From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4D0B83438A6; Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:58:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790791089; cv=none; b=P7cmOUH7SGhI86D19xEjUaby/nyZF1ILyjDQlI5iyNZkdwaMv65gqL6SiAJ2mw88spPBb3Djkyk5MMTwhE0wJao7RqvBeVURMwLL6AFWvEfIjEKk9mmPacZOKJNcY25qKvB3nudSiWzhAGWMZo00EST2kKqvBCSx0VYlqb3h9bU= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790791089; c=relaxed/simple; bh=pckph+sDh+H0VdaXkR5z5KJLpAmq2EwDw2D4VC0wcwU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=gdudkE86WzPAJuF9uyxXpUuVxgX2sojNuxKPlJCuyQzpHM8GSdUHdk8GYDH1f5XJ5T9rQJQ1/q1CPvX8kd9qlZU4o1t4qoiq6Hq3ixPBsCJDjX3ljzmyVA23p7bbHEcLROvV1O52t5RQoQJMtpfi8Gh+I1jMszmr3/S5ABLRYao= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=WVOjrB++; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="WVOjrB++" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A9CBB1F000FF; Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:58:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1790791088; bh=p5M5CHdHTO6aNPZn5ziikQ/+n2hXAMWpHxzi3boBjBI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=WVOjrB++1PGssKJ1tkm5ILzT+0QveMjRXWQ9cIBD7+m7rN6sv+L3ZjjA/m8sQkluB UnzbWO7iKY4VxtZDOaYrjond5Djz271zFi7zkrEhjTBVe1pUI/jnQoLM63gm+mZz3s SWF5rhUDLHYcF3Ey0eU104gBju43BrIH167yeajc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Aurelien DESBRIERES , Md Haris Iqbal , Jason Gunthorpe , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.15 128/752] RDMA/rtrs-srv: Fix integer underflow in process_read and process_write Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:19:58 +0200 Message-ID: <20260930152400.948938174@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260930152358.131179731@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260930152358.131179731@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Aurelien DESBRIERES [ Upstream commit 54bf38b27afc08a0eb6b732f9c14eb8a4bcb66b5 ] usr_len is read from a network-supplied message field (le16_to_cpu) and used to compute data_len = off - usr_len without validating that usr_len <= off. A malicious RDMA client can send usr_len > off causing an integer underflow, resulting in data_len wrapping to a huge size_t value which is then passed to the rdma_ev callback as a memory length, leading to out-of-bounds memory access. Fix by reading and validating usr_len <= off before rtrs_srv_get_ops_ids() in both process_read() and process_write(), ensuring the early return path acquires no reference and has no resource leak. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260608134802.5019-1-aurelien@hackers.camp Reported-by: Aurelien DESBRIERES Reviewed-by: Md Haris Iqbal Signed-off-by: Aurelien DESBRIERES Assisted-by: Claude Acked-by: Md Haris Iqbal Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c index b7f7e24807dfb..455d315dcebf5 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c @@ -1047,6 +1047,11 @@ static void process_read(struct rtrs_srv_con *con, "Processing read request failed, invalid message\n"); return; } + usr_len = le16_to_cpu(msg->usr_len); + if (usr_len > off) { + pr_debug("rtrs-srv: Invalid usr_len %zu > off %u\n", usr_len, off); + return; + } rtrs_srv_get_ops_ids(srv_path); rtrs_srv_update_rdma_stats(srv_path->stats, off, READ); id = srv_path->ops_ids[buf_id]; @@ -1054,7 +1059,6 @@ static void process_read(struct rtrs_srv_con *con, id->dir = READ; id->msg_id = buf_id; id->rd_msg = msg; - usr_len = le16_to_cpu(msg->usr_len); data_len = off - usr_len; data = page_address(srv->chunks[buf_id]); ret = ctx->ops.rdma_ev(srv->priv, id, READ, data, data_len, @@ -1100,6 +1104,11 @@ static void process_write(struct rtrs_srv_con *con, rtrs_srv_state_str(srv_path->state)); return; } + usr_len = le16_to_cpu(req->usr_len); + if (usr_len > off) { + pr_debug("rtrs-srv: Invalid usr_len %zu > off %u\n", usr_len, off); + return; + } rtrs_srv_get_ops_ids(srv_path); rtrs_srv_update_rdma_stats(srv_path->stats, off, WRITE); id = srv_path->ops_ids[buf_id]; @@ -1107,7 +1116,6 @@ static void process_write(struct rtrs_srv_con *con, id->dir = WRITE; id->msg_id = buf_id; - usr_len = le16_to_cpu(req->usr_len); data_len = off - usr_len; data = page_address(srv->chunks[buf_id]); ret = ctx->ops.rdma_ev(srv->priv, id, WRITE, data, data_len, -- 2.53.0