From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Pavol Sakac" <sakacpav@amazon.de>
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/3] iommu: set up the default domain outside iommu_probe_device_lock
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 13:15:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260911131519.9BD6C1F000FF@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911125907.67105-3-sakacpav@amazon.de>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [High] A sysfs linkage failure for one device causes the innocent initiating device to be removed from the IOMMU group and fail its probe.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Concurrent device hot-unplug can trigger a Use-After-Free during `bus_iommu_probe` list traversal.
--
commit bbc77bf7c83c2e939356c6c9d4fe1de6d5066ed7
Author: Pavol Sakac <sakacpav@amazon.de>
Subject: iommu: set up the default domain outside iommu_probe_device_lock
This commit defers the default domain setup in iommu_probe_device() until
after the iommu_probe_device_lock is released. It moves the setup under
group->mutex and uses a group_list for deferred initialization, similar to
bus_iommu_probe(). It also updates error handling and rechecks for default
domain setup to prevent races.
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
> index a5e3327aeacaf..48fe22bbd1bc2 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -735,6 +728,9 @@ int iommu_probe_device(struct device *dev)
> return ret;
>
> mutex_lock(&group->mutex);
> + /* Only the caller that queued the entry may unlink it. */
> + if (!list_empty(&group_list))
> + list_del_init(&group->entry);
> /* iommu_group_link_device() is all-or-nothing. */
> for_each_group_device(group, gdev) {
> if (gdev->linked)
> continue;
> ret = iommu_group_link_device(group, gdev);
> if (ret)
> goto err_remove_device;
> }
[Severity: High]
Does this loop abort the entire group setup and fail the innocent initiating
device if a different device's sysfs linkage fails?
If another device in the group has a sysfs linking failure, this loop will
abort and jump to err_remove_device.
[ ... ]
> @@ -765,8 +775,15 @@ int iommu_probe_device(struct device *dev)
> if (own) {
> list_del(&own->list);
> __iommu_group_free_device(group, own);
> - iommu_deinit_device(dev);
> }
[Severity: High]
Down here in the error handler, it unlinks and frees the innocent initiating
device (own) instead of handling the broken device that failed to link above.
Can this create a permanent cross-device failure state where one broken device
prevents other devices in the same group from probing successfully?
> + /* Members left behind stay attached; give them the DMA ops owed. */
> + if (group->default_domain)
> + for_each_group_device(group, gdev)
> + if (dev_has_iommu(gdev->dev))
> + iommu_setup_dma_ops(gdev->dev,
> + group->default_domain);
> + if (own)
> + iommu_deinit_device(dev);
> mutex_unlock(&group->mutex);
> if (own)
> iommu_group_put(group); /* iommu_init_device()'s reference */
[ ... ]
> @@ -2077,7 +2094,10 @@ static int bus_iommu_probe(const struct bus_type *bus)
> * that the cross-group default domain type and the setup of the
> * IOMMU_RESV_DIRECT will work correctly in non-hotpug scenarios.
> */
> - ret = iommu_setup_default_domain(group, 0);
> + ret = 0;
> + /* A hotplug probe may have finalised this group meanwhile. */
> + if (!group->default_domain)
> + ret = iommu_setup_default_domain(group, 0);
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can concurrent device hot-unplug trigger a
use-after-free during the list traversal in bus_iommu_probe()?
Earlier in this function, bus_for_each_dev() populates group_list with
group->entry without incrementing the group's reference count. If the last
device in a group is concurrently hot-unplugged after bus_for_each_dev()
completes but before the group is processed in the list_for_each_entry_safe()
loop above this block, the group's reference count drops to zero and the
group is freed.
The subsequent list_for_each_entry_safe() traversal then reads from the freed
group (e.g., group->entry.next) and attempts to take its mutex.
> if (ret) {
> mutex_unlock(&group->mutex);
> return ret;
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260911-vfopt-s2-v1-0-fff3db7e01c2@amazon.de?part=3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-11 13:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-11 12:58 [RFC PATCH 0/3] iommu: Reduce iommu_probe_device_lock contention Pavol Sakac
2026-09-11 12:58 ` [RFC PATCH 1/3] iommu: split sysfs link publication out of iommu_group_alloc_device() Pavol Sakac
2026-09-11 13:14 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 12:58 ` [RFC PATCH 2/3] iommu: create device sysfs links outside iommu_probe_device_lock Pavol Sakac
2026-09-11 13:13 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-11 12:58 ` [RFC PATCH 3/3] iommu: set up the default domain " Pavol Sakac
2026-09-11 13:15 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-11 17:45 ` [RFC PATCH 0/3] iommu: Reduce iommu_probe_device_lock contention Robin Murphy
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