From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795036156; b=kjIXHvEKNK6t/rAaULBJCsQs59BeelQrl0DV8UQbMP+fCXHB9G8DaiBDFGWiphA0kVd1 vDq1C1BIb/tUAHitrnyi9spWXMqSNM2GpUbg3d9PKGy28elXysYiA1+xBHOOWxguVmlbb hAOo2BGebzjD/m0XDGoc/Hs9kfxXNuDl6rKqZQWMq5qWRlO6gUoO+hsG7UMPQZwxh0Oq6 wthgC04+zEogtkliMOxYllXhDy4QPEVjI+fLoV0Ls/ATIesryrxv5JstIKwPqdcE0hNpF 3XUHgX9V7DDmIyymi/0ux+zOhHp87JhZM4qDzQLC+DP8DPg8wi1i02pXcIZ8c/oDQ6w== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795036156; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=tYAVIi+qlGKaHXp3+qHJEp4NJg3A3ksP2dGunnPz7nE=; b=q9RlMA1/oBfUWT7ho6BfGmIaiq87d5Mj+QdwbLP0am1xwIQu5LZR59q+DHV0HaPo3Nr4 TB6FpzY9gHKT0ng8m/n53v+JqghhAuOMo58m6T7ZjtKNi0Y31Cg2jPOtq7pgMzqs3Woq0 JDuCfPOAThJpAIy5Nj1C62eDezyPhayZuTsjfUKTQ9u5A5Jc393RCvSHhbbZz12dUdiGQ seZA84fKfxcZ6g1at3mRfpXvoImbcxTbj4TLDXezXDBV3Z7nzxhO9nMl+40sSZjI6MWnQ e0McoVud+j2Oqx1dyuF4KAAiGGnAxAYTUvO93O/rA/tqVKSOxJc0PP0d7514mP5Oktw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=tX6dGOkK; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C654606A320; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:09:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=tX6dGOkK Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EEBAD1F000C8; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:09:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795036156; bh=tYAVIi+qlGKaHXp3+qHJEp4NJg3A3ksP2dGunnPz7nE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=tX6dGOkKcx6ncFkasA+uIz03MbETTIBbOlqvb6i7kHfTUBVSafxcPwXM0O/c5BGxC KcOnvgeIebTdicEmGBrqlQveFE+2zAI5lWFNEUjcggKoAVcmx9Ux3w79kK3d1Q1XiI C+4fuLbFmISHU5gQPM1rcF4gKluzvPf/IH2OeTeU= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Ibrahim Hashimov , Konstantin Komarov , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.6 0958/3318] fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in find_log_rec() causing OOB read Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:26:20 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118150348.378876877@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118150313.527275416@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118150313.527275416@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Ibrahim Hashimov [ Upstream commit e2fcb0040b0b4097b2e97f3fbe77d3b66df9e816 ] find_log_rec() validates the on-disk LFS_RECORD_HDR.client_data_len field (`len`, a raw u32 read straight from a mounted $LogFile page) against the log's total available space: len = le32_to_cpu(rh->client_data_len); rec_len = len + log->record_header_len; if (rec_len >= log->total_avail) return -EINVAL; The addition is unchecked. For len in [0xffffffd0, 0xffffffff] (i.e. log->record_header_len away from UINT_MAX), `rec_len` wraps to a small u32 value that trivially clears the `rec_len >= log->total_avail` guard, so a record whose declared length is actually ~4 GiB is reported as valid and in-page. Because find_log_rec() wrongly accepts the record, its caller read_log_rec_lcb() hands it back to log_replay() as good. On the transaction-table replay leg, log_replay() re-derives the record length directly from the same raw, still-unclamped client_data_len field and uses it to size the restart-table blob: rec_len = le32_to_cpu(frh->client_data_len); /* ~0xffffffff */ ... t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->redo_off); rt = Add2Ptr(lrh, t16); t32 = rec_len - t16; /* still ~4 GiB */ if (!check_rstbl(rt, t32)) return -EINVAL; check_rstbl()'s own `bytes < ts` bounds guard is defeated because the caller-supplied `bytes` (t32) is itself the poisoned ~4 GiB value, so the guard can never trigger. The subsequent entry-validation loop then walks `rt->used` (also attacker-controlled) entries of sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE) == 0x18 bytes each straight past the end of the kmalloc(log->page_size) log-page buffer allocated in read_log_page(), producing an out-of-bounds read that is reachable simply by mounting a crafted $LogFile (no genuine dirty-page / crash-recovery state is required). Confirmed via KASAN as a slab-out-of-bounds read in check_rstbl(), called from log_replay() -> ntfs_loadlog_and_replay() -> ntfs_fill_super() -> mount(2). Fix the root cause instead of hardening every downstream consumer of the poisoned length: make the addition in find_log_rec() overflow-safe with check_add_overflow(), mirroring the pattern fs/ntfs3/run.c already uses to validate other attacker-controlled on-disk length/offset arithmetic decoded from MAPPING_PAIRS runs, e.g.: if (check_add_overflow(vcn64, len, &next_vcn)) return -EINVAL; ... if (check_add_overflow(lcn, len, &lcn_end)) return -EINVAL; (fs/ntfs3/run.c, run_unpack()). With the overflow rejected instead of silently wrapped, `rec_len` is only ever a true, non-wrapped sum, so the existing `rec_len >= log->total_avail` check now correctly rejects any oversized record up front. log_replay()'s transaction-table leg then never gets a chance to re-read the poisoned client_data_len, and check_rstbl() is never invoked with an attacker-inflated `bytes` for this path. Verified on a v6.19 KASAN build: mounting a crafted $LogFile whose client_data_len overflows trips a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds-read report in check_rstbl() before this fix; with check_add_overflow() applied, the same image is cleanly rejected during log replay and no KASAN report fires. Fixes: b46acd6a6a62 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07 Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c index cd40a4ddc53d7..7c26fc591e2fa 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -2455,7 +2456,8 @@ static int find_log_rec(struct ntfs_log *log, u64 lsn, struct lcb *lcb) * Check that the length field isn't greater than the total * available space the log file. */ - rec_len = len + log->record_header_len; + if (check_add_overflow(len, log->record_header_len, &rec_len)) + return -EINVAL; if (rec_len >= log->total_avail) return -EINVAL; -- 2.53.0