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From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
To: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	pratikrajesh.sampat@amd.com, michael.day@amd.com,
	david.kaplan@amd.com, dhaval.giani@amd.com,
	Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
	Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 13/21] KVM: X86: Handle private MMIO as shared
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2024 11:28:56 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <523fc716-51ae-4fb0-9e7c-5d49bbd33e22@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zt7I51r6dqkwkPAz@yilunxu-OptiPlex-7050>



On 9/9/24 20:07, Xu Yilun wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 06, 2024 at 01:31:48PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3/9/24 15:13, Xu Yilun wrote:
>>> On Mon, Sep 02, 2024 at 12:22:56PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 31/8/24 02:57, Xu Yilun wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, Aug 23, 2024 at 11:21:27PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>>>>> Currently private MMIO nested page faults are not expected so when such
>>>>>> fault occurs, KVM tries moving the faulted page from private to shared
>>>>>> which is not going to work as private MMIO is not backed by memfd.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Handle private MMIO as shared: skip page state change and memfd
>>>>>
>>>>> This means host keeps the mapping for private MMIO, which is different
>>>>> from private memory. Not sure if it is expected, and I want to get
>>>>> some directions here.
>>>>
>>>> There is no other translation table on AMD though, the same NPT. The
>>>
>>> Sorry for not being clear, when I say "host mapping" I mean host
>>> userspace mapping (host CR3 mapping). By using guest_memfd, there is no
>>> host CR3 mapping for private memory. I'm wondering if we could keep host
>>> CR3 mapping for private MMIO.
>>>>> security is enforced by the RMP table. A device says "bar#x is
>> private" so
>>>> the host + firmware ensure the each corresponding RMP entry is "assigned" +
>>>> "validated" and has a correct IDE stream ID and ASID, and the VM's kernel
>>>> maps it with the Cbit set.
>>>>
>>>>>    From HW perspective, private MMIO is not intended to be accessed by
>>>>> host, but the consequence may varies. According to TDISP spec 11.2,
>>>>> my understanding is private device (known as TDI) should reject the
>>>>> TLP and transition to TDISP ERROR state. But no further error
>>>>> reporting or logging is mandated. So the impact to the host system
>>>>> is specific to each device. In my test environment, an AER
>>>>> NonFatalErr is reported and nothing more, much better than host
>>>>> accessing private memory.
>>>>
>>>> afair I get an non-fatal RMP fault so the device does not even notice.
>>>>
>>>>> On SW side, my concern is how to deal with mmu_notifier. In theory, if
>>>>> we get pfn from hva we should follow the userspace mapping change. But
>>>>> that makes no sense. Especially for TDX TEE-IO, private MMIO mapping
>>>>> in SEPT cannot be changed or invalidated as long as TDI is running.
>>>>
>>>>> Another concern may be specific for TDX TEE-IO. Allowing both userspace
>>>>> mapping and SEPT mapping may be safe for private MMIO, but on
>>>>> KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2,  KVM cannot actually tell if a userspace
>>>>> addr is really for private MMIO. I.e. user could provide shared memory
>>>>> addr to KVM but declare it is for private MMIO. The shared memory then
>>>>> could be mapped in SEPT and cause problem.
>>>>
>>>> I am missing lots of context here. When you are starting a guest with a
>>>> passed through device, until the TDISP machinery transitions the TDI into
>>>> RUN, this TDI's MMIO is shared and mapped everywhere. And after
>>>
>>> Yes, that's the situation nowadays. I think if we need to eliminate
>>> host CR3 mapping for private MMIO, a simple way is we don't allow host
>>> CR3 mapping at the first place, even for shared pass through. It is
>>> doable cause:
>>>
>>>    1. IIUC, host CR3 mapping for assigned MMIO is only used for pfn
>>>       finding, i.e. host doesn't really (or shouldn't?) access them.
>>
>> Well, the host userspace might also want to access MMIO via mmap'ed region
>> if it is, say, DPDK.
> 
> Yes for DPDK. But I mean for virtualization cases, host doesn't access
> assigned MMIO.
> 
> I'm not suggesting we remove the entire mmap functionality in VFIO, but
> may have a user-optional no-mmap mode for private capable device.
 >
>>
>>>    2. The hint from guest_memfd shows KVM doesn't have to rely on host
>>>       CR3 mapping to find pfn.
>>
>> True.
>>
>>>> transitioning to RUN you move mappings from EPT to SEPT?
>>>
>>> Mostly correct, TDX move mapping from EPT to SEPT after LOCKED and
>>> right before RUN.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> So personally I prefer no host mapping for private MMIO.
>>>>
>>>> Nah, cannot skip this step on AMD. Thanks,
>>>
>>> Not sure if we are on the same page.
>>
>> With the above explanation, we are.
>>
>>> I assume from HW perspective, host
>>> CR3 mapping is not necessary for NPT/RMP build?
>>
>> Yeah, the hw does not require that afaik. But the existing code continues
>> working for AMD, and I am guessing it is still true for your case too,
> 
> It works for TDX with some minor changes similar as this patch does. But
> still see some concerns on my side, E.g. mmu_notifier. Unlike SEV-SNP,
> TDX firmware controls private MMIO accessing by building private S2 page
> table. If I still follow the HVA based page fault routine, then I should
> also follow the mmu_notifier, i.e. change private S2 mapping when HVA
> mapping changes. But private MMIO accessing is part of the private dev
> configuration and enforced (by firmware) not to be changed when TDI is
> RUNning. My effort for this issue is that, don't use HVA based page
> fault routine, switch to do like guest_memfd does.

