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From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] sysfs: Introduce a mechanism to hide static attribute_groups
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 09:57:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024021910-paced-hazing-9c7a@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <65b9285a93e42_5cc6f294ac@dwillia2-mobl3.amr.corp.intel.com.notmuch>

On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 08:48:26AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> Greg KH wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 01:24:08AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > Add a mechanism for named attribute_groups to hide their directory at
> > > sysfs_update_group() time, or otherwise skip emitting the group
> > > directory when the group is first registered. It piggybacks on
> > > is_visible() in a similar manner as SYSFS_PREALLOC, i.e. special flags
> > > in the upper bits of the returned mode. To use it, specify a symbol
> > > prefix to DEFINE_SYSFS_GROUP_VISIBLE(), and then pass that same prefix
> > > to SYSFS_GROUP_VISIBLE() when assigning the @is_visible() callback:
> > > 
> > > 	DEFINE_SYSFS_GROUP_VISIBLE($prefix)
> > > 
> > > 	struct attribute_group $prefix_group = {
> > > 		.name = $name,
> > > 		.is_visible = SYSFS_GROUP_VISIBLE($prefix),
> > > 	};
> > > 
> > > SYSFS_GROUP_VISIBLE() expects a definition of $prefix_group_visible()
> > > and $prefix_attr_visible(), where $prefix_group_visible() just returns
> > > true / false and $prefix_attr_visible() behaves as normal.
> > > 
> > > The motivation for this capability is to centralize PCI device
> > > authentication in the PCI core with a named sysfs group while keeping
> > > that group hidden for devices and platforms that do not meet the
> > > requirements. In a PCI topology, most devices will not support
> > > authentication, a small subset will support just PCI CMA (Component
> > > Measurement and Authentication), a smaller subset will support PCI CMA +
> > > PCIe IDE (Link Integrity and Encryption), and only next generation
> > > server hosts will start to include a platform TSM (TEE Security
> > > Manager).
> > > 
> > > Without this capability the alternatives are:
> > > 
> > > * Check if all attributes are invisible and if so, hide the directory.
> > >   Beyond trouble getting this to work [1], this is an ABI change for
> > >   scenarios if userspace happens to depend on group visibility absent any
> > >   attributes. I.e. this new capability avoids regression since it does
> > >   not retroactively apply to existing cases.
> > > 
> > > * Publish an empty /sys/bus/pci/devices/$pdev/tsm/ directory for all PCI
> > >   devices (i.e. for the case when TSM platform support is present, but
> > >   device support is absent). Unfortunate that this will be a vestigial
> > >   empty directory in the vast majority of cases.
> > > 
> > > * Reintroduce usage of runtime calls to sysfs_{create,remove}_group()
> > >   in the PCI core. Bjorn has already indicated that he does not want to
> > >   see any growth of pci_sysfs_init() [2].
> > > 
> > > * Drop the named group and simulate a directory by prefixing all
> > >   TSM-related attributes with "tsm_". Unfortunate to not use the naming
> > >   capability of a sysfs group as intended.
> > > 
> > > In comparison, there is a small potential for regression if for some
> > > reason an @is_visible() callback had dependencies on how many times it
> > > was called. Additionally, it is no longer an error to update a group
> > > that does not have its directory already present, and it is no longer a
> > > WARN() to remove a group that was never visible.
> > > 
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/2024012321-envious-procedure-4a58@gregkh/ [1]
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20231019200110.GA1410324@bhelgaas/ [2]
> > > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> > > ---
> > >  fs/sysfs/group.c      |   45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> > >  include/linux/sysfs.h |   63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> > >  2 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
> > 
> > You beat me to this again :)
> 
> Pardon the spam, was just showing it in context of the patchset I was
> developing.
> 
> > I have tested this patch, and it looks good, I'll send out my series
> > that uses it for a different subsystem as well.
> > 
> > I guess I can take this as a static tag for others to pull from for this
> > rc development cycle?
> 
> That works for me. Thanks Greg!

I've applied this to my testing branch right now, and if 0-day passes
everything (it's done so in other branches), I can create a static tag
for everyone to pull from.

thanks,

greg k-h

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-19  8:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-30  9:23 [RFC PATCH 0/5] Towards a shared TSM sysfs-ABI for Confidential Computing Dan Williams
2024-01-30  9:23 ` [RFC PATCH 1/5] PCI/CMA: Prepare to interoperate with TSM authentication Dan Williams
2024-02-08 22:09   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-01-30  9:23 ` [RFC PATCH 2/5] coco/tsm: Establish a new coco/tsm subdirectory Dan Williams
2024-02-09  2:24   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-02-27  1:39     ` Dan Williams
2024-01-30  9:24 ` [RFC PATCH 3/5] coco/tsm: Introduce a shared class device for TSMs Dan Williams
2024-02-16 11:29   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-02-27  1:47     ` Dan Williams
2024-03-07 16:41   ` Jonathan Cameron
2024-03-07 19:33     ` Dan Williams
2024-01-30  9:24 ` [RFC PATCH 4/5] sysfs: Introduce a mechanism to hide static attribute_groups Dan Williams
2024-01-30 16:44   ` Greg KH
2024-01-30 16:48     ` Dan Williams
2024-01-30 17:31       ` Greg KH
2024-02-19  8:57       ` Greg KH [this message]
2024-02-22 13:22       ` Greg KH
2024-01-30  9:24 ` [RFC PATCH 5/5] PCI/TSM: Authenticate devices via platform TSM Dan Williams
2024-02-08 22:13   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-02-09  5:51     ` Dan Williams
2024-02-16 11:29   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-02-27  5:52     ` Dan Williams
2024-02-16 21:38   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-02-27  5:59     ` Dan Williams
2024-02-26 11:37   ` Zhi Wang
2024-02-27  6:34     ` Dan Williams
2024-02-27 19:53       ` Zhi Wang
2024-03-01  0:32         ` Dan Williams
2024-03-07 17:18   ` Jonathan Cameron
2024-03-07 19:51     ` Dan Williams

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