From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 351993644C1; Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:20:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790788842; cv=none; b=m5iG0/wO/52TsCsLYBC1kOidSxxbUxa/BRcC0rvIll4olLht0T3nx6Y3ds4mL2SwKIxVileN5AXYIn6NR4dG7zS3cZ0foek1Ky/Bzb5DBKovSDTQCc9hQRMVS+PacxkKUBovKw7KaFeO6KBgUQAEp/ZjEMcGJjgopzF+4ofiGR0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790788842; c=relaxed/simple; bh=KunNLt3n8vXxb6JMwVS5VnhwiyJCQQz6MDjCcLaJn78=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=aez0/k9ORPBEK9GYlEbwLXRLSlIr85vpBwzftQGAomF2vTfdhxEf7TOsllGNdigJE83EnRG8cGOikjQ98JWQ3nk9D9PMtZvh6PRf7YEktS38Vvmmoy0yh//T+7asx6BTdwMrzvbuS7sWQw3iHcQD+1W6NA8DG3C8wocBTae1j84= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=Tdp8rKVM; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="Tdp8rKVM" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 90FEC1F000FF; Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:20:40 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1790788841; bh=eOOHr079yeGEENy/javcdXi3cvkhFhllTCIY+Z8bIuw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Tdp8rKVMa7wt9o5bVz5H5KVTFOXj2hpyxI7lYxBE456/1GWdjvHI+Jmhy9aO3i8f0 pXo+tf8KRjU5Yjjq19SoLHIeE7BYpxtXAV+nhnhrIEb+7/sK+I3npUNI0j4gqto6mi P0gEA+4SZSFsTIevoWL0jG/U9VCeOHjEpifL792M= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Doruk Tan Ozturk , Johannes Berg Subject: [PATCH 6.12 268/877] wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:19:39 +0200 Message-ID: <20260930152420.506814547@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260930152414.738996857@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260930152414.738996857@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Doruk Tan Ozturk commit e667aee1c192d67d27c803007bfa9c6e0873e959 upstream. mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing. Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). Fixes: 5e6e3a92b9a4 ("wireless: mwifiex: initial commit for Marvell mwifiex driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: 0sec:multi-model Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260814134704.85902-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c @@ -104,12 +104,24 @@ has_vendor_hdr(struct ieee_types_vendor_ * a given oui in PTK. */ static u8 -mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie(struct ie_body *iebody, u8 *oui) +mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie(struct ie_body *iebody, u8 *oui, int ie_len) { + const size_t ptk_body_offset = offsetof(struct ie_body, ptk_body); u8 count; + /* ie_len is the number of bytes available at iebody. Keep it signed + * and reject a negative (underflowed) length before the unsigned + * comparisons below, so a small or zero IE length cannot wrap. + */ + if (ie_len < 0 || (size_t)ie_len < ptk_body_offset) + return MWIFIEX_OUI_NOT_PRESENT; + count = iebody->ptk_cnt[0]; + /* Reject an OUI count whose list would run past the element. */ + if (ptk_body_offset + count * sizeof(iebody->ptk_body) > (size_t)ie_len) + return MWIFIEX_OUI_NOT_PRESENT; + /* There could be multiple OUIs for PTK hence 1) Take the length. 2) Check all the OUIs for AES. @@ -143,11 +155,14 @@ mwifiex_is_rsn_oui_present(struct mwifie u8 ret = MWIFIEX_OUI_NOT_PRESENT; if (has_ieee_hdr(bss_desc->bcn_rsn_ie, WLAN_EID_RSN)) { + int ie_len = (int)bss_desc->bcn_rsn_ie->ieee_hdr.len - + RSN_GTK_OUI_OFFSET; + iebody = (struct ie_body *) (((u8 *) bss_desc->bcn_rsn_ie->data) + RSN_GTK_OUI_OFFSET); oui = &mwifiex_rsn_oui[cipher][0]; - ret = mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie(iebody, oui); + ret = mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie(iebody, oui, ie_len); if (ret) return ret; } @@ -169,10 +184,14 @@ mwifiex_is_wpa_oui_present(struct mwifie u8 ret = MWIFIEX_OUI_NOT_PRESENT; if (has_vendor_hdr(bss_desc->bcn_wpa_ie, WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC)) { + int ie_len = (int)bss_desc->bcn_wpa_ie->vend_hdr.len - + (int)sizeof(bss_desc->bcn_wpa_ie->vend_hdr.oui) - + WPA_GTK_OUI_OFFSET; + iebody = (struct ie_body *)((u8 *)bss_desc->bcn_wpa_ie->data + WPA_GTK_OUI_OFFSET); oui = &mwifiex_wpa_oui[cipher][0]; - ret = mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie(iebody, oui); + ret = mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie(iebody, oui, ie_len); if (ret) return ret; }