From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1793210338; b=WoXfEMwg4+RNsnG+LX0b0NOSyGtVODuQVCu017zkPnPEhzCBUldjp3dPboqTEV1CvZFQ Qf03fnn2/2fr+cT/irc5gUdThBzppyS6aelxcd/xAJChd1t0MRtmrrNyTn6/0I3g7fcbm JfboMRdj5L3TlhRf1aGeQnI15M5uIqhQuCd9bEZs53q/+0+0cgsuTvJwuXT+iIzyUha7U TF/viv6wju23WiKtYsGfd8mn/1Gfa9Jj9bSK+lZRtSqA9HJN3iYq2BF8eFCUwTuNG1QeL OEiSo0R9w6DBQZr2KwZUDDRUWP2gZvaM+fs7K+AxhW9zU2vJkoI1P32O6d4FSezVNTA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1793210338; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=Vy98fDSQygXzGHHV/qCFdoyrSE7FZvWAg2Qc28IhVtU=; b=bvYtr3Kr12vyEVH2UAQlMHQmdXIDB71RJCsvYRTqJeF+ahbxVXFysVBjfuP9VZeRKHJJ AM0pVLqUfHdWsLz2yV0HvmyoJAXVLsLGSVtKxV7QDrFpA64KC6mo1yMjllu0NQkyacFN2 AkyqbMuStL3nnl2zeWvt6tABPXjDDoxd9NLB+Y/YlJOzUMwRjKPuewckgfoYJn9aN8IZZ DHfQ7YUsklAe74YKzpTQoL1EcfOYm5Z0ItpWlOGyq0o54iYo1Kr1p/e6tyGsuzVLNOHOV ud/9jssV0PFbVY6ekSINdKuDNweZG8VnELvAex1rx036lRpUg0wnmEZSfH7gQtPLL/w== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=xs0vnfzQ; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB961606A31C; Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:58:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key, unprotected) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=xs0vnfzQ Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 47A861F01825; Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:58:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1793210337; bh=Vy98fDSQygXzGHHV/qCFdoyrSE7FZvWAg2Qc28IhVtU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=xs0vnfzQoTaWZibZPBzDN5IZSIrWLCiJ8VIDNZrgFF1LZZF2HCyUQYY5w1RklCxBf U2ar35BAA9SDg9k1Z5YGakLn5BI2+7aoQIW7RQHQrtv2DP7TPGwG0f9HOy5DivM2yI 8fHIxpdY82LzK5+9zvPmcrWTNz22osNgic0nudEI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Xiang Mei , Weiming Shi , Herbert Xu Subject: [PATCH 6.6 161/168] asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 18:01:37 +0100 Message-ID: <20261028165946.898930029@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261028165943.089486480@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261028165943.089486480@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Weiming Shi commit 9695df3b1db4ac4534274d38ee16e3b9b0bf910e upstream. The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING followed by add_key(). Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279) Call Trace: __key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884) key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021) __do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a valid trust anchor. Fixes: 3c58b2362ba8 ("KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Xiang Mei Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260429181629.110802-2-bestswngs@gmail.com Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c @@ -236,10 +236,14 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct if (IS_ERR(key)) key = NULL; } else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) { + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids; const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids; - signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **) - asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id; + kids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted); + if (!kids) + return -ENOKEY; + + signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)kids->id; /* * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the