From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Yijing Wang <wangyijing@huawei.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>, <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
<xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/3] x86/xen: Introduce a global flag to fix the MSI mask bug
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 16:44:44 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <544FC7FC.9040807@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20141027194501.GI14654@laptop.dumpdata.com>
On 27/10/14 19:45, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:09:42AM +0000, David Vrabel wrote:
>> On 27/10/14 02:44, Yijing Wang wrote:
>>> Commit 0e4ccb1505a9 ("PCI: Add x86_msi.msi_mask_irq() and msix_mask_irq()")
>>> fixed MSI mask bug which may cause kernel crash. But the commit
>>> made MSI code complex. Introduce a new global flag "pci_msi_ignore_mask"
>>> to ignore MSI/MSI-X to fix this issue, it's a cleaner solution.
>>> And the commit 0e4ccb1505a9 will be reverted in the later patch.
>>
>> Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
>>
>> In the sense that it keeps the odd Xen behaviour. But...
>>
>> Konrad, why was this fixed like this in the first place? IMO, it would
>
> As 0e4ccb1505a9 explains:
> PCI: Add x86_msi.msi_mask_irq() and msix_mask_irq()
>
> Certain platforms do not allow writes in the MSI-X BARs to setup or tear
> down vector values. To combat against the generic code trying to write to
> that and either silently being ignored or crashing due to the pagetables
> being marked R/O this patch introduces a platform override.
>
> Note that we keep two separate, non-weak, functions default_mask_msi_irqs()
> and default_mask_msix_irqs() for the behavior of the arch_mask_msi_irqs()
> and arch_mask_msix_irqs(), as the default behavior is needed by x86 PCI
> code.
>
> For Xen, which does not allow the guest to write to MSI-X tables - as the
> hypervisor is solely responsible for setting the vector values - we
> implement two nops.
My question specifically was: could this be fixed by allowing writes to
set/clear the mask bit? If so, why was this not done and could we do
this now?
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-10-28 16:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-10-27 2:44 [PATCH 0/3] xen MSI code clean up Yijing Wang
2014-10-27 2:44 ` [PATCH 1/3] x86/xen: Introduce a global flag to fix the MSI mask bug Yijing Wang
2014-10-27 11:09 ` [Xen-devel] " David Vrabel
2014-10-27 19:45 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-10-28 16:44 ` David Vrabel [this message]
2014-10-28 16:57 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-11-11 0:04 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2014-11-11 1:49 ` Yijing Wang
2014-11-11 15:45 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-11-11 20:24 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2014-11-11 22:04 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-10-27 2:44 ` [PATCH 2/3] x86/xen: Revert "PCI: Add x86_msi.msi_mask_irq() and msix_mask_irq()" Yijing Wang
2014-10-27 11:10 ` David Vrabel
2014-10-27 2:44 ` [PATCH 3/3] s390/MSI: Use __msi_mask_irq() instead of default_msi_mask_irq() Yijing Wang
2014-11-11 21:23 ` [PATCH 0/3] xen MSI code clean up Bjorn Helgaas
2014-11-12 9:24 ` Sebastian Ott
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