From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev, "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH 6.6 0001/3318] x86/bugs: Mitigate TSA on AMD Zen5
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:10:23 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261118150313.635843521@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118150313.527275416@linuxfoundation.org>
6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>
Commit cf27412f19c9cc5909b9107cd1b3f4ab7608e362 upstream.
Zen5 is affected by TSA too, along with a third variant called TSA_FILL.
Detect the vuln there and mitigate it. For Zen5, a table of microcode
revisions is not needed because appropriate microcode sets the VERW_CLEAR
CPUID bit, which simplifies mitigation detection considerably.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 9 +++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 2 ++
6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -475,6 +475,8 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM (21*32+13) /* "" Clear CPU buffers using VERW before VMRUN */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER (21*32+14) /* Use IBPB on exit-to-userspace, see VMSCAPE bug */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO (21*32+17) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-FILL */
+
/*
* BUG word(s)
*/
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -594,9 +594,14 @@ static void tsa_init(struct cpuinfo_x86
if (amd_check_tsa_microcode())
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR);
} else {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO);
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO);
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN5)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO);
+ }
}
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN5))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO);
}
static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1341,6 +1341,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO | TSA | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x1a, SRSO | TSA | VMSCAPE),
{}
};
@@ -1547,7 +1548,8 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO) ||
- !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO)) {
+ !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO) ||
+ !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO)) {
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, TSA) ||
/* Enable bug on Zen guests to allow for live migration. */
(cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN)))
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits
{ X86_FEATURE_BMEC, CPUID_EBX, 3, 0x80000020, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO, CPUID_ECX, 1, 0x80000021, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x80000021, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO, CPUID_ECX, 7, 0x80000021, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x80000022, 0 },
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -794,11 +794,12 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_VERW_CLEAR);
kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX,
- F(TSA_SQ_NO) | F(TSA_L1_NO)
+ F(TSA_SQ_NO) | F(TSA_L1_NO) | F(TSA_FILL_NO)
);
kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO);
kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO);
+ kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO);
/*
* Synthesize "LFENCE is serializing" into the AMD-defined entry in
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
/* CPUID level 0x80000021 (ECX) */
#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, 1)
#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, 2)
+#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_TSA_FILL_NO KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_ECX, 7)
struct cpuid_reg {
u32 function;
@@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_tra
KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(BHI_CTRL);
KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(TSA_SQ_NO);
KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(TSA_L1_NO);
+ KVM_X86_TRANSLATE_FEATURE(TSA_FILL_NO);
default:
return x86_feature;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 14:10 [PATCH 6.6 0000/3318] 6.6.163-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-18 14:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [PATCH 6.6 0002/3318] xen-netback: Fix XenBus connection failure cleanup Greg Kroah-Hartman
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