ah I see, thanks.

> I see SEV-SNP prebuilds RMP to control private MMIO accessing, S2 page
> table modification is allowed at anytime. mmu_notifier only makes
> private access dis-functional. I assume that could also be nice to
> avoid.
> 
>> right? Unless the host userspace tries accessing the private MMIO and some
>> horrible stuff happens? Thanks,
> 
> The common part for all vendors is, the private device will be
> disturbed and enter TDISP ERROR state. I'm not sure if this is OK or can
> also be nice to avoid.

For this instance, on AMD, I expect an RMP fault and no device 
disturbance, no TDISP ERROR. Thanks,


> 
> Thanks,
> Yilun

-- 
Alexey


  reply	other threads:[~2024-09-10  1:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 128+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-23 13:21 [RFC PATCH 00/21] Secure VFIO, TDISP, SEV TIO Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 01/21] tsm-report: Rename module to reflect what it does Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 22:17   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-08-28 13:49   ` Jonathan Cameron
2024-08-30  0:13   ` Dan Williams
2024-09-02  1:29     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 02/21] pci/doe: Define protocol types and make those public Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 22:18   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-08-30  2:15   ` Dan Williams
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 03/21] pci: Define TEE-IO bit in PCIe device capabilities Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 22:19   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-08-28 13:54   ` Jonathan Cameron
2024-08-30  2:21   ` Dan Williams
2024-08-30  4:04     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-30 21:37       ` Dan Williams
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 04/21] PCI/IDE: Define Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE) extended capability Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 22:28   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-08-28 14:24   ` Jonathan Cameron
2024-08-30  2:41   ` Dan Williams
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 05/21] crypto/ccp: Make some SEV helpers public Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-30  2:45   ` Dan Williams
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 06/21] crypto: ccp: Enable SEV-TIO feature in the PSP when supported Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-28 14:32   ` Jonathan Cameron
2024-09-03 21:27   ` Dan Williams
2024-09-05  2:29     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-09-05 17:40       ` Dan Williams
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 07/21] pci/tdisp: Introduce tsm module Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-27 12:32   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-08-28  3:00     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-28 23:42       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-08-29  0:00         ` Dan Williams
2024-08-29  0:09           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-08-29  0:20             ` Dan Williams
2024-08-29 12:03               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-08-29  4:57         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-29 12:07           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-02  0:52             ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-28 15:04   ` Jonathan Cameron
2024-09-02  6:50   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2024-09-02  7:26     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-09-03 23:51   ` Dan Williams
2024-09-04 11:13     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-09-04 23:28       ` Dan Williams
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 08/21] crypto/ccp: Implement SEV TIO firmware interface Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-28 15:39   ` Jonathan Cameron
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 09/21] kvm: Export kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 10/21] vfio: Export helper to get vfio_device from fd Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 11/21] KVM: SEV: Add TIO VMGEXIT and bind TDI Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-29 10:08   ` Xu Yilun
2024-08-30  4:00     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-30  7:02       ` Xu Yilun
2024-09-02  1:24         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-09-13 13:50   ` Zhi Wang
2024-09-13 22:08     ` Dan Williams
2024-09-14  2:47       ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-14  5:19         ` Zhi Wang
2024-09-18 10:45           ` Xu Yilun
2024-09-20  3:41             ` Tian, Kevin
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 12/21] KVM: IOMMUFD: MEMFD: Map private pages Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-26  8:39   ` Tian, Kevin
