From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795022788; b=k5/Ku351c5v492RLOuWdGBAs5glalg4u111VLqdQXOzLp1YCIfIHavzKReO4Nk8uetvD MpZ4k9irvPjXikQDxm4lW4WGmbeF7Z45K7QsDyR9o02Qkq/z54alKjE6CM0ReIEhvsVjj VilIJEMhDm0ChRp7engOL7fjw2o/L9zV2VxPzZb1GaI0oL9KEEjdkgl1e9rviVagqjxXB bq7FwF+6WWd4xdCIy3IjTypP/UyU6HuBef0G4aI5+2m2qxKk9WmJreamzxQzS6QaIEqMf k1q7Du+6q6OoiXfb5nR6X1/xo4cEpu54NVsutfsOYEAWrkcMvp9UMYDsqnV1nccO8ww== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795022788; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=PSXHDEjLu3IgQhXr/u/vlqCeVMJzrxZ1vG+NOOg+utU=; b=SecGeHcOZ+ZMJT2sQXuJHwHhx+JT2k/uabtrV8GsSgUpVA92BReqZrXEWYenLfPg/twH FeMaSsnoql9Q2HL4/Xi/gs5uYcKVS82KkhEnmOb8wfMn4MtEW4f99tbQhLfdhOi23f59n 7Jo2N6r0i26Sj58NAHFEtjqjNCW15F2de2yuXCwZAQRTV/MQJgEly+Rj3NXHowDN6C+Iq nRZni9ljWX3Xb3mDtzD5IMTSABAJoeduEyukA4J7+4ttu8vf3ugmdak6CHMTDWWzq4fd1 Oeh1jhfdVh7ItDvTmRYCNRMWDM0GxMeRAzzlijJqX7srpYPAClMJe/G8tDEJT2BjAPw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=QlIut0nV; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DB02E606DABF; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:26:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=QlIut0nV Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EBA6C1F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:26:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795022788; bh=PSXHDEjLu3IgQhXr/u/vlqCeVMJzrxZ1vG+NOOg+utU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=QlIut0nVoJSlMJVMXHFImDnl8vw/sUludGGG+GLyeCVDbRnwAyUFErBJcnK9cGGAW OZD7AmZnTVpF/QKtu3uZpI4Z3j3/Y5jVU8WuSjM29pir7UOwyXpxgJr3b9jiK/gDaw Xi5Yppd9pquCKdx+CL0aR2sXdgYi6BPMyuei4JPU= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Francis Perron , AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com, "Cen Zhang (Microsoft)" , John Johansen , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.18 0097/2151] apparmor: fix query_data() output overlapping the lookup key Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:30:32 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118150125.336231155@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118150121.603863898@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118150121.603863898@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) [ Upstream commit d30844001360a403a511cf24fc75ecaa6a7a7544 ] In query_data(), buf and query point into the same multi_transaction buffer: buf at the start, query a few bytes in, and the lookup key right after the label string that query points to. Reusing the buffer is by design and is safe as long as the query is fully parsed before buf is written to, but the key is not: it is dereferenced on every iteration of label_for_each_confined(), after output has already been written. So when the label has more than one profile with a data table, the data of the first matching profile is written to buf while the key is still needed, and overwrites it if the data is large enough. The later lookups then run on a corrupted key. Besides, if the data has no NUL byte from the key's position to the end of the allocation, strhash() -> strlen() -> jhash() reads past the 4096-byte slab object, triggering an out-of-bound read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jhash+0x595/0x5e0 Read of size 1 at addr ff1100001159d000 by task exploit/155 CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 155 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.3.0-rc7 #1 Call Trace: jhash+0x595/0x5e0 aa_write_access+0x880/0x1400 vfs_write+0x26f/0xd20 ksys_write+0x115/0x210 Writing to the .access file is unprivileged (0666), but triggering this requires loaded profiles that carry a data table, which needs CAP_MAC_ADMIN and is not the case on default distribution policies. Fix by copying the key with kstrdup() before writing any output to buf, so the key stays valid across all loop iterations regardless of what gets written to the overlapping buffer. Fixes: 317d9a054e1c ("apparmor: update query interface to support label queries") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+ Cc: Francis Perron Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 765812092cacd..48711167956eb 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static void profile_query_cb(const struct aa_profile *profile, static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len, char *query, size_t query_len) { - char *out; + char *out, *keydup; const char *key; struct label_it i; struct aa_label *label, *curr; @@ -777,11 +777,18 @@ static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len, if (buf_len < sizeof(bytes) + sizeof(blocks)) return -EINVAL; /* not enough space */ + /* buf overlaps query, keep a copy of the key for the later lookups */ + keydup = kstrdup(key, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!keydup) + return -ENOMEM; + curr = begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); label = aa_label_parse(curr, query, GFP_KERNEL, false, false); end_current_label_crit_section(curr, needput); - if (IS_ERR(label)) + if (IS_ERR(label)) { + kfree(keydup); return PTR_ERR(label); + } /* We are going to leave space for two numbers. The first is the total * number of bytes we are writing after the first number. This is so @@ -799,13 +806,14 @@ static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len, if (!profile->data) continue; - data = rhashtable_lookup_fast(profile->data, &key, + data = rhashtable_lookup_fast(profile->data, &keydup, profile->data->p); if (data) { if (out + sizeof(outle32) + data->size > buf + buf_len) { aa_put_label(label); + kfree(keydup); return -EINVAL; /* not enough space */ } outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(data->size); @@ -817,6 +825,7 @@ static ssize_t query_data(char *buf, size_t buf_len, } } aa_put_label(label); + kfree(keydup); outle32 = __cpu_to_le32(out - buf - sizeof(bytes)); memcpy(buf, &outle32, sizeof(outle32)); -- 2.53.0