From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3AF63C433EF for ; Tue, 14 Sep 2021 20:48:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0EAE260187 for ; Tue, 14 Sep 2021 20:48:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234382AbhINUt0 (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Sep 2021 16:49:26 -0400 Received: from mail-oi1-f176.google.com ([209.85.167.176]:34772 "EHLO mail-oi1-f176.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234189AbhINUtY (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Sep 2021 16:49:24 -0400 Received: by mail-oi1-f176.google.com with SMTP id p2so1069906oif.1; Tue, 14 Sep 2021 13:48:06 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=3HFIhER9emt5uPB1/5TLsC6QTqnojQ3bLGzt38DSqOE=; b=GOoJICCmirfQsJt+G7Xdh0WHe6kUFxAYjaJxSKzdgUh7MGSdIirSbJVCiPDtAv44BY JC5L/iebOu31WIQ3ntWI9Sd7wgZhP/Ve28pfmZ4hH7sjr/EIrVGAsVqNYCfzGv8rgEjN a+HUPhFaVDc6sn5t0/xIdiWnvnnXcsibgH+QZEa/JiRxrl62MTZZeOqBiKY9Jh3EIRPv d1faYID/Uo6VvHla+5LuFDyZlaH2Ze5gRyPwwJdKBX7GBms3zxbruLT1d8zG4pOr/1Rf fJHghnIjB/0XLzthp0RpbnCOsUpbfr7WSRwjPVCdq+8wBVM3xAY2/IEusgtPj05/ENxi dAUg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533tNYDuX1bQdSlW3Wv37LyhAfjkBqPLVSkY1dKxLWP6mR6XljCa 41/PzRhunklUlUww5nOtJGswBxQ9hQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJw2C68YIthLWSsEtCfwOg23qsrjc0FHMu8l/Dk9d2n+jA/SHwVbtfuY3UhvlaCJ4DsMqxYaXw== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:b21:: with SMTP id t1mr2911761oij.165.1631652486221; Tue, 14 Sep 2021 13:48:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from xps15.herring.priv (66-90-148-213.dyn.grandenetworks.net. [66.90.148.213]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id y14sm2883236oti.69.2021.09.14.13.48.05 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 14 Sep 2021 13:48:05 -0700 (PDT) From: Rob Herring To: Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Peter Zijlstra , Ingo Molnar Cc: Catalin Marinas , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Jiri Olsa , Kan Liang , Ian Rogers , Alexander Shishkin , honnappa.nagarahalli@arm.com, Zachary.Leaf@arm.com, Raphael Gault , Jonathan Cameron , Namhyung Kim , Itaru Kitayama , Vince Weaver , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v10 4/5] arm64: perf: Enable PMU counter userspace access for perf event Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 15:47:59 -0500 Message-Id: <20210914204800.3945732-5-robh@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20210914204800.3945732-1-robh@kernel.org> References: <20210914204800.3945732-1-robh@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org Arm PMUs can support direct userspace access of counters which allows for low overhead (i.e. no syscall) self-monitoring of tasks. The same feature exists on x86 called 'rdpmc'. Unlike x86, userspace access will only be enabled for thread bound events. This could be extended if needed, but simplifies the implementation and reduces the chances for any information leaks (which the x86 implementation suffers from). PMU EL0 access will be enabled when an event with userspace access is part of the thread's context. This includes when the event is not scheduled on the PMU. There's some additional overhead clearing dirty counters when access is enabled in order to prevent leaking disabled counter data from other tasks. Unlike x86, enabling of userspace access must be requested with a new attr bit: config1:1. If the user requests userspace access and 64-bit counters, then chaining will be disabled and the user will get the maximum size counter the underlying h/w can support. The modes for config1 are as follows: config1 = 0 : user access disabled and always 32-bit config1 = 1 : user access disabled and always 64-bit (using chaining if needed) config1 = 2 : user access enabled and always 32-bit config1 = 3 : user access enabled and counter size matches underlying counter. Based on work by Raphael Gault , but has been completely re-written. Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rob Herring --- v10: - Don't control enabling user access based on mmap(). Changing the event_(un)mapped to run on the event's cpu doesn't work for x86. Triggering on mmap() doesn't limit access in any way and complicates the implementation. - Drop dirty counter tracking and just clear all unused counters. - Make the sysctl immediately disable access via IPI. - Merge armv8pmu_event_is_chained() and armv8pmu_event_can_chain() v9: - Enabling/disabling of user access is now controlled in .start() and mmap hooks which are now called on CPUs that the event is on. Depends on rework of perf core and x86 RDPMC code posted here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210728230230.1911468-1-robh@kernel.org/ v8: - Rework user access tracking and enabling to be done on task context changes using sched_task() hook. This avoids the need for any IPIs, mm_switch hooks or undef instr handler. - Only support user access when explicitly requested on open and only for a thread bound events. This avoids some of the information leaks x86 has and simplifies the implementation. v7: - Clear disabled counters when user access is enabled for a task to avoid leaking other tasks counter data. - Rework context switch handling utilizing sched_task callback - Add armv8pmu_event_can_chain() helper - Rework config1 flags handling structure - Use ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER define for remapped user cycle counter index v6: - Add new attr.config1 rdpmc bit for userspace to hint it wants userspace access when also requesting 64-bit counters. v5: - Only set cap_user_rdpmc if event is on current cpu - Limit enabling/disabling access to CPUs associated with the PMU (supported_cpus) and with the mm_struct matching current->active_mm. v2: - Move mapped/unmapped into arm64 code. Fixes arm32. - Rebase on cap_user_time_short changes Changes from Raphael's v4: - Drop homogeneous check - Disable access for chained counters - Set pmc_width in user page --- arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c index a8f8dd741aeb..91af3d1c254b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c @@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_events_attr_group = { PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-15"); PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(long, "config1:0"); +PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(rdpmc, "config1:1"); static int sysctl_perf_user_access __read_mostly; @@ -293,9 +294,15 @@ static inline bool armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(struct perf_event *event) return event->attr.config1 & 0x1; } +static inline bool armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(struct perf_event *event) +{ + return event->attr.config1 & 0x2; +} + static struct attribute *armv8_pmuv3_format_attrs[] = { &format_attr_event.attr, &format_attr_long.attr, + &format_attr_rdpmc.attr, NULL, }; @@ -364,7 +371,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group = { */ #define ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER 0 #define ARMV8_IDX_COUNTER0 1 - +#define ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER 32 /* * We unconditionally enable ARMv8.5-PMU long event counter support @@ -379,15 +386,14 @@ static bool armv8pmu_has_long_event(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) /* * We must chain two programmable counters for 64 bit events, * except when we have allocated the 64bit cycle counter (for CPU - * cycles event). This must be called only when the event has - * a counter allocated. + * cycles event) or when user space counter access is enabled. */ static inline bool armv8pmu_event_is_chained(struct perf_event *event) { int idx = event->hw.idx; struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu); - return !WARN_ON(idx < 0) && + return !(event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT) && armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu) && (idx != ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER); @@ -720,6 +726,27 @@ static inline u32 armv8pmu_getreset_flags(void) return value; } +static void armv8pmu_disable_user_access(void) +{ + write_sysreg(0, pmuserenr_el0); +} + +static void armv8pmu_enable_user_access(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) +{ + int i; + struct pmu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->hw_events); + + /* Clear any unused counters to avoid leaking their contents */ + for_each_clear_bit(i, cpuc->used_mask, cpu_pmu->num_events) { + if (i == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) + write_sysreg(0, pmccntr_el0); + else + armv8pmu_write_evcntr(i, 0); + } + + write_sysreg(ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_ER | ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_CR, pmuserenr_el0); +} + static void armv8pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) { /* @@ -763,6 +790,14 @@ static void armv8pmu_disable_event(struct perf_event *event) static void armv8pmu_start(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) { + struct perf_event_context *task_ctx = + this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->pmu.pmu_cpu_context)->task_ctx; + + if (sysctl_perf_user_access && task_ctx && task_ctx->nr_user) + armv8pmu_enable_user_access(cpu_pmu); + else + armv8pmu_disable_user_access(); + /* Enable all counters */ armv8pmu_pmcr_write(armv8pmu_pmcr_read() | ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_E); } @@ -880,13 +915,16 @@ static int armv8pmu_get_event_idx(struct pmu_hw_events *cpuc, if (evtype == ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_CPU_CYCLES) { if (!test_and_set_bit(ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER, cpuc->used_mask)) return ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER; + else if (armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && + armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event) && + !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu)) + return -EAGAIN; } /* * Otherwise use events counters */ - if (armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && - !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu)) + if (armv8pmu_event_is_chained(event)) return armv8pmu_get_chain_idx(cpuc, cpu_pmu); else return armv8pmu_get_single_idx(cpuc, cpu_pmu); @@ -902,6 +940,23 @@ static void armv8pmu_clear_event_idx(struct pmu_hw_events *cpuc, clear_bit(idx - 1, cpuc->used_mask); } +static int armv8pmu_access_event_idx(struct perf_event *event) +{ + if (!sysctl_perf_user_access || + !(event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT)) + return 0; + + /* + * We remap the cycle counter index to 32 to + * match the offset applied to the rest of + * the counter indices. + */ + if (event->hw.idx == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) + return ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER; + + return event->hw.idx; +} + /* * Add an event filter to a given event. */ @@ -995,9 +1050,23 @@ static int __armv8_pmuv3_map_event(struct perf_event *event, &armv8_pmuv3_perf_cache_map, ARMV8_PMU_EVTYPE_EVENT); - if (armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event)) + /* + * At this point, the counter is not assigned. If a 64-bit counter is + * requested, we must make sure the h/w has 64-bit counters if we set + * the event size to 64-bit because chaining is not supported with + * userspace access. This may still fail later on if the CPU cycle + * counter is in use. + */ + if (armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && + (!armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event) || + armv8pmu_has_long_event(armpmu) || (hw_event_id == ARMV8_PMUV3_PERFCTR_CPU_CYCLES))) event->hw.flags |= ARMPMU_EVT_64BIT; + /* Userspace counter access only enabled if requested and a per task event */ + if (sysctl_perf_user_access && armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event) && + (event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_TASK)) + event->hw.flags |= PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT; + /* Only expose micro/arch events supported by this PMU */ if ((hw_event_id > 0) && (hw_event_id < ARMV8_PMUV3_MAX_COMMON_EVENTS) && test_bit(hw_event_id, armpmu->pmceid_bitmap)) { @@ -1106,6 +1175,11 @@ static int armv8pmu_probe_pmu(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) return probe.present ? 0 : -ENODEV; } +static void armv8pmu_disable_user_access_ipi(void *unused) +{ + armv8pmu_disable_user_access(); +} + int armv8pmu_proc_user_access_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -1113,6 +1187,7 @@ int armv8pmu_proc_user_access_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, if (ret || !write || sysctl_perf_user_access) return ret; + on_each_cpu(armv8pmu_disable_user_access_ipi, NULL, 1); return 0; } @@ -1152,6 +1227,8 @@ static int armv8_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu, char *name, cpu_pmu->set_event_filter = armv8pmu_set_event_filter; cpu_pmu->filter_match = armv8pmu_filter_match; + cpu_pmu->pmu.event_idx = armv8pmu_access_event_idx; + cpu_pmu->name = name; cpu_pmu->map_event = map_event; cpu_pmu->attr_groups[ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_EVENTS] = events ? @@ -1328,6 +1405,14 @@ void arch_perf_update_userpage(struct perf_event *event, userpg->cap_user_time = 0; userpg->cap_user_time_zero = 0; userpg->cap_user_time_short = 0; + userpg->cap_user_rdpmc = !!(event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT); + + if (userpg->cap_user_rdpmc) { + if (event->hw.flags & ARMPMU_EVT_64BIT) + userpg->pmc_width = 64; + else + userpg->pmc_width = 32; + } do { rd = sched_clock_read_begin(&seq); -- 2.30.2