size. Conforming recovery and migration traffic is unaffected. o2net authenticates peers only by the DLM domain key, so any node that has joined the domain -- including a compromised or malicious member -- can send these messages. There is no local trigger; the attacker must already be a member of the cluster. Each sink was confirmed under KASAN with an out-of-tree module mirroring it exactly -- a kmem_cache/kmalloc of the real destination size, then the same unclamped memcpy/loop: slab-out-of-bounds Write for the two writes, Read for the recovery walk, and a panic. A userspace AddressSanitizer build faults identically under -m32 and -m64. Scrubbed logs are available on request. I reported this privately to security@kernel.org and the ocfs2 maintainers on 2026-06-20; with no response after the standard embargo period I am posting the fix publicly. I have no embargo requirement. This patch (of 2): A node receiving a DLM_MIGRATE_REQUEST message trusts the peer-supplied name length (migrate->namelen) without bounding it. dlm_init_mle() then copies that many bytes into the fixed DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX-byte mname[] array of an o2dlm_mle slab object, so a malformed message from a cluster peer overflows the slab object by up to ~215 bytes: a heap out-of-bounds write of attacker-controlled data, reachable by any node in the domain. Reject an oversized name, the way dlm_master_request_handler() and the other o2dlm receive handlers already do; the migration handler omits the check entirely. Conforming messages are unaffected. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-0-6953bcc0421f@proton.me Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-1-6953bcc0421f@proton.me Fixes: 6714d8e86bf4 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Heming Zhao Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c @@ -3112,6 +3112,12 @@ int dlm_migrate_request_handler(struct o name = migrate->name; namelen = migrate->namelen; + if (namelen > DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX) { + mlog(ML_ERROR, "%s: invalid name length %u in migrate request\n", + dlm->name, namelen); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto leave; + } hash = dlm_lockid_hash(name, namelen); /* preallocate.. if this fails, abort */