From: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@debian.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 08:18:32 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1363677512.30246.8.camel@scapa> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1363642353-30749-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 789 bytes --]
On lun., 2013-03-18 at 17:32 -0400, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> This patch introduces CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL. Holding this capability
> indicates that a process is empowered to perform tasks that may result
> in
> modification of the running kernel. While aimed at handling the
> specific
> use-case of Secure Boot, it is generalisable to any other environment
> where
> permitting userspace to modify the kernel is undesirable.
About that, did someone looked at the way securelevel(7) is handled on
OpenBSD? This is more or less the same thing, where there's a desire to
distinguish uid 0 from ring0. They're not using a capability but more a
global state which allows more or less stuff depending on the value
(securelevel=-1 to securelevel=2).
Regards,
--
Yves-Alexis
[-- Attachment #2: This is a digitally signed message part --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 490 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-03-19 7:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-03-18 21:32 [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 02/12] SELinux: define mapping for CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 03/12] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 04/12] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 05/12] PCI: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for PCI BAR access Matthew Garrett
2013-03-27 15:03 ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-27 15:08 ` Kyle McMartin
2013-03-28 12:46 ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 06/12] x86: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for IO port access Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:00 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 07/12] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 08/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 09/12] Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for /dev/mem and /dev/kmem access Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 10/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2013-03-19 8:47 ` Dave Young
2013-03-19 11:19 ` Josh Boyer
2013-03-19 17:07 ` [PATCH v2] " Josh Boyer
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 11/12] x86: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for MSR writing Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` [PATCH 12/12] kexec: Require CAP_SYS_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-19 4:47 ` [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL James Morris
2013-03-20 1:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 16:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 16:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 18:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 21:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-21 13:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:04 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 16:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 17:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 1:58 ` James Morris
2013-03-19 7:18 ` Yves-Alexis Perez [this message]
2013-03-20 1:02 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:05 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 13:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 15:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 15:14 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2013-03-20 1:07 Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:11 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:09 Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:28 Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 2:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:18 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-20 3:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:27 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-21 16:32 Matthew Garrett
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1363677512.30246.8.camel@scapa \
--to=corsac@debian.org \
--cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).