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From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Myron Stowe <mstowe@redhat.com>,
	Myron Stowe <myron.stowe@redhat.com>,
	kay@vrfy.org, linux-hotplug@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, yuxiangl@marvell.com,
	yxlraid@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] udevadm-info: Don't access sysfs 'resource<N>' files
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2013 22:11:22 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1363493482.16793.69.camel@ul30vt.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130317010317.GB9641@kroah.com>

On Sat, 2013-03-16 at 18:03 -0700, Greg KH wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 05:50:53PM -0600, Myron Stowe wrote:
> > On Sat, 2013-03-16 at 15:11 -0700, Greg KH wrote:
> > > On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 03:35:19PM -0600, Myron Stowe wrote:
> > > > Sysfs includes entries to memory that backs a PCI device's BARs, both I/O
> > > > Port space and MMIO.  This memory regions correspond to the device's
> > > > internal status and control registers used to drive the device.
> > > > 
> > > > Accessing these registers from userspace such as "udevadm info
> > > > --attribute-walk --path=/sys/devices/..." does can not be allowed as
> > > > such accesses outside of the driver, even just reading, can yield
> > > > catastrophic consequences.
> > > > 
> > > > Udevadm-info skips parsing a specific set of sysfs entries including
> > > > 'resource'.  This patch extends the set to include the additional
> > > > 'resource<N>' entries that correspond to a PCI device's BARs.
> > > 
> > > Nice, are you also going to patch bash to prevent a user from reading
> > > these sysfs files as well?  :)
> > > 
> > > And pciutils?
> > > 
> > > You get my point here, right?  The root user just asked to read all of
> > > the data for this device, so why wouldn't you allow it?  Just like
> > > 'lspci' does.  Or bash does.
> > 
> > Yes :P , you raise a very good point, there are a lot of way a user can
> > poke around in those BARs.  However, there is a difference between
> > shooting yourself in the foot and getting what you deserve versus
> > unknowingly executing a common command such as udevadm and having the
> > system hang.
> > > 
> > > If this hardware has a problem, then it needs to be fixed in the kernel,
> > > not have random band-aids added to various userspace programs to paper
> > > over the root problem here.  Please fix the kernel driver and all should
> > > be fine.  No need to change udevadm.
> > 
> > Xiangliang initially proposed a patch within the PCI core.  Ignoring the
> > specific issue with the proposal which I pointed out in the
> > https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/7/242 thread, that just doesn't seem like
> > the right place to effect a change either as PCI's core isn't concerned
> > with the contents or access limitations of those regions, those are
> > issues that the driver concerns itself with.
> > 
> > So things seem to be gravitating towards the driver.  I'm fairly
> > ignorant of this area but as Robert succinctly pointed out in the
> > originating thread - the AHCI driver only uses the device's MMIO region.
> > The I/O related regions are for legacy SFF-compatible ATA ports and are
> > not used to driver the device.  This, coupled with the observance that
> > userspace accesses such as udevadm, and others like you additionally
> > point out, do not filter through the device's driver for seems to
> > suggest that changes to the driver will not help here either.
> 
> A PCI quirk should handle this properly, right?  Why not do that?  Worse
> thing, the quirk could just not expose these sysfs files for this
> device, which would solve all userspace program issues, right?

Not exactly.  I/O port access through pci-sysfs was added for userspace
programs, specifically qemu-kvm device assignment.  We use the I/O port
resource# files to access device owned I/O port registers using file
permissions rather than global permissions such as iopl/ioperm.  File
permissions also prevent random users from accessing device registers
through these files, but of course can't stop a privileged app that
chooses to ignore the purpose of these files.  A quirk would therefore
remove a file that actually has a useful purpose for one app just so
another app that has no particular reason for dumping the contents can
run unabated.  Thanks,

Alex


  reply	other threads:[~2013-03-17  4:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-03-16 21:35 [PATCH] udevadm-info: Don't access sysfs entries backing device I/O port space Myron Stowe
2013-03-16 21:35 ` [PATCH] udevadm-info: Don't access sysfs 'resource<N>' files Myron Stowe
2013-03-16 22:11   ` Greg KH
2013-03-16 22:55     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2013-03-16 23:50     ` Myron Stowe
2013-03-17  1:03       ` Greg KH
2013-03-17  4:11         ` Alex Williamson [this message]
2013-03-17  5:36           ` Greg KH
2013-03-17 13:38             ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-17 14:00               ` Kay Sievers
2013-03-17 14:20                 ` Myron Stowe
2013-03-17 14:29                   ` Kay Sievers
2013-03-17 14:36                     ` Myron Stowe
2013-03-17 14:43                       ` Kay Sievers
2013-03-18 16:24                 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-18 16:41                   ` Greg KH
2013-03-18 16:51                     ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-18 17:20                       ` Bjørn Mork
2013-03-18 17:54                         ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-18 18:02                           ` Robert Brown
2013-03-18 18:25                           ` Bjørn Mork
2013-03-18 18:59                             ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-19 16:57                               ` Myron Stowe
2013-03-19 17:06                                 ` Myron Stowe
2013-03-17 14:33               ` Myron Stowe
2013-03-17 22:28                 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-18 14:50                   ` Don Dutile
2013-03-18 16:34                     ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-17 14:12         ` Myron Stowe
2013-03-19  1:54         ` Robert Hancock
2013-03-19  2:03           ` Greg KH
2013-03-19  2:09             ` Robert Hancock
2013-03-19  2:35               ` Greg KH
2013-03-19  3:08                 ` Robert Hancock

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