From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from terminus.zytor.com ([198.137.202.10]:42888 "EHLO mail.zytor.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752561Ab3CTCsf (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:48:35 -0400 Message-ID: <51492379.3090302@zytor.com> Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 19:48:25 -0700 From: "H. Peter Anvin" MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Matthew Garrett CC: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "kexec@lists.infradead.org" , "linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL References: <3pfl8u1ugprwkcs5xmtjth3l.1363742692541@email.android.com> In-Reply-To: <3pfl8u1ugprwkcs5xmtjth3l.1363742692541@email.android.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-pci-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 03/19/2013 06:28 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > Mm. The question is whether we can reliably determine the ranges a device should be able to access without having to trust userspace (and, ideally, without having to worry about whether iommu vendors have done their job). It's pretty important for PCI passthrough, so we do need to care. It is actually very simple: the device should be able to DMA into/out of: 1. pinned pages 2. owned by the process controlling the device ... and nothing else. -hpa -- H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center I work for Intel. I don't speak on their behalf.