From: Wang Haoran <haoranwangsec@gmail.com>
To: acme@kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com, namhyung@kernel.org,
mark.rutland@arm.com, alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com,
linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
haoranwangsec@gmail.com
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] perf/header: reject data offset beyond file size
Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 14:50:13 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <178003741374.62097.136470109571301341@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <178003738371.62097.10360938456907564684@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3413 bytes --]
>From cc2ff328f62f766f74de038347d88ee2dc75f78d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wang Haoran <haoranwangsec@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 15:17:07 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] perf/header: reject data offset beyond file size
A crafted perf.data file can set data.offset to a value larger than
the actual file size. perf then calls mmap() with that file offset,
which succeeds but maps a region entirely past the end of the file.
Any subsequent access to the mapped memory triggers SIGBUS.
Add a fstat() check in perf_file_header__read() that rejects files
whose claimed data.offset exceeds the real file size.
Fixes: <perf_file_header__read>
Signed-off-by: Wang Haoran <haoranwangsec@gmail.com>
---
| 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
--git a/tools/perf/util/header.c b/tools/perf/util/header.c
index e000eb9c1..f1a1831cf 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/header.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/header.c
@@ -4335,6 +4335,15 @@ int perf_file_header__read(struct perf_file_header *header,
return -1;
}
+ {
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == 0 && header->data.offset > (u64)st.st_size) {
+ pr_err("Perf file header corrupt: data offset beyond file size\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
if (header->size != sizeof(*header)) {
/* Support the previous format */
if (header->size == offsetof(typeof(*header), adds_features))
--
2.53.0
---
ASan output on perf 7.0.6 (unpatched) with the attached PoC:
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==55933==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: BUS on unknown address (pc 0x5d35069296b4 bp 0x7fffd2df9100 sp 0x7fffd2df90a0 T0)
==55933==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==55933==Hint: this fault was caused by a dereference of a high value address (see register values below). Disassemble the provided pc to learn which register was used.
#0 0x5d35069296b4 in reader__read_event (perf+0x65e6b4) (BuildId: 25d667fa7a7274046cb5bcb3375c4b1074f3f6db)
#1 0x5d350692a21d in perf_session__process_events (perf+0x65f21d) (BuildId: 25d667fa7a7274046cb5bcb3375c4b1074f3f6db)
#2 0x5d350660ff97 in cmd_sched (perf+0x344f97) (BuildId: 25d667fa7a7274046cb5bcb3375c4b1074f3f6db)
#3 0x5d350664e87f in handle_internal_command (perf+0x38387f) (BuildId: 25d667fa7a7274046cb5bcb3375c4b1074f3f6db)
#4 0x5d35064c1836 in main (perf+0x1f6836) (BuildId: 25d667fa7a7274046cb5bcb3375c4b1074f3f6db)
#5 0x7f111f42a600 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:59
#6 0x7f111f42a717 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
#7 0x5d35064c9754 in _start (perf+0x1fe754) (BuildId: 25d667fa7a7274046cb5bcb3375c4b1074f3f6db)
==55933==Register values:
rax = 0x0000000000000007 rbx = 0x00007b111d54bd90 rcx = 0x0000000000000001 rdx = 0x0000000000000000
rdi = 0x00007b111d54bdd8 rsi = 0x00007ce11e5e0080 rbp = 0x00007fffd2df9100 rsp = 0x00007fffd2df90a0
r8 = 0x0000000000000f68 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x00007ce11e5e0080 r11 = 0x0000000000000246
r12 = 0x00007f111ebb7f68 r13 = 0x00000000000103c8 r14 = 0x00007f111ebb7f6e r15 = 0x00007ce11e5e0080
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: BUS (perf+0x65e6b4) (BuildId: 25d667fa7a7274046cb5bcb3375c4b1074f3f6db) in reader__read_event
==55933==ABORTING
[-- Attachment #2: crash_sig7_iter210.data --]
[-- Type: application/octet-stream, Size: 4760 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-29 6:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-29 6:49 [PATCH 0/6] perf: fix six memory-safety vulnerabilities in sched/header/subcmd Wang Haoran
2026-05-29 6:49 ` [PATCH 1/6] perf/sched: fix memory leaks in schedstat processing Wang Haoran
2026-05-29 6:50 ` [PATCH 2/6] perf/header: validate bitmap size before allocation in do_read_bitmap Wang Haoran
2026-05-29 6:50 ` Wang Haoran [this message]
2026-05-29 6:50 ` [PATCH 4/6] perf/header: add bounds check for domain index in process_cpu_domain_info Wang Haoran
2026-05-29 6:50 ` [PATCH 5/6] perf/sched: replace list_first_entry with list_first_entry_or_null Wang Haoran
2026-05-29 6:50 ` [PATCH 6/6] subcmd: fix memory leak in parse_options_subcommand Wang Haoran
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