From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1793210381; b=emiu89wgih5ASJBucKTzgESW4W0zdDq0XxnVj77Mk0zWpSvDhfqCwn62jLVesjMkx+Pd aTS8R48RHeO5nlXGMQMek6v3YmcI2YpqkuUes25GAdLKp6J3ou11T8bybmaUXClTZcmwP gJYUHFESK/eQv+y1AJYUDOzYqiwm/IbiYLJMpNZBqu8H0l3pYqPnSvHarUpu8NkYKYUoE 2fzCvd+m7uwsjHBQr838a1x0IOOtHosgBXGa12TjQX9Hu8s9B012V7zwcQpvyeaYNOZsl QTI5iytBD+qSx2yNyHPrXv/VxSYfq/878XrNyts87LMgLz7DYLNx/tOugStcVr0K/+A== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1793210381; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=jzmGSYSXcBEYCUuAKX7Hs239pyRqcqZiiGtlG4fvL24=; b=y+OX58MRof80n+F2AuyfkjVjfWeynKLMuosMQaFlXaJUgQ3ZE6lIUycJW6Si5l+9OPkH nl0X0iXixxjNkrrtcV0HFP3jr+sLhfFpBvrEcaybJD1Hj3I8UnsL2rJ/i49bc6GYieNzZ kAuaQ3LE1aDwh7SCRa5NtnFV4vK6pWV7Cg/2I5uwhq8pqL5bIozz0cMpt02dZWm4WUlbv 2esQrawtm+NZPUMEwXenfanXuN1O2ScfQgONxK80BCMRCplKR0MtI7w7NBxPDQL1F1z6s XxJnRZchFhz1WIql4VYykDMznVI4hIG5p+rtU0gD+2+jIgGQib+lkH1fq9jHzEARXpw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=itSl6Zjl; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A5A16606A31C; Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:59:40 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key, unprotected) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=itSl6Zjl Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 031661F01825; Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:59:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1793210380; bh=jzmGSYSXcBEYCUuAKX7Hs239pyRqcqZiiGtlG4fvL24=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=itSl6ZjlxZ5vR8Kp02nwkdAXBrU6rEnmku1SVPpBju6NU3Fachsbkm8pAGxuaiGEM f41nu42hOqnX4ntwiAg87Og8NCiGeqhiq9izJr+R3+uGczM9rVxmZVfKFoWSQvJK2i q1dnvT8A0qyR+7QKGx6t50DFdg3xb85i/A4H3V9w= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Cen Zhang , Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: [PATCH 6.6 154/168] keys: Check the authorization payload in process keyring searches Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 18:01:30 +0100 Message-ID: <20261028165946.730926632@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261028165943.089486480@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261028165943.089486480@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Cen Zhang commit 0a0ec45bf577a9b4d4960567f20d3877ef480de9 upstream. An authorization payload and its saved credentials must remain valid while search_process_keyrings_rcu() searches the requestor's keyrings. The function validates the authorization key, then separately loads payload.data[0] and unconditionally reads rka->cred. Validation does not prevent request_key_auth_revoke() from clearing the payload. A request-key helper can assume authority and fork a descendant that inherits the authorization key. If the descendant misses in its own keyrings, it falls back to the saved requestor credentials. Successful target instantiation invalidates the authorization key without clearing the payload. After the helper exits, UMH_WAIT_PROC returns to the requester, which calls complete_request_key() and revokes that key. With the descendant paused after validation, the paths can interleave as follows: 1. The descendant enters search_process_keyrings_rcu() under RCU and key_validate() succeeds. 2. The helper instantiates the target, invalidates the authorization key, and exits. 3. The requester resumes from UMH_WAIT_PROC, calls complete_request_key(), and revokes the authorization key. request_key_auth_revoke() sets its payload pointer to NULL. 4. The descendant loads NULL and dereferences rka->cred. This NULL dereference can oops the kernel. RCU delays payload disposal but does not prevent the pointer from being cleared. Load the payload with dereference_key_rcu() and require a non-NULL result before validating the authorization key and searching its saved credentials. A non-NULL payload and its credentials remain alive for the caller's RCU read-side section; a cleared payload skips the fallback search and follows the existing error selection. KASAN report as below: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] RIP: 0010:search_process_keyrings_rcu+0x32b/0x790 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e59428f721ee ("keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions") Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/pm-key-management-objects-candidate-0004-v3-598361863b76bc25d58d@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/keys/process_keys.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -556,9 +556,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings_rcu(st ) { const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred; - if (key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) { - rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; - + rka = dereference_key_rcu(cred->request_key_auth); + if (rka && key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) { //// was search_process_keyrings() [ie. recursive] ctx->cred = rka->cred; key_ref = search_cred_keyrings_rcu(ctx);