2024-08-26 12:30     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-08-29  9:34       ` Xu Yilun
2024-08-29 12:15         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-08-30  3:47           ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-30 12:35             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-02  1:09               ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-09-02 23:52                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-03  0:03                   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-09-03  0:37                     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-08-30  5:20           ` Xu Yilun
2024-08-30 12:36             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-03 20:34               ` Dan Williams
2024-09-04  0:02                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-04  0:59                   ` Dan Williams
2024-09-05  8:29                     ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-05 12:02                       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-05 12:07                         ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-05 12:00                     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-05 12:17                       ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-05 12:23                         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-05 20:53                           ` Dan Williams
2024-09-05 23:06                             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-06  2:46                               ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-06 13:54                                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-06  2:41                             ` Tian, Kevin
2024-08-27  2:27     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-27  2:31       ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-15 21:07   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-20 21:10     ` Vishal Annapurve
2024-09-23  5:35       ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-23  6:34         ` Vishal Annapurve
2024-09-23  8:24           ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-23 16:02             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-23 23:52               ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-24 12:07                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-25  8:44                   ` Vishal Annapurve
2024-09-25 15:41                     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-09-23 20:53             ` Vishal Annapurve
2024-09-23 23:55               ` Tian, Kevin
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 13/21] KVM: X86: Handle private MMIO as shared Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-30 16:57   ` Xu Yilun
2024-09-02  2:22     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-09-03  5:13       ` Xu Yilun
2024-09-06  3:31         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-09-09 10:07           ` Xu Yilun
2024-09-10  1:28             ` Alexey Kardashevskiy [this message]
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 14/21] RFC: iommu/iommufd/amd: Add IOMMU_HWPT_TRUSTED flag, tweak DTE's DomainID, IOTLB Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-27 12:17   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 15/21] coco/sev-guest: Allow multiple source files in the driver Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 16/21] coco/sev-guest: Make SEV-to-PSP request helpers public Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 17/21] coco/sev-guest: Implement the guest side of things Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-28 15:54   ` Jonathan Cameron
2024-09-14  7:19   ` Zhi Wang
2024-09-16  1:18     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 18/21] RFC: pci: Add BUS_NOTIFY_PCI_BUS_MASTER event Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 19/21] sev-guest: Stop changing encrypted page state for TDISP devices Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 20/21] pci: Allow encrypted MMIO mapping via sysfs Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-23 22:37   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-09-02  8:22     ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-09-03 21:46       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-08-23 13:21 ` [RFC PATCH 21/21] pci: Define pci_iomap_range_encrypted Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-28 20:43 ` [RFC PATCH 00/21] Secure VFIO, TDISP, SEV TIO Dan Williams
2024-08-29 14:13   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-29 23:41     ` Dan Williams
2024-08-30  4:38       ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2024-08-30 21:57         ` Dan Williams
2024-09-05  8:21     ` Tian, Kevin
2024-09-03 15:56 ` Sean Christopherson

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